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Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)

Realism, irrationality, and spinor spaces

Adrian Heathcote

Published Dec 31, 2023• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Mathematics, as Eugene Wigner noted, is unreasonably effective in physics. The argument of this paper is that the disproportionate attention that philosophers have paid to discrete structures such as the natural numbers, for which a nominalist construction may be possible, has deprived us of the best argument for Platonism, which lies in continuous structures—in fields and their derived algebras, such as Clifford algebras. The argument that Wigner was making is best made with respect to such structures—in a loose sense, with respect to geometry rather than arithmetic. The purpose of the present paper is to make this connection between mathematical realism and geometrical entities. It thus constitutes an argument against formalism, for which mathematics is merely a game with humanly set rules; and nominalism, in which whatever mathematics is used is eliminable in the final analysis, by often insufficiently specified means. The hope is that light may be cast on the stubborn mysteries of the nature of quantum mechanics and its mathematical formulation, with particular reference to spinor representations—as they have been developed by Andrej Trautman. Thus, according to our argument, quantum mechanics (QM) may appear more natural, as we have better reasons to take spinor structures as irreducibly real, a view consonant with the work of Trautman and Penrose in particular.

DOI
10.59203/zfn.75.612

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Mathematics, as Eugene Wigner noted, is unreasonably effective in physics. The argument of this paper is that the disproportionate attention that philosophers have paid to discrete structures such as the natural numbers, for which a nominalist construction may be possible, has deprived us of the best argument for Platonism, which lies in continuous structures—in fields and their derived algebras, such as Clifford algebras. The argument that Wigner was making is best made with respect to such structures—in a loose sense, with respect to geometry rather than arithmetic. The purpose of the present paper is to make this connection between mathematical realism and geometrical entities. It thus constitutes an argument against formalism, for which mathematics is merely a game with humanly set rules; and nominalism, in which whatever mathematics is used is eliminable in the final analysis, by often insufficiently specified means. The hope is that light may be cast on the stubborn mysteries of the nature of quantum mechanics and its mathematical formulation, with particular reference to spinor representations—as they have been developed by Andrej Trautman. Thus, according to our argument, quantum mechanics (QM) may appear more natural, as we have better reasons to take spinor structures as irreducibly real, a view consonant with the work of Trautman and Penrose in particular.
In this paper I will provide the beginnings of a nominalization of quantum mechanics, or QM. I will not completely nominalize QM, but I will pro-vide what I think is the most important part of such a nominalization, namely, a nominalistic recovery of the algebraic structure of Hilbert spaces. To nominalize QM is to reformulate it so that it no longer contains any reference to, or quantification over, abstract objects, i.e., objects which are aspatial, atemporal, acausal, mind-independent, etc. The reason for want-ing to do this is to show that we can be realists about QM without believ-ing in abstract objects. To argue that our physical theories can be nominalized is not to argue that nominalism—i.e., the view that there are no abstract objects—is true. It is merely to rebut a certain argument against nominalism, viz., the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. I do not think there are any good arguments for nominalism, and I have elsewhere (1995) responded to what is widely regarded as the best such argument, viz., Benacerraf's (1973) epistemological argument against the existence of abstract objects. And I should also note here that even if it turns out that empirical science cannot be nominalized, it will not necessarily mean that nominalism is false, because it may be that nominalists can admit that empirical science contains indispensable abstract-object talk, and simply account for this fact; indeed, in another paper (forthcoming) I have tried to do just that. 1. How Field nominalizes The program of nominalization was initiated by Hartry Field (1980), who tried to nominalize Newtonian Gravitation Theory, a classical flat-space-time theory. David Malament has argued (1982) that Field's method can-not be extended to cover QM. I think Malament is wrong, and below, I will explain why. The first thing to do, however, is explain Field's method. I will concentrate on Field's nominalization of physical quantities, such as temperature and length (Field 1980, Ch. 7). For the sake of simplicity, my presentation will differ somewhat from Field's. For example, I concen-
The argument of this article is threefold. First, the article argues that from its rise in the sixteenth century to our own time, the advancement of modern physics as mathematical-experimental science has been defined by the invention of new mathematical structures. Second, the article argues that quantum theory, especially following quantum mechanics, gives this thesis a radically new meaning by virtue of the following two features: on the one hand, quantum phenomena are defined as essentially different from those found in all previous physics by purely physical features; and on the other, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are defined by purely mathematical postulates, which connect them to quantum phenomena strictly in terms of probabilities, without, as in all previous physics, representing or otherwise relating to how these phenomena physically come about. While these two features may appear discordant, if not inconsistent, I argue that they are in accord with each other, at least in certain interpretations (including the one adopted here), designated as “reality without realism”, RWR, interpretations. This argument also allows this article to offer a new perspective on a thorny problem of the relationships between continuity and discontinuity in quantum physics. In particular, rather than being concerned only with the discreteness and continuity of quantum objects or phenomena, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory relate their continuous mathematics to the irreducibly discrete quantum phenomena in terms of probabilistic predictions while, at least in RWR interpretations, precluding a representation or even conception of how these phenomena come about. This subject is rarely, if ever, discussed apart from previous work by the present author. It is, however, given a new dimension in this article which introduces, as one of its main contributions, a new principle: the mathematical complexity principle.
