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European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Quantum ontology without textbooks. Nor overlapping

Cristian López

Published Feb 21, 2024• 20 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, I critically assess two recent proposals for an interpretation-independent understanding of non-relativistic quantum mechanics: the overlap strategy (Fraser & Vickers, 2022) and the textbook account (Egg, 2021). My argument has three steps. I first argue that they presume a Quinean-Carnapian meta-ontological framework that yields flat, structureless ontologies. Second, such ontologies are unable to solve the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. Finally, only structured ontologies are capable of solving the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. But they require some dose of speculation. In the end, I defend the conservative way to do quantum ontology, which is (and must be) speculative and non-neutral.

DOI
10.1007/s13194-024-00573-w

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In this paper, I critically assess two recent proposals for an interpretation-independent understanding of non-relativistic quantum mechanics: the overlap strategy (Fraser & Vickers, 2022) and the textbook account (Egg, 2021). My argument has three steps. I first argue that they presume a Quinean-Carnapian meta-ontological framework that yields flat, structureless ontologies. Second, such ontologies are unable to solve the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. Finally, only structured ontologies are capable of solving the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. But they require some dose of speculation. In the end, I defend the conservative way to do quantum ontology, which is (and must be) speculative and non-neutral.
Existing proposals concerning the ontology of quantum mechanics (QM) either involve speculation that goes beyond the scientific evidence or abandon realism about large parts of QM. This paper proposes a way out of this dilemma, by showing that QM as it is formulated in standard textbooks allows for a much more substantive ontological commitment than is usually acknowledged. For this purpose, I defend a non-fundamentalist approach to ontology, which is then applied to various aspects of QM. In particular, I will defend realism about spin, which has been viewed as a particularly hard case for the ontology of QM.
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.
Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ.
An argument to the effect that quantum mechanics commits us to the existence of non-supervenient relations, and therefore that we should admit such relations into our quantum ontology as fundamental entities, has been given by Teller and reformulated by French. This paper aims, first, to explicate and evaluate that argument; second, to extend its premises in order to assess its relevance for other interpretations of quantum mechanics; and, third, to clarify its implications for holism and individuation in quantum ontology.
Abstract In the previous chapter, the structure of the ontology proposed by the MHI was introduced. In this ontology, properties are the fundamental items and quantum systems are non-objectual bundles of properties. However, as is well known, metaphysics is underdetermined by physics; in particular, quantum mechanics is compatible with different ontological pictures. Thus, arguing in favor of a certain quantum ontology over others requires showing how fruitful it is in the task of offering reasonable solutions to interpretative problems. This chapter is devoted to show the advantages of the proposed picture for dealing with the ontological challenges of quantum mechanics: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. Finally, the top-down approach presented in Chapter 8 is revisited, showing how it acquires an ontological significance from the perspective of the ontology of properties proposed by the MHI.
I present and defend a new ontology for quantum theories (or ``interpretations'' of quantum theory) called Generative Quantum Theory (GQT). GQT postulates different sets of features, and the combination of these different features can help generate different quantum theories. Furthermore, this ontology makes quantum indeterminacy and determinacy play an important explanatory role in accounting for when quantum systems whose values of their properties are indeterminate become determinate. The process via which determinate values arise varies between the different quantum theories. Moreover, quantum states represent quantum properties and structures that give rise to determinacy, and each quantum theory specifies a structure with certain features. I will focus on the following quantum theories: GRW, the Many-Worlds Interpretation, single-world relationalist theories such as Relational Quantum Mechanics, Bohmian Mechanics, hybrid classical-quantum theories, and Environmental Determinacy-based (EnD) Quantum Theory. I will argue that GQT should be taken seriously because it provides a series of important benefits that current widely discussed ontologies lack, namely, wave function realism and primitive ontology, without some of their costs. For instance, it helps generate quantum theories that are compatible with relativistic causality, such as EnD Quantum Theory. Also, GQT has the benefit of providing new ways to compare and evaluate quantum theories, which may lead to philosophical and scientific progress.