Abstract In the previous chapters we have shown many successful applications of quantum mechanics, and it would be a major problem not having this excellent theory available. Despite these successes, however, the basic conceptual framework has been considered by many scientists to be unsatisfactory. In this chapter we will outline the standard Copenhagen –G öttingen interpretation and some of the alternative approaches. Quantum mechanics has to be seen as a major part of more basic quantum field theories. Inevitably, many of the questions that arise are matters of opinion rather than of fact, and therefore many physicists consider that they belong more properly to philosophy than to physics. However, the conceptual basis of quantum mechanics is so fundamental to our understanding of nature that it should surely be important to physicists as well. The conception of determinism differs substantially from classical physics because quantum theory predicts only the relative probabilities of different outcomes. The feature of non-locality is another new concept which makes space-like separated events instantaneously entangled.
Abstract In the previous chapters we have shown many successful applications of quantum mechanics, and it would be a major problem not having this excellent theory available. Despite these successes, however, the basic conceptual framework has been considered by many scientists to be unsatisfactory. In this chapter we will outline the standard Copenhagen –G öttingen interpretation and some of the alternative approaches. Quantum mechanics has to be seen as a major part of more basic quantum field theories. Inevitably, many of the questions that arise are matters of opinion rather than of fact, and therefore many physicists consider that they belong more properly to philosophy than to physics. However, the conceptual basis of quantum mechanics is so fundamental to our understanding of nature that it should surely be important to physicists as well. The conception of determinism differs substantially from classical physics because quantum theory predicts only the relative probabilities of different outcomes. The feature of non-locality is another new concept which makes space-like separated events instantaneously entangled.
The previous chapters contain many examples of the successful application of quantum mechanics to the solution of real physical problems. These represent only a small sample of the wide range of experimental results, spanning just about all areas of physics and chemistry and beyond, that have been successfully explained by quantum theory. So far at least, no quantum-mechanical prediction has been experimentally falsified. Despite these successes, however, many scientists have considered the basic conceptual framework of the subject to be unsatisfactory, and repeated attempts have been made to reinterpret quantum mechanics, or even replace it with a different theory whose philosophical and conceptual basis could be considered more acceptable. In the present chapter we shall explain the reasons for this dissatisfaction and outline some of the reinterpretations and alternative approaches that have been devised. Inevitably many of the questions that arise in this area are matters of opinion rather than fact and, for this reason, some physicists consider that they belong more properly to the realm of philosophy than of physics. However, the conceptual basis of quantum mechanics is so fundamental to our whole understanding of the nature of the physical universe that it should surely be important for physicists to understand the nature of the problems involved, if nothing else.1,2 16.1 THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS In this section we outline some of the main areas of difficulty with a view to more detailed discussion later in the chapter.
This book examines in detail two of the fundamental questions raised by quantum mechanics. Is the world indeterministic? Are there connections between spatially separated objects? In the first part of the book after outlining the formalism of quantum mechanics and introducing the measurement problem, the author examines several interpretations, focusing on how each proposes to solve the measurement problem and on how each treats probability. In the second part, the author argues that there can be non-trivial relationships between probability (specifically, determinism and indeterminism) and non-locality in an interpretation of quantum mechanics. The author then re-examines some of the interpretations of part one of the book in the light of this argument, and considers how they are with regard to locality and Lorentz invariance. One of the important lessons that comes out of this discussion is that any examination of locality, and of the relationship between quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, should be undertaken in the context of a detailed interpretation of quantum mechanics. The book will appeal to anyone with an interest in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, including researchers in the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics, as well as graduate students in those fields.
Standard quantum theory is highly successful in all its applications, from photons and atoms, to semiconductors, superconductors, quarks, and so on. Yet the need to understand what the theory is really trying to tell us about the nature of the world beyond specific predictions forces us into the realm of philosophy, or, as some have dubbed it, quantum metaphysics: the study of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. There is a wide range of opinions regarding the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics. This chapter focuses on two of the most prominent interpretations: the Copenhagen interpretation, and one alternative interpretation that has been gaining some support in recent years, the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), also known as the many universes interpretation. The central issues of contention are: firstly, that the measurement of some attribute of a quantum system generally involves the probabilistic collapse, or reduction, of the state vector where the probabilistic nature of the process is inherent—that is, not reducible to a more fundamental, deterministic explanation; and, secondly, the problem of bringing a measurement to a completion—a problem generally known as the measurement paradox.
This paper deals with the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of physical theory, and the future of physics. First, the question of why there are so many different interpretations of quantum mechanics proposed and accepted by outstanding quantum experts is treated. This requires a discussion of the relation between physics and philosophy and drawing a distinction between a physical formalism and a physical explanation. The Copenhagen interpretation is considered, criticized, and found to be unsatisfactory in some respects. Finally, an interpretation that contains ideas from previous interpretations but which may itself be new, is proposed. Hopefully, this is superior to the previous interpretations. It has, I believe, the advantage of logical clarity. In the process of doing this, I introduce a theory of levels of physical theory, according to which microscopic physical theory, as it develops in successive stages, becomes more and more adaptable to explaining—or at least taking cognizance of—fundamental biological or ultimately psychological phenomena.
Since its inception, the many counter-intuitive aspects and results of quantum mechanics have provoked strong philosophical debates and many interpretations. Even fundamental issues, such as Max Born's basic rules concerning probability amplitudes and probability distributions, took decades to be appreciated by society and many leading scientists. Richard Feynman once said, think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.[48] According to Steven Weinberg, There is now in my opinion no entirely satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics. The Copenhagen interpretation - due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr - remains the quantum mechanical formalism that is currently most widely accepted amongst physicists, some 75 years after its enunciation. According to this interpretation, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is not a temporary feature which will eventually be replaced by a deterministic theory, but instead must be considered a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality. The full paper: http://www.iiste.org/PDFshare/APTA-PAGENO-307447-311734.pdf
In this monograph I present the basic structure of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 1 outlines the central ideas behind the interpretation and illustrates them by means of examples: Subsequent chapters fill in the details of the interpretation. But it is important to begin by explaining what I take an interpretation of quantum mechanics to be, and why any further interpretation needs to be offered. After all, quantum mechanics (in some form) is by now both a foundation for much of contemporary physics and a veteran of more than sixty years of intermittent but sometimes intense reflection on its content and meaning. What more can be, or should be, said about the interpretation of this theory? Many physicists believe that no more needs to be said: that there is basically only one way of understanding quantum mechanics, due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others, and that the only remaining interpretative task is that of the physics teacher, who seeks to perfect ways of conveying this understanding to new generations of students. Sir Rudolf Peierls, one of the more lucid and distinguished of these physicists, even objects to the use of the familiar term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ to refer to the way of understanding quantum mechanics due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others. Because this sounds as if there were several interpretations of quantum mechanics. There is only one. There is only one way in which you can understand quantum mechanics.[…]