When we consider and analyze physical events with the purpose of creating corresponding mathematical models we often assume that the mathematical apparatus used in modeling, at least the simplest mathematical apparatus, is infallible. In particular, this relates to the use of infinitely small and infinitely large numbers in arithmetic and the use of Newton's definition of a limit in analysis. We believe that is where the main problem lies in contemporary study of nature (physics, genetics). We have introduced a new concept of “Observer's Mathematics—Mathematics of Relativity” (see references). Observer's mathematics creates new arithmetic, algebra, geometry, topology, analysis and logic which do not contain the concept of continuum, but locally coincide with the standard fields. The concept of a quantum arises automatically from the human thought process, rather than from physics. From this point of view classical mechanics is brought closer to quantum mechanics.
In physics, structures are good candidates for the role of transparadigmatic invariants, which entities can no longer play. This is why structural realism looks more credible than standard entity realism. But why should structures be stable, rather than entities ? Here, structural realists have no answer ; they content themselves with the mere observation that this is how things stand. By contrast, transcendental structuralism (a byproduct of Kant’s transcendental idealism) can easily make sense of this fact. Indeed, it shows that when knowledge bears on phenomena, namely on the emergent byproduct of a relation between the explorer and what is to be explored, this knowledge necessarily bears on relations between such phenomena. After a development on the clarifying power of transcendental structuralism, I turn to an early transcendental structuralist interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Jean-Louis Destouches (1909-1980). Destouches, an early French philosopher of physics, was a student of Louis de Broglie. He recasted in the 1940 the very concept of physical theory in the light of quantum physics. According to him, whenever phenomena are inextricably relative to the experimental set-up, a physical theory cannot provide anything beyond a list of interconnected predictions for future facts given a relevant class of past facts. In his general mathematical theory of predictions, the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics do not refer to some “real” waves; they are shown to be nothing but the formal expression of the phenomena’s being relative to incompatible experimental contexts. Since the quantization of variables can itself be derived from a wave-mechanical formalism, it becomes clear that the most prominent features of quantum mechanics are a mere consequence of contextuality. Destouches thus proved that it is easy to make sense of quantum mechanics provided a reflective attitude is adopted. By contrast, too many difficulties arise when one tries at any cost to make quantum mechanics intelligible within a purely ontological framework.
In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. This account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why the quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom. Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science Without Numbers (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first step towards a genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics. I will also compare the present account to Mark Balaguer’s (1996) nominalization of quantum mechanics and discuss how it might bear on the debate about “wave function realism.” In closing, I will suggest some possible ways to extend this account to accommodate spinorial degrees of freedom and a variable number of particles (e.g. for particle creation and annihilation). Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call a “periodic difference structure” and prove a representation theorem as well as a uniqueness theorem. These formal results could prove fruitful for further investigation into the metaphysics of phase and theoretical structure. (For a more recent version of this paper, please see "The Intrinsic Structure of Quantum Mechanics" available on PhilPapers.)
The argument of this chapter is governed by the double meaning of its title: (a) the relationships between the concepts of discreteness and continuity in modern mathematics and physics; and (b) the relationships, both continuous and discontinuous, between mathematics and physics, as, from Galileo on, a mathematical-experimental science, with mathematics coming first in this conjunction. The project of modern physics was, thus, defined by an essential continuity between mathematics and physics, as a mathematical representation of nature, principally by means of continuous functions and then calculus, until the rise of quantum theory, specifically as quantum mechanics (QM) and quantum field theory (QFT). With QM, at least in certain interpretations, such as the one adopted in this chapter, quantum theory disconnected the ultimate constitution of nature from any mathematical representation, thus, making physics discontinuous with mathematics. As this chapter will argue, however, this new epistemological situation did not disconnect quantum physics from mathematics, but, on the contrary, led to relating abstract mathematics, such as that of Hilbert spaces over ℂ and operator algebra there, to discrete physical phenomena in terms of probabilities, thus reestablishing the connection, which was no longer representational, between mathematics and physics. This chapter will also argue that the development of the concepts of continuity and discontinuity, and the relationships between them, has acquired a great richness and complexity through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in mathematics itself, richness and complexity that found their way into physics, in particular relativity and quantum theory. One of the intriguing aspects of this development is the idea, advanced by, among others, A. Grothendieck, following B. Riemann's comment on the subject, that the continuous may serve as an approximation of the discontinuous, rather than seeing, as is more common, the discontinuous as a mode of technical approach to the continuous. This chapter will discuss this idea, and the relationships between continuity and discontinuity in, and between, mathematics and physics in terms of two new concepts: reality without realism (RWR), applicable in both mathematics and physics, and the relationships between them, and ideality without idealism (IWI), the version of the concept of RWR, applicable specifically to mathematics.