The development of quantum computers, which could potentially implement Shor’s algorithm and thereby pose a threat to classical encryption, has created the need for establishing ultra-secure communication systems. One solution is quantum key distribution (QKD), a method based on the principles of quantum mechanics that enables sharing an encryption key in a way that is fundamentally resilient to computational attacks, quantum or classical. QKD used together with a one-time-pad symmetric cryptography algorithm thus provides information-theoretically secure communication. In addition, QKD enables the detection of any eavesdropping attempt on communications lines. While classical optical communication systems allow signal amplification, the no-cloning theorem from the foundations of quantum mechanics prohibits the cloning of unknown states. This nogo theorem results in the practical limitation of quantum key distribution via optical fibers, prompting the need for free-space solutions. In this work, we present the proposed design of the first Optical Ground Station connected to the terrestrial Croatian Quantum Communication Infrastructure through a QKD node. The station’s function involves receiving prepare-and-measure photons from the low Earth orbit satellite and quantum key generation through the decoy-state BB84 protocol. By utilizing the satellite as a trusted node, this process ensures ultra-secure communication between two optical ground stations.
The development of quantum computers, which could potentially implement Shor’s algorithm and thereby pose a threat to classical encryption, has created the need for establishing ultra-secure communication systems. One solution is quantum key distribution (QKD), a method based on the principles of quantum mechanics that enables sharing an encryption key in a way that is fundamentally resilient to computational attacks, quantum or classical. QKD used together with a one-time-pad symmetric cryptography algorithm thus provides information-theoretically secure communication. In addition, QKD enables the detection of any eavesdropping attempt on communications lines. While classical optical communication systems allow signal amplification, the no-cloning theorem from the foundations of quantum mechanics prohibits the cloning of unknown states. This nogo theorem results in the practical limitation of quantum key distribution via optical fibers, prompting the need for free-space solutions. In this work, we present the proposed design of the first Optical Ground Station connected to the terrestrial Croatian Quantum Communication Infrastructure through a QKD node. The station’s function involves receiving prepare-and-measure photons from the low Earth orbit satellite and quantum key generation through the decoy-state BB84 protocol. By utilizing the satellite as a trusted node, this process ensures ultra-secure communication between two optical ground stations.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a promising method to guarantee future-proof, information theoretic security. Since optical fibers have an exponential loss with distance, satellite-based QKD solutions are being developed in order to realize long-distance links. Therefore, Optical Ground Stations for QKD (QKD-OGS) need to be designed to enable quantum communication with satellites. Different link configurations will result in different integration options of the QKD-OGS in the terrestrial fiber network and therefore impact its performance. Applicable integration options must be identified and trade-off analysis conducted at the architecture, system and sub-system level. The reference scenario is a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) downlink configuration employing a decoy-state BB84 protocol with polarization encoded qubits at 1550 nm wavelength. The satellite acts as trusted node for implementation of the key distribution between two parties on ground. Furthermore, only direct connections from the satellite to the end-users are considered, i.e. the QKD-OGS does not serve as a trusted-node relay. This results in the selection of three main integration concepts: first, a free-space, end-user QKD-OGS which is located directly at the end-user where the quantum signal is measured directly behind the receiver telescope in free-space; second, a fiber-coupled, end-user QKD-OGS where the quantum signal is coupled into a single-mode fiber and guided to a co-located server room hosting the QKD Receiver system; third, a fiber-coupled, provider QKD-OGS, which reaches several end-users by using a local fiber network. In order to evaluate these three concepts, the comparison parameter is defined to be an estimated factor of suppliable end-users. The estimated comparison factor shows that the fiber-coupled, enduser QKD-OGS can supply 6.7 times more end users than the free-space, end-user QKD-OGS. The fiber-coupled, end-user QKD-OGS can supply 129.7 times more end-users than the free-space, end-user QKD-OGS.
The European efforts to establish a quantum-safe communication infrastructure have motivated the development of advanced optical ground stations (OGS) capable of supporting satellite quantum key distribution (QKD). Building on the previously proposed concept of the first Croatian optical ground station for quantum communications in Zagreb (OGSZG), this work presents an updated system design. The OGSZG comprises a Ritchey–Chrétien telescope with a Coudé path optimized for C-band operation, a motorized dome and telescope mount designed to track low-Earth-orbit satellites, and a dedicated Coudé laboratory with a QKD node. The station integrates wide and narrow field-of-view cameras as part of the pointing, acquisition, and tracking (PAT) system, together with a tip-tilt compensation unit to correct beam wander induced by atmospheric turbulence and pointing jitter. The design has been developed with future upgrades in mind, including adaptive optics, a classical laser communication terminal, and the Eagle-1-compatible quantum receiver required for a fully functional quantum communication ground segment.
With the rapid advancement of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, ensuring the security of satellite-to-ground communication has become a critical concern. Traditional cryptographic techniques, while effective against classical attacks, face increasing threats from quantum computing. This paper proposes a quantum key secure transmission method tailored for LEO satellite-ground communication scenarios. The method integrates quantum key distribution (QKD) with dynamic channel estimation and orbital mobility prediction to support secure and low-latency key handshakes between satellites and ground stations. A hybrid encryption strategy is introduced, where QKD-generated keys are used to refresh symmetric session keys in real time, significantly enhancing resistance to eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method ensures stable key distribution under Doppler-shifted and intermittent link conditions, achieving improved secrecy capacity and resilience against quantum-level adversaries. This work provides a viable and scalable quantum-safe communication solution for future secure satellite networks.
