There is a huge gap between the upper and lower bounds on the share size of secret-sharing schemes for
n-party access structures; consistent with our current knowledge the optimal share size can be anywhere between polynomial and exponential in
n. For linear secret-sharing schemes, the share size for almost all
n-party access structures is exponential in
n. We would like to study larger classes of secret-sharing schemes with two goals: 1) prove lower bounds for larger classes of secret-sharing schemes; and 2) construct efficient secret-sharing schemes. Given this motivation, Paskin-Cherniavsky and Radune (ITC’20) introduced a new class of secret-sharing schemes in which the shares are generated by applying degree-
dpolynomials to the secret and some random field elements. We define and study two additional classes of polynomial secret-sharing schemes: 1) schemes in which the reconstruction of the secret is done using polynomials; and 2) schemes in which both sharing and reconstruction are done by polynomials. Our main result is a construction of secret-sharing schemes and conditional disclosure of secrets protocols with quadratic sharing and reconstruction that are more efficient than linear secret-sharing schemes. To complement our results, we prove lower bounds on the share size for schemes with polynomial reconstruction. Finally, we give an evidence that schemes with polynomial sharing are probably stronger than schemes with polynomial reconstruction.
Abstract As a fundamental component of quantum cryptography, quantum secret sharing (SS) faces a critical security challenge: dishonest participants may gain exclusive access to the shared secret through deceptive actions. To address this, recent advances in fair quantum SS have emerged, allowing equitable secret access among all participants. However, our analysis reveals security vulnerabilities in Bai et al ’s fair quantum SS scheme (Physica A, 2022). First, we show that Bai et al ’s scheme is vulnerable to collusion attack by m − 1 dishonest participants when m − 1 ⩾ t , where t is the threshold value. Second, we point that Bai et al ’s scheme is insecure under our defined attack model—the latent attack. In this work, a possible improved scheme is proposed to overcome the security flaws and halve the computational cost.