Security Analysis and Mitigation of “PRLAP-IoD: A PUF-Based Robust and Lightweight Authentication Protocol for Internet of Drones”
Deokkyu Kwon, Youngho Park
Internet of drones (IoD) environments can provide convenient services such as safety monitoring, map exploration, and military applications using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, UAVs can be vulnerable to security attacks because they provide services to users through aerial networks. Moreover, the limited computational power of UAVs, due to their restricted resources, must be considered. Therefore, lightweight and secure authentication protocol is necessary for IoD environments. In 2024, Zhang et al. propose a “PUF-based robust and lightweight authentication protocol for IoD (PRLAP-IoD)” environments. In this paper, we conduct a cryptanalysis of PRLAP-IoD and prove that their protocol can encounter “ephemeral secret leakage (ESL)” and “stolen verifier attacks”. Moreover, PRLAP-IoD does not ensure “perfect forward secrecy (PFS)” and “untraceability”. After that, we present mitigation strategies to reinforce security and privacy of PRLAP-IoD.
International Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks•Jul 8, 2025•3 citations