Large quantum computers will be able to break the cryptographic algorithms on which current secure communications rely on. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum key distribution (QKD) are two security technologies that show protection capabilities against the latent quantum threat. While PQC relies on different hard mathematical problems to develop a wide variety of cryptographic operations, QKD is based on quantum physics laws to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys through different QKD protocols. These keys can be used by different applications to perform security transformations. QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The hybridization of PQC and QKD is an important step for future secure infrastructures, being able to provide long-term security. In this work we propose authenticated QKD approaches that rely on pre-shared keys and hybrid PQC/QKD alternatives and which are able to securely exchange secret QKD keys through authenticated channels. We identify the different configuration alternatives and their parameters, as well as we develop a wide performance evaluation. Results show that pre-shared keys and PQC-based authentication through Dilithium algorithm are the fastest alternatives. Also, we show the potential of the T12 QKD protocol.
Large quantum computers will be able to break the cryptographic algorithms on which current secure communications rely on. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum key distribution (QKD) are two security technologies that show protection capabilities against the latent quantum threat. While PQC relies on different hard mathematical problems to develop a wide variety of cryptographic operations, QKD is based on quantum physics laws to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys through different QKD protocols. These keys can be used by different applications to perform security transformations. QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The hybridization of PQC and QKD is an important step for future secure infrastructures, being able to provide long-term security. In this work we propose authenticated QKD approaches that rely on pre-shared keys and hybrid PQC/QKD alternatives and which are able to securely exchange secret QKD keys through authenticated channels. We identify the different configuration alternatives and their parameters, as well as we develop a wide performance evaluation. Results show that pre-shared keys and PQC-based authentication through Dilithium algorithm are the fastest alternatives. Also, we show the potential of the T12 QKD protocol.
Emerging network applications are based on collaborative environments that rely on the secure group-based communication paradigm. These protocols use traditional public-key cryptography (PKC) for authenticating the group members and exchange secret keys. However, the foreseeable breakthrough of quantum computers represents a risk for the secure systems based on PKC. In order to prepare for such an event, quantum-secure group-based communications must be established. Post-quantumcryptography (PQC) and quantum-key distribution (QKD) are two quantum-resistant technologies that can be used for enabling the long term security in such collaborative environments. This work proposes four quantum-secure group-based communication solutions, based on contributory and decentralized protocols. PQC and hybrid technologies (PQC/QKD) are explored. The solutions use PQC Key-exchange algorithms or QKD protocols (decoy-BB84 and T12) for key generation and PQC signature algorithms for authentication. For the first time hybrid schemes for group-based technologies are designed and explored. Results show that the group-based decentralized protocol (PQC SLIMCAST) outperforms the contributory protocol PQC GAKE. The PQC-based approaches have a better performance than the QKD versions.
The emergence of highly developed quantum computing is threatening the current established public key cryptography systems like Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA, and it enables attackers to perpetrate harvest now, decrypt later attacks on the current encrypted communications. Quantum resistant security has provided shedding light on quantum threats by introducing Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) project and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). QKD offers a no-d efficiency protection with respect to quantum mechanics, though PQC provides protection against quantum attacks of comparable scalability via classical methods of cryptography that are standardized by the NIST. Nevertheless, these two approaches have practical constraints in the field of application in isolation, especially distance, cost, scaling, and infrastructure overhead. This paper suggests a hybrid secure communication system integrating QKD based key generation following the BB84 protocol through the quantum channel and PQC based authentication and integrity schemes following the classical channel and a bulk data transmission scheme utilizing the symmetric encryption. System level performance measures are as well evaluated by simulation to analyse classical cryptography, PQC alone, QKD alone and hybridQKD−PQCschemes, comparing the systems throughput and performance impact amid various network conditions. According to the outcomes of the experiment, the proposed hybrid approach injects a throughput overhead of less than 0.1 percent compared to the traditional cryptographic systems, and thus, strong quantum-resilient security is computable with insignificantly low performance costs. This justifies the practicability of hybrid QKD-PQC topologies to prospective quantum safe communication networks encompassing next generation and large-scale distributed communication systems.
The Hybrid approach in Quantum Cryptography creates adaptable security model which provides the safest Communication in the emerging quantum era. The development of quantum computing raise questions about the long-term security. Traditional algorithms, such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman, which is seemed computationally secure but it can be effectively solved by quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's. This problem leads to the origination of two key trends in current studies, namely Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), designing mathematical approaches to encryption resistant to quantum attacks; Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) using the principles of quantum mechanics to assure security in communications. Accordingly, this research proposes a hybrid security framework including reliable data encryption and authentication using PQC, combined with the safe key- exchange method of QKD. The model is implemented in Python, Qiskit, and PQClean's Kyber and Dilithium algorithms to show how these two paradigms can cooperate toward quantum- resilient communication. To present the system performance, key exchange efficiency, computational overhead, and security strength have been considered. According to the results, this hybrid approach gives superior defense against quantum threats while maintaining practical effectiveness for real-world applications such as cloud security, 6G networks, and the Internet of Things.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic systems, necessitating the development of quantum-resistant alternatives. This thesis explores a hybrid key exchange framework combining Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to secure classical post-processing steps such as information reconciliation and privacy amplification. Specifically, CRYSTALS-Kyber is used for key encapsulation, while CRYSTALS-Dilithium and SPHINCS+ provide digital signatures for authentication. While the mathematical security foundations of these algorithms are assumed, their integration is evaluated through performance benchmarking and system-level analysis. The results show that incorporating PQC-based authentication into QKD post-processing significantly improves resilience against quantum adversaries, while introducing only a reasonable computational and bandwidth overhead. This work contributes to the development of robust hybrid cryptographic systems capable of with standing both classical and quantum-era threats.
Quantum computing is posing a serious risk to classical cryptographic tools such as RSA and ECC as sophisticated quantum algorithms are able to crack their mathematical foundation in a time bound that is a a polynomial in the number of repetitions. In this paper, we will describe the process of integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) into a hybrid approach to secure communications in the post-quantum world. The suggested methodology is a combination of the computational efficiency and scalability of PQC and the information-theoretic security and eavesdropping detection abilities of QKD. Simulation observations indicate that PQC-only systems are both faster in generating keys and scalable, but do not have a strong eavesdropping detection. On the other hand, non-conditional security is only a feature of systems based on QKD, but it is also highly overhead and slows down key rate. The hybrid PQC-Q KD model provides a balanced performance, high resilience, high authentication, high confidentiality, and realistic deployability. On balance, this discussion demonstrates that the hybrid approach is better than standalone methods and can provide a strong solution to protect against new quantum threats. The large-scale network protocol can be optimized, resources and further integration with other emerging technologies, such as 5G/6G, IoT or cloud computing, can be directed in future research.
With the development of quantum computers, traditional cryptographic systems are facing more and more serious security threats. Fortunately, quantum key distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are two cryptographic mechanisms with quantum-resistant security, and both will become important solutions for future information security. However, neither of them is perfect, and they are complementary. Quantum key distribution has unconditional security that post-quantum cryptography does not have, and PQC can provide secure and convenient authentication for QKD networks. In this paper, we propose two protocols based on PQC to realize the full authentication of the QKD data post-processing, and we only need to assume the short-term security of PQC algorithm to ensure the long-term quantum resistant security of distributed keys. We found that for the above two authentication protocols, attackers cannot successfully implement replay attacks. These authentication protocols can solve the problems of the current pre-shared key authentication in the application of large-scale quantum key distribution networks, and are expected to realize a key distribution mechanism with practical operability and quantum resistant security, which will be beneficial to promote the deployment and application of quantum key distribution networks.