Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Oxford University Press eBooks

The Tree of Life: Agency and Immortality in a Metaphysics Inspired by Quantum Theory

Peter Forrest

Published Jan 25, 2007• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Recently several philosophers including Huw Price, Peter Lewis, and David Lewis have argued that on one interpretation of quantum theory (genus Indeterminacy, species No Collapse) death is an illusion.1 Taking Schroedinger’s unhappy cat as the standard example, this interpretation tells us that it is as if the whole universe splits into two copies in one of which the cat survives and in the other there is a corpse. Fission into a living organism on the one hand and a corpse on the other is, most of us agree, a way of surviving.2 So we arrive at the first premise, namely that organisms survive situations like that of SchrÖdinger’s cat.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780199277506.003.0014

Related papers

SHOULD WE FEAR QUANTUM TORMENT?

István A. Aranyosi

Abstract The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1

Ratio•Aug 15, 2012•4 citations

The paradox of Schrodinger's cat

C N Villars

Erwin Schrodinger first described the thought-experiment which has since become known as 'the paradox of Schrodinger's cat' 51 years ago. In recent years, popular accounts of quantum mechanics have tended to adopt one or other of the philosophically most extreme solutions to this paradox, i.e. the consciousness hypothesis or the many worlds interpretation. The author attempts to redress the balance by describing what he takes to be the orthodox solution to the paradox which explains the paradox, without recourse to such counterintuitive notions as a cat simultaneously dead and alive or a universe continually splitting into multiple worlds, as being due to a misapplication of the quantum formalism.

Physics Education•Jul 1, 1986•8 citations

The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory.

John Halpin, Henry Krips

The interplay between non-relativistic quantum theory and metaphysics has generated radically opposed interpretations for quantum theory: Niels Bohr's 'orthodox' interpretation, and Einstein's 'realist' one. Out of this debate emerged the classical first-generation paradoxes of quantum theory: Schrodinger's Cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradoxes. And more recently a range of new paradoxes has emerged from the work of J.S. Bell which questions the `local' nature of quantum theory, prefiguring a return either to an action-at-a-distance metaphysics or to a radically holistic conception of matter. This book outlines the contours of these debates, and presents an interpretation of quantum theory which, while metaphysically realist, resolves most of the paradoxes. This interpretation takes quantum systems to be fuzzy particles, piloted by fields of propensities which are represented by density operators on Hilbert space; and constitutes, in part, a return to an earlier view of quantum systems advanced by De Broglie, Schrodinger, Born, and Einstein. A book for philosophers and physicists who are interested in the philo sophy o f science.

The Philosophical Review•Jul 1, 1991•38 citations

David Lewis and Schro dinger’s Cat

David Papineau

Abstract In ‘How Many Lives Has Schro dinger’s Cat?’ David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does. On 27 June 2001, not four months before his untimely death, David Lewis delivered the third Jack Smart Lecture at the Australian National University. His title was ‘How Many Lives has Schro dinger’s Cat?’ > and he spoke on a topic which is absent from his published writings, the interpretation of quantum mechanics. More specifically, he discussed the ‘no-collapse’ interpretation of quantum mechanics pioneered by Hugh Everett III [1957]. Lewis allowed that this interpretation offers initial theoretical attractions, but also argued that it suffers from irremediable flaws. If you have heard of Everett because of his association with the ‘many-worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics popularised by Bryce Dewitt [1970; 1973], you might suppose that there is some affinity between the no-collapse interpretation and Lewis’s philosophical realism about possible worlds. But this would be a mistake. While Everett’s interpretation does add extra ‘branches’ to the reality recognized by common sense, these additions fall far short of Lewis’s multiplication of worlds. For a start, the extra ‘branches’ that Everett adds to reality all lie within the actual world that evolves from the actual initial conditions in line with the actual laws of physics-these branches by no means include all possibilities. Moreover, Everett’s branches are best conceived, not as sundering’s of the whole universe, but rather as entities that spread out causally at finite speeds, ‘like ripples on a pond’, as Lewis puts it. For example, in the Schro dinger’s Cat experiment, firstthe photon branches into a deflected and undeflected version when it passes through the half-silvered mirror; thenthe detector branches into a triggered and untriggered state when it interacts with the photon; thenthe poison bottle branches into a smashed bottle and an unsmashed bottle under the influence of the detector; and so on, culminating in the cat branching into a live and dead cat, and the human observer branching into a self who sees a live cat and a self who sees a dead cat. >

Oxford University Press eBooks•Sep 2, 2004•0 citations

The Schrödinger Cat: Physics, Myth, and Philosophy

C. S. Unnikrishnan

The most discussed of ``live'' metaphors in physical sciences is that of the Schrödinger cat. Introduced in the early, but mature days of the new quantum theory, in 1935, the parable of the cat has provoked and enlivened debates on the meaning of the quantum theory, on the ontology of the quantum wavefunction, on the puzzle of the collapse of the wavefunction, on the meaning of quantum measurement, and on the boundary between the quantum world and the classical world. In this article, I will discuss these issues of the quantum theory focussing on various aspects of the metaphor of the Schrödinger cat.

