This chapter focuses on recent experiments that are often claimed to have substantial implications for interpretations of quantum theory. These experiments fall under the heading of quantum facts. These new facts are most easily understood by looking at the EPR/Bell/Aspect trilogy. This trilogy consists of the EPR thought experiment; John Bell's 1964 proof, generally referred to as Bell's theorem or Bell's inequality; and a series of experiments from Alain Aspect's lab. The EPR argument argues that quantum theory is an incomplete theory of reality, in that quantum theory fails to represent an element of reality, namely, the polarization of the photons before they are detected. One can summarize the EPR argument in this way: either the locality assumption is false or quantum theory is an incomplete theory. Bell discovered that predictions based on quantum theory, on the one hand, and predictions based on the locality assumption, on the other hand, do not agree.
This chapter focuses on recent experiments that are often claimed to have substantial implications for interpretations of quantum theory. These experiments fall under the heading of quantum facts. These new facts are most easily understood by looking at the EPR/Bell/Aspect trilogy. This trilogy consists of the EPR thought experiment; John Bell's 1964 proof, generally referred to as Bell's theorem or Bell's inequality; and a series of experiments from Alain Aspect's lab. The EPR argument argues that quantum theory is an incomplete theory of reality, in that quantum theory fails to represent an element of reality, namely, the polarization of the photons before they are detected. One can summarize the EPR argument in this way: either the locality assumption is false or quantum theory is an incomplete theory. Bell discovered that predictions based on quantum theory, on the one hand, and predictions based on the locality assumption, on the other hand, do not agree.
In this Einstein Year of Physics it seems appropriate to look at an important aspect of Einstein's work that is often down-played: his contribution to the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Contrary to physics ‘folklore’, Bohr had no defence against Einstein's 1935 attack (the EPR paper) on the claimed completeness of orthodox quantum mechanics. I suggest that Einstein's argument, as stated most clearly in 1946, could justly be called Einstein's reality – locality – completeness theorem, since it proves that one of these three must be false. Einstein's instinct was that completeness of orthodox quantum mechanics was the falsehood, but he failed in his quest to find a more complete theory that respected reality and locality. Einstein's theorem, and possibly Einstein's failure, inspired John Bell in 1964 to prove his reality – locality theorem. This strengthened Einstein's theorem (but showed the futility of his quest) by demonstrating that either reality or locality is a falsehood. This revealed the full non-locality of the quantum world for the first time.
Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.
Bell's Theorem demonstrates that factorizable theories for the EPR experiment (EPR) cannot reproduce the quantum correlations. Factorizability is motivated by various locality conditions. So to understand the nature of nonlocality in EPR, we first need to understand the conceptual relations between factorizability, these various locality conditions and the nature of the quantum correlations. That is the main focus of my thesis. My main conclusion is that these conceptual relations are more subtle than the literature has usually suggested. Chapter 1 is a general introduction. In Chapter 2, I review the general framework of factorizable stochastic theories for EPR. I argue that factorizability can be motivated by various locality conditions, even in theories that admit time-dependent states and take the measurement interactions to be neither instantaneous, nor simultaneous. In Chapter 3, I focus on Cartwright' s (1989) and Humphreys' (1989) theories of probabilistic causation for singular events, which are based on modifications of traditional causal linear modelling. I argue (against Cartwright) that local models for EPR in the framework of these theories are committed to factorizability; and so they cannot reproduce the EPR correlations. In Chapter 4, I turn to Stochastic-Einstein Locality (SEL). Hellman (1982) proposed that SEL with some provisos characterizes the No-Superluminal-Action (NSA) of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and he argued that SEL is not violated in EPR. Butterfield (1994) proposed that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) characterizes the lack of superluminal Lewisian causation, and he argued that SEL is violated in EPR. I argue that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) is motivated by NSA and spatiotemporal separability. Thus, the violation of SEL might arise from the failure of spatiotemporal separability. And this failure is compatible with NSA and superluminal Lewisian causation. Accordingly, Hellman's and Butterfield's views need not be in tension. In Chapter 5, I focus on the implications for nonlocality of Jarrett's (1984) analysis of factorizability into "locality" and "completeness". I argue that although this analysis cannot distinguish between failures of factorizability which are compatible with STR and those which are not, it is significant for clarifying the implications of Bell's theorem for nonlocality. In Chapter 6, I qmsider three arguments that are intended to deny superluminal causal propagation in EPR, and a fourth argument that is intended to establish the opposite conclusion. I argue that in various ways these arguments have gone wrong. Three of these argument rely on implicit assumptions that have been overlooked. Accordingly, two of them reached a reasonable conclusion, i.e. the failure of separability, for the wrong reasons; whereas the third reached a wrong conclusion, i.e. that the failure of the contiguity of causal processes explains the failure of factorizability in EPR. The fourth relies on a wrong assumption, and thus it reaches a too strong conclusion, that the EPR correlations require superluminal action. My main conclusion is that the quantum correlations require nonseparability . In Chapter 7, I focus on decision theory in the context of EPR. In both EPR and the famous Newcomb's problem (NewProb), there are unscreenable-off correlations. I argue that NewProb can be related to EPR, in the sense that a NewProb can be realized by that experiment.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
The first round of the Einstein–Bohr debates took place when Einstein challenged Bohr’s principle of complementarity at the Solvay conference in 1927 and Bohr successfully defended it. The most serious challenge, however, came in 1935 when a paper by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) argued that quantum mechanics was incomplete through a gedanken experiment motivating an approach based on hidden variables. In this chapter, EPR’s arguments about the incompleteness of quantum mechanics and Bohr’s reply to them are presented. The ultimate answer came almost 30 years later, almost ten years after Einstein’s death, and was nothing that Einstein would have expected. Bell’s inequality and the subsequent Bell-CHSH inequality, that are satisfied by all theories based on the “self-evident truths” of reality and locality are discussed. The startling results that quantum mechanics violates Bell’s inequality and the experimental results are in agreement with the prediction of quantum mechanics are presented.
Abstract If we reject the ‘spooky’ action at a distance that seems to be required in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, and which is highlighted by the EPR thought experiment, we must accept the EPR argument that the theory is somehow incomplete. In essence, this involves the rejection of the first postulate of quantum theory: the state of a quantum mechanical system is not completely described by the wave function or state vector.Einstein had hinted at a statistical interpretation. In his opinion, the squares of the wave functions or state vectors of quantum theory represented statistical probabilities obtained by averaging over a large number of real particles. The Copenhagen interpretation of the EPR experiment insists that the reality of the physical states that can be measured is defined by the nature of the interaction between two quantum particles and the nature of the experimental arrangement. A completely deterministic, locally real version of quantum theory demands that the physical states of the particles be established at the moment of their interaction and that the particles separate as individually real entities in those physical states. The physical states of the particles are prescribed by the physics of their interaction and independent of how we choose to set up the measuring instrument, and so no reference to the nature of the latter is necessary, except to define how the independently real particles interact with it. The instrument thus probes an observer-independent reality.