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Computer architecture and design methodologies

Implementation and Analysis of Ciphers in Quantum Computing

Anubhab Baksi, Kyungbae Jang

Published Jan 1, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-981-97-0025-7

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Abstract A significant amount of study is being done to review the security promises made for the various ciphers now in use as a result of the development of quantum computing technology. A general attack against symmetric key cryptography primitives that can reduce search costs to the square root is Grover's search algorithm. To implement Grover's algorithm, it is necessary that the target cipher be implemented as a quantum circuit. Despite being relatively new, this area of study has received significant attention from the research community. The authors have estimated the cost of Grover's key search attack against the stream cipher Atom, for the first time, under circuit depth restrictions defined in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardisation process. The authors implement the quantum circuit of Atom in QISKIT, (open‐source software development kit for working with quantum computers running on IBM Quantum Experience). The results are also compared with other existing literature on LFSR‐based stream ciphers, such as Grain‐v1, Grain‐128‐AEAD, and Lizard. The authors also find that, to the best of their knowledge, in the existing literature on estimating the cost of Grover's attack on symmetric ciphers, Atom is the only 128‐bit key cipher that meets the threshold of ≈2 170 set by NIST for quantum security of 128‐bit key ciphers. The authors also analyse the security of Atom against quantum TMDTO attacks.
The emergence of quantum computing demands rigorous reassessment of classical cryptographic primitives, particularly lightweight block ciphers (LBCs). This work addresses this critical need by presenting the first comprehensive quantum implementation and security analysis of the Feistel-based LBCs SLIM and MIBS against quantum cryptanalysis. Leveraging the inherent reversibility of the ciphers, we develop novel ancilla-free quantum circuits optimizing qubit utilization and depth. For SLIM-80, our design achieves 30,404 quantum cost with 112 qubits and depth of 4,066. For MIBS-64 and MIBS-80, we implement circuits with 23,371 and 24,363 quantum costs requiring 128 and 144 qubits, respectively, and a uniform depth of 4,768. We then quantify vulnerability to Grover’s key-search under the NIST PQC security constraint MAXDEPTH. By constructing Grover oracles under inner parallelization with multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs to suppress false positives, we demonstrate total attack costs of 2^111 for SLIM-80 and MIBS-80, and 2^94 for MIBS-64. These costs fall below NIST’s Level-1 security threshold 2^170, confirming both ciphers’ susceptibility to quantum threats despite their lightweight efficiency. Our methodology establishes a quantum implementation framework for Feistel ciphers, revealing critical trade-offs among qubit efficiency, depth, and quantum resilience.
A quantum computer capable of running the Grover search algorithm, which reduces the complexity of brute-force attacks by a square root, has the potential to undermine the security strength of symmetric-key cryptography and hash functions. Recently, studies on quantum approaches have proposed analyzing potential quantum attacks using the Grover search algorithm in conjunction with optimized quantum circuit implementations for symmetric-key cryptography and hash functions. Analyzing quantum attacks on a cipher (i.e., quantum cryptanalysis) and estimating the necessary quantum resources are related to evaluating post-quantum security for the target cryptography algorithms. In this paper, we revisit quantum implementations of CHAM block cipher, an ultra lightweight cipher, with a focus on optimizing the linear operations in its key schedule. We optimized the linear equations of CHAM as matrices by applying novel optimized decomposition techniques. Using the improved CHAM quantum circuits, we estimate the cost of Grover’s key search and evaluate the post-quantum security strength with further reduced costs.