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Wiley eBooks

The Reality Question: The Measurement Problem and Interpretations of Quantum Theory

Richard DeWitt

Published Jun 5, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter explores the following two interrelated issues surrounding quantum theory: measurement problem; and interpretations of quantum theory. The measurement problem arises with quantum theory in a way that it has never arisen with earlier scientific theories and, as it is closely tied to the question of what is really going on in experiments and phenomena involving quantum entities. Interpretations of quantum theory primarily involve views on what sort of reality could underlie the known facts. The measurement problem provides a convenient way to broadly categorize approaches to interpretations of quantum theory. In particular, interpretations will be divided into collapse interpretations and non-collapse interpretations. All of the viable interpretations of quantum theory - collapse interpretations as well as non-collapse interpretations - have features that strike most people as substantially odd. The chapter also presents an overview of the most common collapse interpretations, and further looks at some common noncollapse interpretations.

DOI
10.1002/9781119119005.ch27

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This chapter explores the following two interrelated issues surrounding quantum theory: measurement problem; and interpretations of quantum theory. The measurement problem arises with quantum theory in a way that it has never arisen with earlier scientific theories and, as it is closely tied to the question of what is really going on in experiments and phenomena involving quantum entities. Interpretations of quantum theory primarily involve views on what sort of reality could underlie the known facts. The measurement problem provides a convenient way to broadly categorize approaches to interpretations of quantum theory. In particular, interpretations will be divided into collapse interpretations and non-collapse interpretations. All of the viable interpretations of quantum theory - collapse interpretations as well as non-collapse interpretations - have features that strike most people as substantially odd. The chapter also presents an overview of the most common collapse interpretations, and further looks at some common noncollapse interpretations.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics (QM) is related to the inability to include learning about the properties of a quantum system by an agent in the formalism of quantum theory. It includes questions about the physical processes behind the measurement, uniqueness, and randomness of obtained outcomes and an ontic or epistemic role of the state. These issues have triggered various interpretations of quantum theory. They vary from refusing any connection between physical reality and a measurement process to insisting that a collapse of the wave-function is real and possibly involves consciousness. On the other hand, the actual mechanism of a measurement is not extensively discussed in these interpretations. This essay attempts to investigate the quantum measurement problem from the position of the scientific consensus. We begin with a short overview of the development of sensing in living organisms. This is performed for the purpose of stressing the relation between reality and our experience. We then briefly present different approaches to the measurement problem in chosen interpretations. We then state three philosophical assumptions for further consideration and present a decomposition of the measurement act into four stages: transformation, conversion, amplification and broadcasting, and, finally, perception. Each of these stages provides an intuition about the physical processes contributing to it. These conclusions are then used in a discussion about, e.g., objectivity, the implausibility of reversing a measurement, or the epistemic status of the wave-function. Finally, we argue that those in favor of some of the most popular interpretations can find an overlap between their beliefs and the consequences of considerations presented here.
Abstract Although much has been written about the measurement problem, there is still significant disagreement about what the problem really is and what a solution should look like. In this chapter I present a brief introduction to quantum mechanics and the measurement problem, and then I argue that the measurement problem should be understood in part a problem of epistemology: solving the problem requires telling a consistent story about how the reality underlying quantum mechanics could allow us to reliably come to know about that reality via the medium of our empirical evidence for quantum mechanics, and an interpretation of quantum mechanics which fails to achieve this is self-undermining.
Scientific progress does not always remove difficult conceptual questions about knowledge, reality, and observation. Quantum mechanics is one of the most successful theories in modern science, yet its development has raised persistent questions concerning measurement, observation, and quantum reality. Despite extensive theoretical and experimental progress, the measurement problem remains unresolved and continues to generate different interpretations. This paper examines what this unresolved problem reveals about scientific understanding and how people may approach unresolved scientific questions when established knowledge does not provide a final answer. The discussion uses a conceptual approach, drawing on selected historical and theoretical work and experiments related to the measurement and observer problem. The paper highlights how competing interpretations can remain open while established applications continue to work
Despite the unparalleled accuracy of quantum-theoretical predictions across an enormous range of phenomena, the theory's foundations are still in doubt. The theory deviates radically from classical physics, predicts counterintuitive phenomena, and seems inconsistent. The biggest stumbling block is measurement, where the Schrodinger equation's unitary evolution seems inconsistent with collapse. These doubts have inspired a variety of proposed interpretations and alterations of the theory. Most interpretations posit the theory represents only observed appearances rather than reality. The realistic interpretations, on the other hand, posit entities such as other universes, hidden variables, artificial collapse mechanisms, or human minds, that are not found in the standard mathematical formulation. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the possibility that the standard theory is both realistic and correct as it stands. This paper examines several controversial issues, namely quantization, field particle duality, quantum randomness, superposition, entanglement, non-locality, and measurement, to argue that standard quantum physics, realistically interpreted, is consistent with all of them.
This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Standard quantum theory is highly successful in all its applications, from photons and atoms, to semiconductors, superconductors, quarks, and so on. Yet the need to understand what the theory is really trying to tell us about the nature of the world beyond specific predictions forces us into the realm of philosophy, or, as some have dubbed it, quantum metaphysics: the study of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. There is a wide range of opinions regarding the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics. This chapter focuses on two of the most prominent interpretations: the Copenhagen interpretation, and one alternative interpretation that has been gaining some support in recent years, the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), also known as the many universes interpretation. The central issues of contention are: firstly, that the measurement of some attribute of a quantum system generally involves the probabilistic collapse, or reduction, of the state vector where the probabilistic nature of the process is inherent—that is, not reducible to a more fundamental, deterministic explanation; and, secondly, the problem of bringing a measurement to a completion—a problem generally known as the measurement paradox.