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Wiley eBooks

Cyber Crime Attack Vulnerability Review for Quantum Computing

Vaishnavi Gawde, Vanshika Goswami, Balwinder Kaur Dhaliwal, Sunil Parihar, Rupali Chaure, Mandakini Ingle

Published Oct 13, 2023• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The frequency of cyberattacks is rising as internet usage grows more prevalent. As the race for quantum computing (QC) progresses, QC businesses and research organisations may be targeted by nation states, cybercriminals, and hacktivists for financial gain and destruction. This essay examines the state of QC technology and how cybersecurity is connected to QC. We now go into the dangers and recommended practises for preventing the quickly developing cybercrimes. Following that, we put out suggestions on how to proactively lower the cyberattack surface using threat intelligence and by ensuring that quantum software and hardware components are secure by design. Once large-scale and fault-tolerant Qcomp(Qcomp) are built, it is projected that the security of widely used public-key science techniques (such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography) would worsen. Due to the fact that these algorithms are at the core of modern society's IT infrastructure, including the financial industry, the potential threat is serious. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been working on a technique of standardising post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is designed to be safe against Qcomp, even if the danger is unlikely to materialise in the predictable future. NIST has been examining the performance and security of fifteen potential algorithms (seven finalists and eight alternate candidates). Standardization should hasten the transition to PQC globally, not only in the United States. In this chapter, we will discuss current developments in Qcomp analysis and development as well as the security problems associated with public-key scientific algorithms. Then we cover NIST's ongoing PQC standardisation efforts and, therefore, the responses of various organisations in favour of the migration. Finally, we discuss potential difficulties with applying PQC in the actual world.

DOI
10.1002/9781394167401.ch29

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The frequency of cyberattacks is rising as internet usage grows more prevalent. As the race for quantum computing (QC) progresses, QC businesses and research organisations may be targeted by nation states, cybercriminals, and hacktivists for financial gain and destruction. This essay examines the state of QC technology and how cybersecurity is connected to QC. We now go into the dangers and recommended practises for preventing the quickly developing cybercrimes. Following that, we put out suggestions on how to proactively lower the cyberattack surface using threat intelligence and by ensuring that quantum software and hardware components are secure by design. Once large-scale and fault-tolerant Qcomp(Qcomp) are built, it is projected that the security of widely used public-key science techniques (such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography) would worsen. Due to the fact that these algorithms are at the core of modern society's IT infrastructure, including the financial industry, the potential threat is serious. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been working on a technique of standardising post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is designed to be safe against Qcomp, even if the danger is unlikely to materialise in the predictable future. NIST has been examining the performance and security of fifteen potential algorithms (seven finalists and eight alternate candidates). Standardization should hasten the transition to PQC globally, not only in the United States. In this chapter, we will discuss current developments in Qcomp analysis and development as well as the security problems associated with public-key scientific algorithms. Then we cover NIST's ongoing PQC standardisation efforts and, therefore, the responses of various organisations in favour of the migration. Finally, we discuss potential difficulties with applying PQC in the actual world.
The security of widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms (e.g., RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography) is expected to deteriorate once large-scale and fault-tolerant quantum computers are developed. The potential threat is severe because such algorithms underlie the IT infrastructure in modern society, such as in the financial industry. Although the threat is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been in the process of standardizing post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is designed to be secure against quantum computers. NIST has been scrutinizing the security and performance of 15 candidate algorithms (seven finalists and eight alternates). Standardization should accelerate the migration to PQC around the world, not only within the U.S. government. In this paper, we discuss recent trends in the R&D of quantum computers and the security risks of public-key cryptographic algorithms. Then we review NIST's ongoing progress in standardizing PQC and the responses of other organizations in support of the migration. Finally, we discuss future challenges for the real-world implementation of PQC.
With rising cyberattack frequency and range, Quantum Computing companies, institutions and research groups may become targets of nation-state actors, cybercriminals and hacktivists for sabotage, espionage and fiscal motivations as the Quantum computing race intensifies. Quantum applications have expanded into commercial, classical information systems and services approaching the necessity to protect their networks, software, hardware and data from digital attacks. This paper discusses the status quo of quantum computing technologies and the quantum threat associated with it. We proceed to outline threat vectors for quantum computing systems and the respective defensive measures, mitigations and best practices to defend against the rapidly evolving threat landscape. We subsequently propose recommendations on how to proactively reduce the cyberattack surface through threat intelligence and by ensuring security by design of quantum software and hardware components.
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As the race to develop practical quantum computers heats up, businesses, academic institutions, and research organisations working in the field may find themselves the focus of increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks for espionage, economic gain, and other nefarious purposes. As a consequence of the proliferation of quantum applications, conventional commercial information systems and services are rapidly approaching the point at which they will be required to protect their networks, software, hardware, and data from being subjected to digital assaults. This is the case as a result of the fact that quantum applications have been expanding. In this paper, we take a look at the present level of quantum computing as well as the risks that are associated with the emergence of this new area. We next proceed to describe potential attack vectors against quantum computing systems and the countermeasures, precautions, and best practises that can be taken to protect against them. After that, we propose suggestions for proactively reducing the cyberattack surface through threat intelligence and by ensuring the security by design of quantum software and hardware components.
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With the arrival of fault-tolerant quantum computers, an existential threat has come to the cryptographic underpinnings of the security infrastructure in place for modern information technologies. Virtually all secure digital communication protocols used today are based on classical public-key cryptographic systems – RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Diffie-Hellman key exchange – that are susceptible to polynomial-time quantum attacks using Shor's algorithm. Symmetric cryptographic algorithms that are not broken are being effectively halved by Grover's algorithm, for example, AES. In this article, a complete and journal-standard systematic review of quantum computing and its implications in the field of information technology security is presented which includes 22 peer-reviewed publications from 2023-2025. The study covers the basics of quantum computing (qubits, superposition, entanglement and quantum gates), and how quantum computing specifically poses a threat to classical cryptography via algorithmic mechanisms. The three post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that were standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in August 2024 (ML-KEM, FIPS 203; ML-DSA, FIPS 204; and SLH-DSA, FIPS 205) are compared based on their security assumptions, performance, and readiness for deployment. The practical limitations and the use of Quantum Key Distribution, (QKD), as a physics based alternative to the computational security assumptions are discussed. Results show that although mature PQ solutions are now available for most cryptographic applications, the migration challenge, including legacy system transitions, migration architecture, and governance, is significant and pressing as the ‘harvest now, decrypt later’ threat model is relevant and adversaries might be collecting encrypted data for quantum decryption. The impact for financial services, health care, government, cloud infrastructure and critical national infrastructure is discussed. Lastly, the researchers list key research areas: standardisation of quantum-safe protocols, hybrid PQC-QKD designs, light-weight PQC for constrained devices, and quantum-safe blockchain.