arXiv:2107.10241•Jul 20, 2021•0 citations

A Requiem For Schrödinger's Cat

Thomas L. Wilson

It is pointed out that Schrödinger's celebrated "cat" paradox contains a simple error in reasoning regarding the definition of life. It is then shown that there is no paradox in the context of life as we currently understand it.

arXiv:1208.4375•Aug 18, 2012•0 citations
Abstract Recently several philosophers including Huw Price, Peter Lewis, and David Lewis have argued that on one interpretation of quantum theory (genus Indeterminacy, species No Collapse) death is an illusion.1 Taking Schroedinger’s unhappy cat as the standard example, this interpretation tells us that it is as if the whole universe splits into two copies in one of which the cat survives and in the other there is a corpse. Fission into a living organism on the one hand and a corpse on the other is, most of us agree, a way of surviving.2 So we arrive at the first premise, namely that organisms survive situations like that of SchrÖdinger’s cat.
Abstract The prospect, in terms of subjective expectations, of immortality under the no‐collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is certain, as pointed out by several authors, both physicists and, more recently, philosophers. The argument, known as quantum suicide, or quantum immortality, has received some critical discussion, but there hasn't been any questioning of David Lewis's point that there is a terrifying corollary to the argument, namely, that we should expect to live forever in a crippled, more and more damaged state, that barely sustains life. This is the prospect of eternal quantum torment. Based on some empirical facts, I argue for a conclusion that is much more reassuring than Lewis's terrible scenario. 1
Erwin Schrodinger first described the thought-experiment which has since become known as 'the paradox of Schrodinger's cat' 51 years ago. In recent years, popular accounts of quantum mechanics have tended to adopt one or other of the philosophically most extreme solutions to this paradox, i.e. the consciousness hypothesis or the many worlds interpretation. The author attempts to redress the balance by describing what he takes to be the orthodox solution to the paradox which explains the paradox, without recourse to such counterintuitive notions as a cat simultaneously dead and alive or a universe continually splitting into multiple worlds, as being due to a misapplication of the quantum formalism.
The interplay between non-relativistic quantum theory and metaphysics has generated radically opposed interpretations for quantum theory: Niels Bohr's 'orthodox' interpretation, and Einstein's 'realist' one. Out of this debate emerged the classical first-generation paradoxes of quantum theory: Schrodinger's Cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradoxes. And more recently a range of new paradoxes has emerged from the work of J.S. Bell which questions the `local' nature of quantum theory, prefiguring a return either to an action-at-a-distance metaphysics or to a radically holistic conception of matter. This book outlines the contours of these debates, and presents an interpretation of quantum theory which, while metaphysically realist, resolves most of the paradoxes. This interpretation takes quantum systems to be fuzzy particles, piloted by fields of propensities which are represented by density operators on Hilbert space; and constitutes, in part, a return to an earlier view of quantum systems advanced by De Broglie, Schrodinger, Born, and Einstein. A book for philosophers and physicists who are interested in the philo sophy o f science.
Abstract In ‘How Many Lives Has Schro dinger’s Cat?’ David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does. On 27 June 2001, not four months before his untimely death, David Lewis delivered the third Jack Smart Lecture at the Australian National University. His title was ‘How Many Lives has Schro dinger’s Cat?’ > and he spoke on a topic which is absent from his published writings, the interpretation of quantum mechanics. More specifically, he discussed the ‘no-collapse’ interpretation of quantum mechanics pioneered by Hugh Everett III [1957]. Lewis allowed that this interpretation offers initial theoretical attractions, but also argued that it suffers from irremediable flaws. If you have heard of Everett because of his association with the ‘many-worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics popularised by Bryce Dewitt [1970; 1973], you might suppose that there is some affinity between the no-collapse interpretation and Lewis’s philosophical realism about possible worlds. But this would be a mistake. While Everett’s interpretation does add extra ‘branches’ to the reality recognized by common sense, these additions fall far short of Lewis’s multiplication of worlds. For a start, the extra ‘branches’ that Everett adds to reality all lie within the actual world that evolves from the actual initial conditions in line with the actual laws of physics-these branches by no means include all possibilities. Moreover, Everett’s branches are best conceived, not as sundering’s of the whole universe, but rather as entities that spread out causally at finite speeds, ‘like ripples on a pond’, as Lewis puts it. For example, in the Schro dinger’s Cat experiment, firstthe photon branches into a deflected and undeflected version when it passes through the half-silvered mirror; thenthe detector branches into a triggered and untriggered state when it interacts with the photon; thenthe poison bottle branches into a smashed bottle and an unsmashed bottle under the influence of the detector; and so on, culminating in the cat branching into a live and dead cat, and the human observer branching into a self who sees a live cat and a self who sees a dead cat. >
The most discussed of ``live'' metaphors in physical sciences is that of the Schrödinger cat. Introduced in the early, but mature days of the new quantum theory, in 1935, the parable of the cat has provoked and enlivened debates on the meaning of the quantum theory, on the ontology of the quantum wavefunction, on the puzzle of the collapse of the wavefunction, on the meaning of quantum measurement, and on the boundary between the quantum world and the classical world. In this article, I will discuss these issues of the quantum theory focussing on various aspects of the metaphor of the Schrödinger cat.