Quantum computers, although still in the theoretical stage, conceptually have the power to break many current cryptosystems, including public-key schemes., for example, RSA (Rivest, Shamir., Adleman), elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), and ElGamal. NIST specialists and national governments believe that existing cryptography algorithms will become vulnerable to brute force analysis by the end of the decade and agree that measures should be taken before then to ensure the secrecy of current and future algorithms. In this context, information security, including confidentiality and integrity, must be considered. This paper provides a systematic literature review on whether existing public-key schemes have the necessary complexity and solution space to resist a quantum computer. The discussion will focus on a quantum computer's negative “real-world” impact and examine existing post-quantum algorithms, then provide analysis across two selected dimensions. Finally, we summarise the latest trends and gaps in post-quantum cryptography and provide the security analysis of NIST's last round finalists.
Quantum computers, although still in the theoretical stage, conceptually have the power to break many current cryptosystems, including public-key schemes., for example, RSA (Rivest, Shamir., Adleman), elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), and ElGamal. NIST specialists and national governments believe that existing cryptography algorithms will become vulnerable to brute force analysis by the end of the decade and agree that measures should be taken before then to ensure the secrecy of current and future algorithms. In this context, information security, including confidentiality and integrity, must be considered. This paper provides a systematic literature review on whether existing public-key schemes have the necessary complexity and solution space to resist a quantum computer. The discussion will focus on a quantum computer's negative “real-world” impact and examine existing post-quantum algorithms, then provide analysis across two selected dimensions. Finally, we summarise the latest trends and gaps in post-quantum cryptography and provide the security analysis of NIST's last round finalists.
The development of quantum computers poses a new security threat to network infrastructures and services, as they will be powerful enough to break the most common forms of digital encryption. Existing encryption services based on Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman (DH), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and so on are vulnerable to attacks by quantum computers. Although the gap between today’s quantum computers and the threats they pose to current public-key cryptography is large, the telecommunications landscape should begin planning for the transition to the post-quantum era as early as possible. In this paper, we examine recent advances in Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms from the perspective of the networking and telecommunications industries. The efforts are categorized at three levels, namely communication, computation (consisting of design, implementation and Public Key System (PKS)), and network. Some of the existing challenges and future recommendations for securing communication networks in the post-quantum era are also listed at the end of the paper.
The security of widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms (e.g., RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography) is expected to deteriorate once large-scale and fault-tolerant quantum computers are developed. The potential threat is severe because such algorithms underlie the IT infrastructure in modern society, such as in the financial industry. Although the threat is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been in the process of standardizing post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is designed to be secure against quantum computers. NIST has been scrutinizing the security and performance of 15 candidate algorithms (seven finalists and eight alternates). Standardization should accelerate the migration to PQC around the world, not only within the U.S. government. In this paper, we discuss recent trends in the R&D of quantum computers and the security risks of public-key cryptographic algorithms. Then we review NIST's ongoing progress in standardizing PQC and the responses of other organizations in support of the migration. Finally, we discuss future challenges for the real-world implementation of PQC.
As quantum computing advances, current cryptographic protocols are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly those based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) like RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This paper presents a comprehensive review of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as a solution to protect digital systems in the quantum era. We provide an in-depth analysis of various quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, and multivariate approaches. The review highlights the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization process, highlighting key algorithms, such as CRYSTALS–Kyber, CRYSTALS–Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, and discusses the strengths, vulnerabilities, and implementation challenges of the leading algorithms. In addition, we explore transition strategies for organizations, emphasizing hybrid cryptography to ensure backward compatibility during migration. This study offers key insights into the future of cryptographic standards and the critical steps necessary to prepare for the transition from classical to quantum-resistant systems.
The rise of the new paradigm (Quantum computing) in the recent years have created a major security challenge to classical and widely used primitive cryptography schemes such as ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) and RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) Algorithm. These classical computing algorithms depend on the problems of discrete logarithm and integer factorization respectively. Recent advancements in quantum computing have made encryption schemes more vulnerable since they are weak to some quantum attacks, like Shor’s Algorithm and Grove’s Algorithm. Therefore the call for a new set of algorithms known as Post-Quantum cryptography (PQC) that would not be vulnerable to quantum attacks is imminent. NIST haven selected some candidates in the second round of Post-Quantum Cryptographic algorithms standardization project. This work’s goal is to review these algorithms under there types. A rigorous survey on each Post-Quantum Cryptography schemes and their underlying properties will be x-rayed while recommending areas for research in this new security paradigm.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.