Aristotle was the first to notice that entity exists not only as real, but also as possible. The Aristotelian concept of possibility has an insufficiently clear ontological sense. Aristotle does not ask about own Being of possibilities. For a classical thought it had no essential importance. In quantum physics the situation is different. Quantum possibilities have own action, so, it is necessary to recognize their own Being. However, it cannot be made within usual thinking, since quantum possibilities do not allow representation in terms of an entity present-at-hand. It sends us to Heidegger’s ideas. Classical philosophical thought does not notice an ontological difference between the “Being” and “Entity”; as a result “Being” is presented as “something”. Heidegger showed simplified nature of such approach, however the natural sciences usually accept the specified identification. A surprising exception is the quantum mechanics. Having recognized own Being of quantum possibilities, we will see the attribute of Heidegger’s ontology. This “Being” is not “Something” and is designated by me as “Ψ-Being”. It possesses the internal temporality similar to existential time of Dasein. Also the difference between “Ψ-Being” and “Being” of Heidegger’s ontology is detected. The fact is that “Ψ-Being possesses action which is capable to change definiteness of quantum entity. It offers a heuristic prospect for philosophical ontology. According to Heidegger, Dasein is the existential Being of possibilities. However, these possibilities are not connected with personal definiteness. But the quantum mechanics shows us that definiteness of “entity” (“something” or “who”) can change under the influence of “Being” that cannot be imagined in terms of “something”.
Aristotle was the first to notice that entity exists not only as real, but also as possible. The Aristotelian concept of possibility has an insufficiently clear ontological sense. Aristotle does not ask about own Being of possibilities. For a classical thought it had no essential importance. In quantum physics the situation is different. Quantum possibilities have own action, so, it is necessary to recognize their own Being. However, it cannot be made within usual thinking, since quantum possibilities do not allow representation in terms of an entity present-at-hand. It sends us to Heidegger’s ideas. Classical philosophical thought does not notice an ontological difference between the “Being” and “Entity”; as a result “Being” is presented as “something”. Heidegger showed simplified nature of such approach, however the natural sciences usually accept the specified identification. A surprising exception is the quantum mechanics. Having recognized own Being of quantum possibilities, we will see the attribute of Heidegger’s ontology. This “Being” is not “Something” and is designated by me as “Ψ-Being”. It possesses the internal temporality similar to existential time of Dasein. Also the difference between “Ψ-Being” and “Being” of Heidegger’s ontology is detected. The fact is that “Ψ-Being possesses action which is capable to change definiteness of quantum entity. It offers a heuristic prospect for philosophical ontology. According to Heidegger, Dasein is the existential Being of possibilities. However, these possibilities are not connected with personal definiteness. But the quantum mechanics shows us that definiteness of “entity” (“something” or “who”) can change under the influence of “Being” that cannot be imagined in terms of “something”.
The realized analysis shows internal communication of quantum mechanics with ontological problems which were born in sources of a rational thought and were present in the history of philosophy and science. The quantum theory describes evolution of possibility however Being of an possibility cannot be presented as the ontological subject. It leads us to new understanding of ontology. In article on the basis of plots of quantum mechanics and history of philosophy and science the new definition of Being is given and it allows to see internal unity classical and nonclassical ontology. Basic attribute of Being is two-dimensional action, which can work a) in the form of events or b) at not-event levell (in quantum mechanics it is presented through an interference of amplitudes of probability). Thus, Being comprises two internally connected level - subject and not-subject. Rationally expressed causal relationship of these two measurements is discovery which is made in the quantum theory, but has the general philosophical meaning.
The aim of the article is to analyze the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics and the relationship of various interpretations of quantum mechanics with the question of truth in scientific knowledge. The theoretical material (various interpretations of quantum mechanics) was analyzed. The research methods were analysis, comparative-historical and institutional approaches. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that physicists are only able to predict the probabilities of physical phenomena or processes, without any knowledge of the structure of entity in itself. The study helps to complement the theoretical picture of the ontology of quantum mechanics and to get an idea about the development prospects of the methodology of physical sciences. We should not ascribe properties that are unobservable in experience to the entity because science can truly interpret only the representation of entity in itself in experience and the ways of dealing with it, not future events or possible states of the entity. Otherwise, science “slides” down to the level of dialectical (rhetorical) exercises based not on true premises, but on generally accepted or “authoritative” biases, which gives room to extreme forms of relativism and takes natural scientists away from studying nature to inventing empirically unsupported hypotheses. When, in accordance with the Cartesian ontology, the scientist assumes that the entity is as the “subject” observes it (that is, the “reflection” of the entity in consciousness is identified with entity in itself), this assumption leads the scientist to attempts to “scientifically” describe the future events or the possible states of the entity. The criterion for the truth of a scientific theory put forward by Einstein in his dispute with Bohr remains a fundamentally unattainable ideal. Cognition of nature is probabilistically and fundamentally incomplete since a person can consciously comprehend natural phenomena only within the framework of their representation in the existing being. The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is due to the impossibility of knowing things as they exist by themselves, that is, as they exist outside of representation in the mind of the observer. This does not mean that physical entities did not exist before their knowledge: they existed potentially, but were not valid for the observer, that is, conscious. Quantum physics is as incomplete as any other physical theory when compared with an unattainable ideal, but this fact does not negate its truth for modern scientists since quantum theory is based on the results of verified experiments.
