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ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS)

OPRFs from Isogenies: Designs and Analysis

Lena Heimberger, Tobias Hennerbichler, Fredrik Meisingseth, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger

Published Jun 28, 2024• 16 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) are an elementary building block in cryptographic and privacy-preserving applications. While there are numerous pre-quantum secure OPRF constructions, it is unclear which of the proposed options for post-quantum secure constructions are practical for modern-day applications. In this work, we focus on isogeny group actions, as the associated low bandwidth leads to efficient constructions. We introduce OPUS, a novel Naor-Reingold-based OPRF from isogenies without oblivious transfer, and show efficient evaluations of the Naor-Reingold PRF using CSIDH and CSI-FiSh. Additionally, we analyze a previous proposal of a CSIDH-based OPRF and that the straightforward instantiation of the protocol leaks the server's private key. As a result, we propose mitigations to address those shortcomings, which require additional hardness assumptions. Our results report a very competitive protocol when combined with lattices for Oblivious Transfer.

DOI
10.1145/3634737.3645010

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Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) are an elementary building block in cryptographic and privacy-preserving applications. While there are numerous pre-quantum secure OPRF constructions, it is unclear which of the proposed options for post-quantum secure constructions are practical for modern-day applications. In this work, we focus on isogeny group actions, as the associated low bandwidth leads to efficient constructions. We introduce OPUS, a novel Naor-Reingold-based OPRF from isogenies without oblivious transfer, and show efficient evaluations of the Naor-Reingold PRF using CSIDH and CSI-FiSh. Additionally, we analyze a previous proposal of a CSIDH-based OPRF and that the straightforward instantiation of the protocol leaks the server's private key. As a result, we propose mitigations to address those shortcomings, which require additional hardness assumptions. Our results report a very competitive protocol when combined with lattices for Oblivious Transfer.
Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) allow a client to evaluate a pseudorandom function (PRF) on her secret input based on a key that is held by a server. In the process, the client only learns the PRF output but not the key, while the server neither learns the input nor the output of the client. The arguably most popular OPRF is due to Naor, Pinkas and Reingold (Eurocrypt 2009). It is based on an Oblivious Exponentiation by the server, with passive security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. In this work, we strengthen the security guarantees of the NPR OPRF by protecting it against active attacks of the server. We have implemented our solution and report on the performance. Our main result is a new batch OPRF protocol which is secure against maliciously corrupted servers, but is essentially as efficient as the semi-honest solution. More precisely, the computation (and communication) overhead is a multiplicative factor o ( 1 ) as the batch size increases. The obvious solution using zero-knowledge proofs would have a constant factor overhead at best, which can be too expensive for certain deployments. Our protocol relies on a novel version of the DDH problem, which we call the Oblivious Exponentiation Problem (OEP), and we give evidence for its hardness in the Generic Group model. We also present a variant of our maliciously secure protocol that does not rely on the OEP but nevertheless only has overhead o ( 1 ) over the known semi-honest protocol. Moreover, we show that our techniques can also be used to efficiently protect threshold blind BLS signing and threshold ElGamal decryption against malicious attackers.
Abstract We present a highly efficient post-quantum Randomized Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) construction based on a novel TFHE key transformation technique. Unlike prior lattice-based OPRF schemes that rely on complex homomorphic PRF evaluation, our approach leverages the algebraic structure of TFHE to enable direct ciphertext transformation, resulting in significant performance improvements. Our protocol achieves strong security under the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption and provides session unlinkability, making it well-suited for privacy-preserving applications. We demonstrate the practical efficiency of our construction with a Rust implementation, achieving substantial speedups over existing schemes. Furthermore, we show how our Randomized OPRF can be adapted for use in the OPAQUE password-authenticated key exchange protocol by employing a singularization technique to ensure deterministic outputs when required. This work highlights a new, practical path for post-quantum OPRFs with strong privacy and efficiency guarantees.
Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) and Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) are essential cryptographic primitives in privacy-preserving applications such as anonymous authentication, private set intersection (PSI), and decentralized identity. Existing constructions, however, rely on number-theoretic assumptions that are vulnerable to quantum attacks. This PhD research project focuses on constructing efficient and practical VRFs and OPRFs from lattice-based assumptions to ensure post-quantum security. A key obstacle in these constructions is the overhead of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), particularly range proofs, which are costly in terms of size and prover complexity. To address this, we investigate probabilistic techniques that relax exact correctness. In particular, we explore approximate range proofs and algebraic transformations, such as using automorphisms in polynomial rings to simulate inner product arguments via polynomial multiplication. These methods enable more efficient and scalable lattice-based constructions of VRFs, including group and context-bound variants, as well as OPRFs. The goal is to make these primitives practical for deployment in post-quantum privacy-preserving systems.
