Bi-deniable Encryption scheme means that when the sender and the receiver are coerced, the coercer can obtain fake plaintext, random numbers, and secret keys. It’s a solution strategy in the case of information leakage. Compared with traditional encryption, deniable encryption can provide secret communications in situations of coercion in the Post-Quantum era. Compared with sender-deniable encryption and receiver-deniable encryption, bi-deniable encryption can achieve secret communications in the situation that both sender and receiver are coerced by the coercer. So, we propose to design a bi-deniable encryption scheme under the multi-distribution model. In our bi-deniable encryption scheme, we construct a bi-deniable encryption scheme based on the assumption of Decision-Learning With Errors (DLWE) under the multi-distribution model. Firstly, the principle of Inner Product Predicate Encryption (IPPE) is applied in our scheme. Secondly, we apply the framework of Bi-Translucent Set (BTS), combined with inner product predicate encryption. Thirdly, we construct a series of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, which apply linear transformation between different lattice structures, and Regev dual encryption. Fourthly, the statistical indistinguishability between the sampling algorithm with discrete Gaussian sampling algorithm, and the computational indistinguishability between LWE’s ciphertext samples with uniform samples, the property of indistinguishability is applied in theorem proving, which obtain Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) security and the property of bi-deniability. Given the value range of the Gaussian parameter and security parameter in our scheme, the correctness of the bi-deniable encryption scheme is guaranteed. We also give the security proof of IND-CPA and bi-deniability’s property by a series of games. The ‘Inner-Product Bi-Translucent Set’ Bi-Deniable Encryption scheme under the multi-distribution model is based on Decision-LWE assumption, and can avoid quantum-resistant attacks. The bi-deniable encryption scheme is firstly constructed by the inner product with the Decision-LWE assumption, which can provide better properties of security and deniability.
Bi-deniable Encryption scheme means that when the sender and the receiver are coerced, the coercer can obtain fake plaintext, random numbers, and secret keys. It’s a solution strategy in the case of information leakage. Compared with traditional encryption, deniable encryption can provide secret communications in situations of coercion in the Post-Quantum era. Compared with sender-deniable encryption and receiver-deniable encryption, bi-deniable encryption can achieve secret communications in the situation that both sender and receiver are coerced by the coercer. So, we propose to design a bi-deniable encryption scheme under the multi-distribution model. In our bi-deniable encryption scheme, we construct a bi-deniable encryption scheme based on the assumption of Decision-Learning With Errors (DLWE) under the multi-distribution model. Firstly, the principle of Inner Product Predicate Encryption (IPPE) is applied in our scheme. Secondly, we apply the framework of Bi-Translucent Set (BTS), combined with inner product predicate encryption. Thirdly, we construct a series of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, which apply linear transformation between different lattice structures, and Regev dual encryption. Fourthly, the statistical indistinguishability between the sampling algorithm with discrete Gaussian sampling algorithm, and the computational indistinguishability between LWE’s ciphertext samples with uniform samples, the property of indistinguishability is applied in theorem proving, which obtain Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) security and the property of bi-deniability. Given the value range of the Gaussian parameter and security parameter in our scheme, the correctness of the bi-deniable encryption scheme is guaranteed. We also give the security proof of IND-CPA and bi-deniability’s property by a series of games. The ‘Inner-Product Bi-Translucent Set’ Bi-Deniable Encryption scheme under the multi-distribution model is based on Decision-LWE assumption, and can avoid quantum-resistant attacks. The bi-deniable encryption scheme is firstly constructed by the inner product with the Decision-LWE assumption, which can provide better properties of security and deniability.
Deniable encryption is an intriguing scheme against the problem of information leakage caused by adversary coercion. Previously proposed deniable schemes cannot resist the attack of quantum computers and there are few implementations of these schemes. Aiming at this problem, a deniable encryption scheme based on learning with errors (LWE) and related implementations were proposed. The scheme can resist the quantum attack, and also can deny the plaintext to any fake plaintext, so that the sender can resist the adversary’s coercive attack. Firstly, by using the indistinguishability of the LWE problem, a subset with low density named “translucent set” was constructed in a uniform space. The “translucent set” was used to construct the ciphertexts of bits 0 and 1, which enabled one-way deniability of a single bit and reduced the error rate. Then, a plaintext coding method was proposed to realize two-way deniability of a single bit so that the sender could deny the original plaintext to any fake plaintext. The theoretical analyses were given to show the deniability, security (IND–CPA), correctness, complexity and ciphertext expansion rate of the scheme. Finally, the scheme was implemented by C++, and experiments had been done for the error rate, ciphertext expansion rate, encryption and decryption efficiency. The experimental results showed that the error rate and ciphertext expansion rate were consistent with the theoretical results. Compared with other deniable schemes based on the quadratic residual problem, the proposed scheme has obvious advantages in anti-quantum attack, efficiency and ciphertext expansion rate. Specifically, the encryption efficiency is improved by 70%, and the ciphertext expansion rate is reduced to 1/3 of above schemes.