In the present article the author will deal with an inquiry of the ontological structure of quantum mechanics, and he will analyze the evolution of the heno-ontological equation (the identity of being one and of being) in the shape of the new arrangement prepared by the orthodox interpretation of the theory.Hence the article will particularly focus on the Copenhagen interpretation and the lack of intuition [Anschaulichkeit] in the representation of physical external objects; as far as the latter topic is concerned, the author will also consider the classic representation of Heisenberg's philosophy given by Heelan.The author will then show the impossibility of holding the old physical body-representation which worked for classical mechanics as well, because quantum mechanics denies an absolute localizability of physical entities.A non-defective determination of localizability was in fact the very postulate which lays at the basis of the heno-ontological equation as Aristotle had envisaged it: what is not localizable, is not one being.It also has to be considered a specific lack as regards the chronological permanence of the identity of the quantum object, which appears to be constantly modified by its interaction with the devices and with other particles.Accordingly, the author will explain the peculiar definition of physical entity in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics as a non-substantial entity, as a non-body, considering the argument that henceforth the actual substance, in physics, will be only the whole totality.Arguing about the latter point, the author will develop a definition of individuality which could not be extraneous to the most recent interpretations of quantum mechanics.He will indeed aim for a non strictly ontological definition of individuality, if one has to figure out the individuum as a body of daily experience.Rather than a body, the quantum individuum is almost a being whose ontological content is only relative to the transformations of a primitive context: this implies that his ontological charge cannot be considered permanent.From this point of view, one can argue that quantum mechanics is very close to the old representation of nature as being by the ancient Greek physicists, which tended to distinguish between the ontological definition of individual entities and the unity of being as a whole.Hence the article will show, through Cassirer's review, how it is possible to depict a new setting for the relationship between one and being, as well as trying to shed some light on the basic assumptions of the ontology of Copenhagen interpretation and of modern quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics has maintained over the years the reputation of being "the most obscure theory." It works perfectly well, but nobody seems to know why. It has been argued that the difficulty in understanding quantum theory is our failed attempt to force onto it a wrong conceptual scheme, wanting at all costs to think about the objects of the theory as, precisely, objects, i.e., entities having continuously actual spatiotemporal properties. This too restrictive spatiotemporal scheme is most probably at the heart of the problem, as also underlined by the Einsteinian revolution, but then what could be an alternative? Many thinkers have suggested that we must surrender to the fact that our physical world is one of immanent powers and potencies. Aristotle did so ante quantum litteram, followed by scholars like Heisenberg, Primas, Shimony, Piron, Kastner, Kauffman, de Ronde, just to name a few, including the authors, who were both students of Piron in Geneva. However, if on the one hand a potentiality ontology puts the accent on the processes of change, responsible for the incessant shifts between actual and potential properties, on the other hand it does not tell what these changes are all about. In other words, the metaphysical question remains of identifying the nature of the bearer of these potencies, or potentialities, and of the entities that can actualize them. It is the purpose of the present article to emphasize that the above question has found a possible answer in the recent Conceptuality Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, which we believe offers the missing ontology and metaphysics that can make the theory fully intelligible, and even intuitive.
According to de Ronde it was Bohr's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) which closed the possibility of understanding physical reality beyond the realm of the actual, so establishing the Orthodox Line of Research. In this sense, it is not the task of any physical theory to look beyond the language and metaphysics supposed by classical physics, in order to account for what QM describes. If one wishes to maintain a realist position (though not nave) regarding physical theories, one seems then to be trapped by an array of concepts that do not allow to understand the main principles involved in the most successful physical theory thus far, mainly: the quantum postulate, the principle of indetermination and the superposition principle. If de Ronde is right in proposing QM can only be completed as a physical theory by the introduction of `new concepts' that admit as real a domain beyond actuality, then a new ontology that goes beyond Aristotelian and Newtonian actualism is needed. It was already in the early 20th century that misunderstood philosopher Alexius von Meinong proposed a Theory of Objects that admits a domain of being beyond existence-actuality. Member of the so called `School of Brentano', Meinong's concerns were oriented to provide an ontology of everything that can be thought of, and at the same time an intentionality theory of how objects are thought of. I wish to argue that in Meinong's theory of objects we find the rudiments of the ontology and the intentionality theory we need to account for QM's basic principles: mainly the possibility of predicating properties of non-entities, or in other words, the possibility of objectively describing a domain of what is, that is different from the domain of actual existence.