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Quantum Information Processing

Breaking permutation-based pseudorandom cryptographic schemes using distributed exact quantum algorithms

Ping Zhang, Yiyuan Luo

Published Jun 14, 2024• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11128-024-04424-8

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Pseudorandom permutations are ubiquitous in theoretical and applied cryptography. PRPs that offer security even against adversaries making quantum queries are of increasing interest, and used in applications ranging from constructing pseudorandom unitaries to separating SZK from BQP. A successful framework for constructing classically-secure PRPs is the key-alternating Even-Mansour approach, which interleaves applications of public permutations with additions of round keys. The single-round construction is already classically secure in the ideal permutation model (IPM), with added rounds offering improved concrete security. However, in the quantum-query setting, the status of this framework is presently unclear. A simple quantum-query attack based on Simon's algorithm breaks the one-round cipher. For two or more rounds, security is only known against non-adaptive adversaries who must prepare all queries in advance. In this work, we show that the two-round Even-Mansour cipher is information theoretically secure in the IPM against adversaries making polynomially-many adaptive forward and inverse quantum queries to all available oracles. Our proof uses compressed permutation oracles and a specially crafted isometry relating the ideal and real experiments. We also show that this construction is minimal, in the sense that essentially any cipher constructed via a single call to a public permutation is quantumly insecure.

quant-pharXiv:2609.40350•Oct 1, 2026•0 citations
We study quantum superposition attacks against permutation‐based pseudorandom cryptographic schemes. We first extend Kuwakado and Morii’s attack against the Even–Mansour cipher and exhibit key recovery attacks against a large class of pseudorandom schemes based on a single call to an n ‐bit permutation, with polynomial O ( n ) (or O ( n 2 ), if the concrete cost of Hadamard transform is also taken in) quantum steps. We then consider schemes, namely, two permutation‐based pseudorandom cryptographic schemes. Using the improved Grover‐meet‐Simon method, we show that the keys of a wide class of schemes can be recovered with O ( n ) superposition queries (the complexity of the original is O ( n 2 n /2 )) and O ( n 2 n /2 ) quantum steps. We also exhibit subclasses of “degenerated” schemes that lack certain internal operations and exhibit more efficient key recovery attacks using either the Simon’s algorithm or collision searching algorithm. Further, using the all‐subkeys‐recovery idea of Isobe and Shibutani, our results give rise to key recovery attacks against several recently proposed permutation‐based PRFs, as well as the two‐round Even–Mansour ciphers with generic key schedule functions and their tweakable variants. From a constructive perspective, our results establish new quantum Q2 security upper bounds for two permutation‐based pseudorandom schemes as well as sound design choices.
One of the central questions in cryptology is how efficient generic constructions of cryptographic primitives can be. Gennaro, Gertner, Katz, and Trevisan [SIAM J. of Compt., 2005] studied the lower bounds of the number of invocations of a (trapdoor) one-way permutation in order to construct cryptographic schemes, e.g., pseudorandom number generators, digital signatures, and public-key and symmetric-key encryption. Recently, quantum machines have been explored to _construct_ cryptographic primitives other than quantum key distribution. This paper studies the efficiency of _quantum_ black-box constructions of cryptographic primitives when the communications are _classical_. Following Gennaro et al., we give the lower bounds of the number of invocations of an underlying quantumly-computable quantum-one-way permutation when the _quantum_ construction of pseudorandom number generator and symmetric-key encryption is weakly black-box. Our results show that the quantum black-box constructions of pseudorandom number generator and symmetric-key encryption do not improve the number of invocations of an underlying quantumly-computable quantum-one-way permutation.
Pseudorandom permutations are ubiquitous in theoretical and applied cryptography. PRPs that offer security even against adversaries making quantum queries are of increasing interest, and used in applications ranging from constructing pseudorandom unitaries to separating SZK from BQP. A successful framework for constructing classically-secure PRPs is the key-alternating Even-Mansour approach, which interleaves applications of public permutations with additions of round keys. The single-round construction is already classically secure in the ideal permutation model (IPM), with added rounds offering improved concrete security. However, in the quantum-query setting, the status of this framework is presently unclear. A simple quantum-query attack based on Simon's algorithm breaks the one-round cipher. For two or more rounds, security is only known against non-adaptive adversaries who must prepare all queries in advance. In this work, we show that the two-round Even-Mansour cipher is information theoretically secure in the IPM against adversaries making polynomially-many adaptive forward and inverse quantum queries to all available oracles. Our proof uses compressed permutation oracles and a specially crafted isometry relating the ideal and real experiments. We also show that this construction is minimal, in the sense that essentially any cipher constructed via a single call to a public permutation is quantumly insecure.