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Lecture notes in networks and systems

A Password-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol via Zero-Knowledge Proof Solution

Mostefa Kara, Konstantinos Κarampidis, Zaoui Sayah, Abdelkader Laouid, Giorgos M. Papadourakis, Mohammad Nadir Abid

Published Jan 1, 2023• 27 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-40598-3_4

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Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols are essential for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data communications. Mutual authentication between client and server is crucial in high-security scenarios such as finance and government. However, existing TLS protocols typically rely on certificate-based public key infrastructures (PKI) for client authentication, which increases deployment complexity and introduces risks associated with third-party trust. In contrast, password-authenticated TLS protocols use memorable passwords for client authentication, offering advantages in simplicity and usability. Nonetheless, such protocols remain vulnerable to server compromise and fail to provide sufficient security against quantum adversaries.To address these challenges, we propose a novel TLS protocol based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). The protocol employs an asymmetric PAKE mechanism wherein only password-derived information is stored on the server, while the client derives its private key from the password. This design effectively mitigates the risk of server leakage attacks. The protocol further integrates two types of post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs): an OW-ChCCA (One-Way Checkable against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks) secure KEM for server key exchange and authentication, and an OW-PCA (One-Way Plaintext-Checkable Attacks) secure KEM for binding the client’s password-derived private key to enable client authentication. Both KEMs support multi-user, multi-challenge settings and admit tight, post-quantum secure instantiations.Furthermore, this paper provides a formal security analysis of the proposed protocol within an optimized multi-stage key exchange model. By combining the random oracle and ideal cipher models with a game-based proof methodology, we demonstrate that the protocol achieves mutual authentication and forward secrecy, while also providing tight security bounds and post-quantum resilience. This work thus presents a promising solution for constructing post-quantum password-authenticated TLS protocols.

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Zero Knowledge Proofs based on computational hardness assumptions are fundamental primitives for secure user authentication. This paper proposes a novel Designated Verifier Zero Knowledge Proof that leverages the inherent randomness of quantum bits. Unlike traditional constructions relying on computationally intractable NP problems, the proposed protocol derives its security from the physical layer, specifically the uncertainty principle of quantum state projections in misaligned measurement bases. A rigorous formal mathematical analysis establishes the completeness, soundness and zero knowledge properties of the scheme. Furthermore, the protocol’s performance is evaluated via a quantum simulator under realistic error-prone conditions. The results demonstrate that the construction is robust against dishonest parties while remaining feasible under constrained quantum resources, offering a scalable approach for secure quantum authentication.

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Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols are essential for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data communications. Mutual authentication between client and server is crucial in high-security scenarios such as finance and government. However, existing TLS protocols typically rely on certificate-based public key infrastructures (PKI) for client authentication, which increases deployment complexity and introduces risks associated with third-party trust. In contrast, password-authenticated TLS protocols use memorable passwords for client authentication, offering advantages in simplicity and usability. Nonetheless, such protocols remain vulnerable to server compromise and fail to provide sufficient security against quantum adversaries.To address these challenges, we propose a novel TLS protocol based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). The protocol employs an asymmetric PAKE mechanism wherein only password-derived information is stored on the server, while the client derives its private key from the password. This design effectively mitigates the risk of server leakage attacks. The protocol further integrates two types of post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs): an OW-ChCCA (One-Way Checkable against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks) secure KEM for server key exchange and authentication, and an OW-PCA (One-Way Plaintext-Checkable Attacks) secure KEM for binding the client’s password-derived private key to enable client authentication. Both KEMs support multi-user, multi-challenge settings and admit tight, post-quantum secure instantiations.Furthermore, this paper provides a formal security analysis of the proposed protocol within an optimized multi-stage key exchange model. By combining the random oracle and ideal cipher models with a game-based proof methodology, we demonstrate that the protocol achieves mutual authentication and forward secrecy, while also providing tight security bounds and post-quantum resilience. This work thus presents a promising solution for constructing post-quantum password-authenticated TLS protocols.
Identity verification is the process of confirming an individual's claimed identity, which is essential in sectors like finance, healthcare, and online services to ensure security and prevent fraud. However, current password/PIN-based identity solutions are susceptible to phishing or skimming attacks, where malicious intermediaries attempt to steal credentials using fake identification portals. Alikhani et al. [Nature, 2021] began exploring identity verification through graph coloring-based relativistic zero-knowledge proofs (RZKPs), a key cryptographic primitive that enables a prover to demonstrate knowledge of secret credentials to a verifier without disclosing any information about the secret. Our work advances this field and addresses unresolved issues: From an engineering perspective, we relax further the relativistic constraints from 60m to 30m, and significantly enhance the stability and scalability of the experimental demonstration of the 2-prover graph coloring-based RZKP protocol for near-term use cases. At the same time, for long-term security against entangled malicious provers, we propose a modified protocol with comparable computation and communication costs, we establish an upper bound on the soundness parameter for this modified protocol. On the other hand, we extend the two-prover, two-verifier setup to a three-prover configuration, demonstrating the security of such relativistic protocols against entangled malicious provers.
Zero Knowledge Proofs based on computational hardness assumptions are fundamental primitives for secure user authentication. This paper proposes a novel Designated Verifier Zero Knowledge Proof that leverages the inherent randomness of quantum bits. Unlike traditional constructions relying on computationally intractable NP problems, the proposed protocol derives its security from the physical layer, specifically the uncertainty principle of quantum state projections in misaligned measurement bases. A rigorous formal mathematical analysis establishes the completeness, soundness and zero knowledge properties of the scheme. Furthermore, the protocol’s performance is evaluated via a quantum simulator under realistic error-prone conditions. The results demonstrate that the construction is robust against dishonest parties while remaining feasible under constrained quantum resources, offering a scalable approach for secure quantum authentication.