As quantum computing threatens to compromise classical cryptographic systems, the need for future-proof, information-theoretically secure methods of communication has become critical. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to enable the secure generation and exchange of encryption keys, immune to computational attacks. This paper investigates the integration of QKD into telecom infrastructures to enable ultra-secure communication. We examine the performance of key QKD protocols, such as BB84 and E91, over fiber-optic and free-space channels, and simulate their deployment within realistic metropolitan network topologies. Results show that secure key rates of up to 10 kbps can be maintained over 50–80 km fiber links with Quantum Bit Error Rates (QBER) below 5%. The study also explores architecture models based on trusted relay nodes and WDM coexistence, highlighting practical deployment considerations. Our findings suggest that QKD is a viable enhancement for telecom security and a necessary foundation for long-term quantum-resilient communication systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can in principle offer unconditional security by making use of the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. In practice, this is typically achieved by preparing individual photons in quantum superposition states and sending them to a remote receiver. To date, most commercially available QKD systems rely on the transmission of the photons via optical fibers, which, due to channel loss and detector noise, limits the distance over which QKD is feasible to a few hundred kilometers. Alternatively, satellite-based QKD facilitates low photon loss and negligible signal disturbance and offers a viable solution for establishing a global scale quantum network. Recently, a quantum science mission of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in collaboration with the Austrian Academy of Sciences (AAS) and the University of Vienna aimed at a satellite-based intercontinental quantum-key relay. Using the Chinese Quantum Science Satellite “Micius” as a trusted relay, a quantum network consisting of three optical ground stations located in China (Xinglong, Nanshan) and Austria (Graz-Lustbühel) has been demonstrated successfully. Here we report on the development of a quantum receiving module, installed at the Satellite Laser Ranging Station in Graz (Austria) capable of implementing the so-called decoy-state QKD protocol in a downlink scenario from the LEO satellite “Micius”. Furthermore, we will present the experimental results obtained during several downlinks from the Chinese satellite focusing on the performance of the Austrian receiving station.
Information security is a growing concern in our modern world, where almost everything can be done online. To protect security, classical encryption protocols, such as RSA, are used. These encryption protocols are almost always based on mathematical problems that are computational difficult. Therefore, the security is only valid under limited computational resources, and therefore do not provide provable security. An exception is the one-time pad protocol, which is provably secure but requires an existing shared key that is as long as the information it must encrypt. The exchange of such a key can be challenging, often requiring the two partied to physically meet to exchange the key or the use a trusted courier to physically carry the key on a hard drive. \n \nQuantum key distribution (QKD) offers a solution by utilizing quantum mechanics to grow a secure cryptographic key shared between two distant parties. The quantum nature of the particles used in the exchange ensure that any eavesdropper would leave signs of their presence, allowing the users to precisely quantify the security of the key that is produced. This allows secure generation of a random key which can be used for the one-time pad encryption protocol which, unlike most encryption protocols, does not rely on computational assumptions, and is secure regardless of available computational power. \n \nCurrent implementations of QKD are limited to a single link distance of ≈200 km, preventing implementation of QKD on a global scale, or even between distant cities within a single country, without some additional techniques. One promising solution is the use of orbiting low Earth orbit satellite platforms as trusted nodes in a quantum communications network. The main purpose of this work has been to show the viability of this solution, trough theoretical performance modeling and experimental demonstrations. \n \nThorough numerical simulations have been developed to evaluate the performance and challenges in implementing QKD using a low Earth orbit satellite platform and determine an optimal approach to its implementation. The simulations include a realistic satellite orbit analysis, all expected loss mechanisms, estimates of background contributions and realistic simulation of quantum optical processes. This work addresses the questions of optimal wavelength and beam waist, the effect of the telescope design and pointing error, and the impact of detector degradation due to exposure to radiation in the space environment. The simulation is used to determine the length of secure key for QKD and the performance of fundamental quantum optics experiments such as Bell tests and quantum teleportation. We compare the advantages and disadvantages of uplink and dowlink scenarios, and show that an uplink, despite having reduced performance compared to a downlink, offers more scientific freedom, by allowing changes to the quantum source, and benefits from a simpler satellite design with reduced pointing requirement. This work provides a theoretical foundation for ongoing design and development of quantum systems for satellite implementation of QKD. \n \nIn addition to theoretical analyses, experiments where developed and conducted corresponding to the challenges likely to be faced by a satellite uplink. Two main challenges where identified and experimentally overcome. First, the difficulty of operating in the high loss regime of a satellite uplink, which typically experience losses in the range of 40-50 dB when above 40° of elevation from the horizon, an elevation only reached by half of the satellite passes. This challenge was addressed by demonstrating full QKD protocols at losses exceeding 50 dB. Also, the ability to perform full QKD during the short duration of a satellite pass was shown by replicating the varying loss of archetypal passes and successfully extracting secure keys. Secondly, the difficulty of accurately tracking and pointing to a receiver platform traveling at the high angular speed of a satellite was overcome by successfully exchange quantum signals to a truck traveling at angular speeds exceeding that of a low Earth orbit satellite. This required the design, construction, and implementation of a transmitter system and a quantum receiver system capable of active pointing using a custom pointing system. \n \nAn additional experiment was also performed where we experimentally investigate the feasibility of performing QKD using light scattered by a diffusive screen. A system capable of doing so could be used to create QKD hot-spots, where a QKD source could be aimed at a diffusive screen to allow multiple users to simultaneously exchange secure keys with the source without the need for high precision pointing. \n \nThrough these analyses and experimental demonstrations we evaluated the performance of QKD using a satellite and have shown its technological readiness to be implemented. Implementation of such a system would allow QKD to be performed on a global scale, enabling communications security that is not based on computational assumptions without the need to physically transport the key from one party to the other.