Inner-product functional encryption (IPFE) is an exciting paradigm for non-interactively computing on encrypted data where a master secret key can be used to derive decryption keys associated with certain inner-product functions in such a way that the decryption operation reveals an inner-product result, and nothing else. Over the decades, all efforts regarding existing IPFE schemes have been dedicated to extending them to multi-input/multi-client scenarios, understanding the security concepts that can be achieved, and identifying a multitude of practical use cases. However, in the event of key compromise, a common issue in real-world applications, the existing IPFE schemes are unable to guarantee the confidentiality of past encryptions. This paper introduces a novel variant of IPFE that supports key updates, called updatable IPFE, potentially opening up a new avenue of research to address the common key exposure problem. In this setting, any sender can initiate the transition to the next period by computing a new public key and a special update. The special update can be processed by the system administrator and the receiver to compute the next-period master secret key and the next-period decryption key, respectively. If done honestly, future (regular) ciphertexts generated with the new public key can be decrypted with the new decryption key, but ciphertexts from the past cannot be decrypted with the new decryption key. To formally illustrate this, we formalize the notion of the indistinguishability-based security under chosen randomness chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CR-CPA). We further propose the first efficient construction of updatable IPFE in the standard model, based on Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption with polynomial modulus-to-noise rate. Finally, we conduct a comprehensive performance evaluation of our updatable IPFE, and the experimental results demonstrate its computational efficiency, making it a viable solution for real-world applications.
We study multi-authority attribute-based functional encryption for noisy inner-product functionality, and propose two new primitives: (1) multi-authority attribute-based (noisy) inner-product functional encryption (MA-AB(N)IPFE), which generalizes existing multi-authority attribute-based IPFE schemes by Agrawal et al. (TCC'21), by enabling approximate inner-product computation; and (2) multi-authority attribute-based evasive inner-product functional encryption (MA-evIPFE), a relaxed variant inspired by the evasive IPFE framework by Hsieh et al. (EUROCRYPT'24), shifting focus from ciphertext indistinguishability to a more relaxed pseudorandomness-based security notion. To support the above notions, we introduce two variants of lattice-based computational assumptions: evasive IPFE assumption and indistinguishability-based evasive IPFE assumption (IND-evIPFE). We present lattice-based constructions of both primitives for subset policies, building upon the framework of Waters et al.( TCC'22). Our schemes are proven to be statically secure in the random oracle model under the standard LWE assumption and the newly introduced assumptions. Additionally, we show our MA-AB(N)IPFE scheme can be transformed via modulus switching into a noiseless MA-IPFE scheme that supports exact inner-product functionality. This yields the first lattice-based construction of such a primitive. All our schemes support arbitrary polynomial-size attribute policies and are secure in the random oracle model under lattice assumptions with a sub-exponential modulus-to-noise ratio, making them practical candidates for noise-tolerant, fine-grained access control in multi-authority settings.
Signcryption is a public-key cryptographic primitive which combines the functions of public-key encryption and digital signature into a single logical step at low computational and communication costs. While multi-receiver signcryption is suited for a situation where a sender wants to send a signcrypted message to multiple receivers in a confidential and authenticated way. Due to this attractive property, recently, multi-receiver signcryption plays an important role in some practical applications such as virtual conference as well as authenticated mail transferring. In this paper, we present an efficient multi-receiver identity-based signcryption (MIBSC) scheme from lattice assumption which is believed to resist quantum computer attacks. The proposed scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model, which has the indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks under the hardness of learning with errors (LWE), and existentially unforgeability against chosen message attacks under the small integer solution assumption (SIS). Moreover, we also compare our MIBSC scheme with existing schemes from performance efficiency and security, the result shows that our proposed scheme is more efficient and more secure. In particular, our scheme can be properly applied in the post-quantum communication environments.
Ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic technology that provides fine-grained access control as well as data confidentiality. It enables one sender to encrypt the data for more receivers, and to specify a policy on who can decrypt the ciphertext using his/her attributes alone. However, most existing ABE schemes are constructed on bilinear maps and they cannot resist quantum attacks. In this paper, we propose a multi-authority CP-ABE (MA-CPABE) scheme on ideal lattices which is still secure in post-quantum era. On one hand, multiple attribute authorities are required when user's attributes cannot be managed by a central authority. On the other hand, compared with generic lattice, the ideal lattice has extra algebraic structure and can be used to construct more efficient cryptographic applications. By adding some virtual attributes for each authority, our scheme can support flexible threshold access policy. Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA) in the standard model under the ring learning with errors (R-LWE) assumption.
To ensure resistance to attacks with coercion to disclose a secret key by an active adversary, the protocol of deniable encryption includes a procedure for mutual authentication of the sender and receiver of a message with their long-term public keys, which is combined with a hidden exchange of single-use public keys used to generate a single-use shared key, on which the secret message is encrypted. Longterm public keys are used to generate a shared secret key, on which a fake message is encrypted. The produced intermediate ciphertexts are converted into a single ciphertext, which is computationally indistinguishable from the ciphertext obtained by probabilistic encryption of a fake message. This approach allows us to build an encryption protocol that is resistant to bi-sided attacks with coercion, since the disclosure of users' private keys gives access only to the fake message and cannot be used to prove the possibility of alternative decryption of the ciphertext transmitted over a public communication channel. The authentication of the single-use public keys is also used to implement protocols for secure encryption using short shared keys.