We propose plausible post-quantum (PQ) oblivious pseudorandom functions (OPRFs) based on the Power-Residue PRF (Damgård CRYPTO'88), a generalization of the Legendre PRF. For security parameterλ\lambdaλ, we consider the PRF Goldk(x)k(x)k(x)that maps an integerxxxmodulo a public primep=2λ⋅g+1p=2^{\lambda}\cdot g+1p=2λ⋅g+1to the element(k+x)gmod p(k+x)^{g}\text{mod}\ p(k+x)gmod p, wheregggis public andlog⁡g≈2λ\log g\approx 2\lambdalogg≈2λ. At the core of our constructions are efficient novel methods for evaluating Gold within two-party computation (2PC-Gold), achieving different security requirements. Here, the serverPs\mathcal{P}_{s}Ps​holds the PRF keykkkwhereas the clientPc\mathcal{P}_{c}Pc​holds the PRF inputxxx, and they jointly evaluate Gold in2PC2\mathbf{PC}2PC. 2 PC-Gold uses standard Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation (VOLE) correlations and is information-theoretic and constant-round in the (V)OLE-hybrid model. We show: •For a semi-honestPs\mathcal{P}_{s}Ps​and a maliciousPc\mathcal{P}_{c}Pc​: a 2PC-Gold that just uses a single (V)OLE correlation, and has a communication complexity of 3 field elements (2 field elements if we only require a uniformly sampled key) and a computational complexity ofO(λ)\mathcal{O}(\lambda)O(λ)field operations. We refer to this as half-malicious security. •For maliciousPs\mathcal{P}_{s}Ps​andPc\mathcal{P}_{c}Pc​: a 2PC-Gold that just usesλ4+O(1)\frac{\lambda}{4}+\mathcal{O}(1)4λ​+O(1)VOLE correlations, and has a communication complexity ofλ4+O(1)\frac{\lambda}{4}+\mathcal{O}(1)4λ​+O(1)field elements and a computational complexity ofO(λ)\mathcal{O}(\lambda)O(λ)field operations. These constructions support additional features and extensions, e.g., batched evaluations with better amortized costs wherePc\mathcal{P}_{c}Pc​repeatedly evaluates the PRF under the same key. Furthermore, we extend 2PC-Gold to Verifiable OPRFs and use the methodology from Beullens et al. (Eurocrypt'25) to get strong OPRF security in the universally composable setting. All the protocols are efficient in practice. We implemented 2PC-Gold-with (PQ) VOLEs-and benchmarked them. For example, our half-malicious (resp. malicious) n-batched PQ OPRFs incur about 100B (resp. 1.9KB) of amortized communication forλ=128\lambda=128λ=128.
Advances in quantum computing have heightened concerns about information security in the post-quantum era. While traditional cryptographic schemes rooted in number- theoretic assumptions (e.g., integer factorization, elliptic curve discrete logarithm, and discrete logarithm problems) remain foundational to modern security infrastructures, their vulnerabilities in quantum computing environments have become apparent. To address this, researchers have shifted focus toward quantum-resistant mathematical problems. Among these, isogeny-based cryptography has emerged as a strong candi- date within the five primary post-quantum cryptographic approaches, garnering sig- nificant academic interest. Recent progress in isogeny-based cryptographic schemes includes SIDH (though recent cryptanalysis by Castryck and Decru has compromised its security), CSIDH, and SQISign. Despite progress, the inherent structural characteristics of isogenies impose limitations on design flexibility compared to other post-quantum alternatives. The goal of the thesis is to develop isogeny-based cryptographic protocols with ad- vanced functionalities. We develop isogeny-based blind signatures based on techniques from CSIDH, CSI-FiSh, and other works. We also develop ring signature schemes us- ing SQISign. Finally, we develop a verifiable encryption scheme (based on CSIDH) and bit commitment scheme (based on the Charles–Goren–Lauter isogeny-based hash function). For both schemes, we give ways to prove to a verifier that the encrypted/ committed bits satisfy a given Boolean equation.
Our modern world is dependent on online communications and transactions. To ensure privacy in these digital actions, it is extremely common to use protocols such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme. Unfortunately, these systems have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks from a quantum adversary. This means that an overhaul of the field of cryptography is needed in order to anticipate and mitigate this threat.Over the past years, the community has begun to answer this call by proposing and analyzing new techniques that are conjectured to be quantum safe. One such example is the study of cryptographic group actions. These mappings mimic some of the structure from the Diffie-Hellman protocol,but abstract it enough so that new mathematical operations can be employed that avoid quantum attacks. Currently, the main examples of group actions come from isogenies, codes, and lattices.In order for a protocol to be used in the real-world we would hope for it to be secure, fast, and requiring little storage. This means that in these early stages of research and development of cryptographic group actions, it is essential to begin to answer some of the questions surrounding security and efficiency. This thesis contributes to this effort by focusing on these aspects across different group actions that have been proposed for use in the literature.It is certainly true that each individual group action needs its own study of security. When designers are trying to achieve some advanced functionalities in a protocol, they may sometimes alter the underlying security assumptions.Each time this is done, the new assumptions need their own careful study as well. In this thesis we consider four different variants of group action security assumptions spanning the isogeny, tensor, linear code, and matrix code group actions. We analyze their security by either offering concrete attacks or giving a polynomial time reduction to a more well-studied assumption. This helps to indicate whether a problem is appropriate for use in cryptography, and what parameters to use if so.In addition to security, this thesis is also inscribed in the effort to study the efficiency of group actions by including three works studying the isogeny group action and related subroutines. They span the core isogeny problem for oriented elliptic curves, evaluating isogenies from a kernel generator, and supersingularity testing. With an effort from the community to improve overall runtimes, we can hope to get closer to reasonable speeds for real-life use.By studying the security and efficiency of cryptographic group actions, this thesis shines light on group actions as a promising framework for post-quantum cryptographic solutions.