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Electronics Letters

First end‐to‐end PQC protected DPU‐to‐DPU communications

Abraham Cano Aguilera, X. Arnal i Clemente, D.C. Lawo, Idelfonso Tafur Monroy, Juan José Vegas Olmos

Published Sep 1, 2023• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract The appearance of quantum computing in the short foreseeable future and its capability to break conventional cryptographic algorithms forces to change the paradigm of secure real‐time communications. Thus, government organizations, data centers, and enterprises among others are migrating their public key infrastructure towards using post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms in order to mitigate the security threats posed by quantum computers. This letter presents the first quantum resilient secure end‐to‐end communication link based on PQC algorithms operating between two data‐processing units DPU. Both data‐processing units employ on‐board ARM processors to perform the computationally expensive cryptographic building blocks—in that case CRYSTALS‐Kyber as a key encapsulation mechanism and CRYSTALS‐Dilithium for digital signature scheme in combination with advanced encryption standard with 256‐bit key.

DOI
10.1049/ell2.12901

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Abstract The appearance of quantum computing in the short foreseeable future and its capability to break conventional cryptographic algorithms forces to change the paradigm of secure real‐time communications. Thus, government organizations, data centers, and enterprises among others are migrating their public key infrastructure towards using post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms in order to mitigate the security threats posed by quantum computers. This letter presents the first quantum resilient secure end‐to‐end communication link based on PQC algorithms operating between two data‐processing units DPU. Both data‐processing units employ on‐board ARM processors to perform the computationally expensive cryptographic building blocks—in that case CRYSTALS‐Kyber as a key encapsulation mechanism and CRYSTALS‐Dilithium for digital signature scheme in combination with advanced encryption standard with 256‐bit key.
The imminent appearance of Quantum Computers poses a threat to the cryptographic algorithms used by public key infrastructure (PKI) of world-wide used communication protocols. High performance computing (HPC) data centers, among others entities, being well aware of the catastrophic consequences of quantum attacks to their PKI, are transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC), despite the considerable associated overhead on handling the incoming network packets. This work helps with the transition to PQC providing an implementation of a quantum-resilient security protocol for communication between data processing units (DPU). Our solution ensures quantum security providing PQ authentication by means of CRYSTALS-Dilithium, PQ authenticated Key exchanges by means of CRYSTALS-Kyber and confidential transmission of data by means of AES-256. Additionally, the implementation on DPUs help reducing the computational load on the HPC data centers.
As the advent of quantum computing threatens traditional cryptographic protocols, hybrid classical-quantum secure communication infrastructures have emerged as a critical frontier in cybersecurity. This paper explores the integration of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms—specifically CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation and CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures—into hybrid communication architectures designed to resist quantum-level attacks. Leveraging lattice-based cryptographic primitives, both algorithms have been selected for standardization by NIST due to their robust security and performance characteristics. This study evaluates their implementation in real-world communication stacks, assesses latency and throughput under hybrid channel configurations, and proposes a layered security architecture combining classical and quantum-resilient mechanisms. Furthermore, it examines key management, digital trust, and infrastructure scalability in a post-quantum context. Simulation results and hardware-based validations are used to determine practical deployment feasibility in critical sectors such as finance, defense, and healthcare. The findings offer a comprehensive framework for securing data in transitional computing eras, ensuring forward secrecy, and maintaining operational integrity against future adversarial quantum threats.
ABSTRACT Quantum computing poses a looming threat to the cryptographic primitives that secure today's satellite communications. In response, post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged to protect data against future quantum‐enabled adversaries. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of lattice‐based PQC methods for secure satellite communication in the post‐quantum era. We examine the performance and security of leading lattice‐based schemes—including encryption/key‐establishment algorithms like CRYSTALS‐Kyber and NTRU, and digital signature schemes like CRYSTALS‐Dilithium and FALCON—in the context of satellite systems. Real‐world benchmark data from peer‐reviewed sources are used to evaluate computational efficiency, bandwidth overhead, memory footprint, and energy consumption of these schemes on resource‐constrained satellite hardware. We compare lattice‐based approaches with classical RSA/ECC and alternative post‐quantum techniques (hash‐based signatures, code‐based encryption), highlighting the favorable trade‐offs that have led to lattice‐based algorithms becoming primary candidates for standardization. Security analysis is presented to explain the hardness assumptions (e.g., Learning With Errors and NTRU problems) that underpin lattice cryptography, and to assess known cryptanalytic results, resistance to quantum attacks, and remaining security margins. We also discuss practical considerations for deploying lattice‐based cryptography on satellites, including integration into existing communication protocols, potential need for hardware acceleration, and strategies for cryptographic agility in long‐lived space assets. The results show that lattice‐based PQC can be feasibly implemented in satellites with acceptable performance impact, providing strong security against quantum threats and a viable path to future‐proof the confidentiality and authenticity of satellite communications.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant challenges to traditional cryptographic systems, threatening the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of digital communications. This paper investigates the integration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms into mobile communication systems to address these challenges. The study focuses on evaluating key PQC algorithms shortlisted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+, within the context of 5G and future mobile network architectures. The research encompasses the design and implementation of an experimental framework involving mobile devices, servers, and cloud-based infrastructure to simulate real-world communication scenarios. Performance metrics such as key generation time, signature generation, encryption and decryption speed, and resource consumption were analyzed across various devices to identify algorithms suitable for mobile environments. The findings reveal that lattice-based algorithms, such as Kyber and Dilithium, offer a promising balance between security and efficiency, making them ideal for resource-constrained devices. In contrast, hash-based algorithms like SPHINCS+ exhibit higher computational demands, limiting their practicality in certain applications. This work highlights the importance of algorithm selection and hardware optimization in ensuring secure and efficient communications in the quantum era. By integrating theoretical advancements in PQC with practical applications, this research lays the foundation for quantum-resistant security in mobile networks, ensuring secure and future-ready digital communications.
The development of quantum computers poses a risk to the cryptographic algorithms utilized by current public key infrastructure (PKI). High performance computing (HPC), inter- and intra-datacenter communications, and governmental communications are particularly vulnerable to security attacks by quantum computers. In response, there are on-going efforts on implementing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) despite the considerable overhead involved in processing PQC encrypted data packets in comparison with their classical counterparts. This work aims to help with the transition to quantum resistant cryptographic schemes by means of providing a thorough experimental performance comparison of the four algorithms selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for standardization when implemented in a data processing unit (DPU). The experiments are conducted at line-rate, demonstrating for the first time operation at almost 100 Gbit/s and hence suitability for high-capacity data center environments.
The practice of securely transmitting messages in an unreadable form dates back to the dawn of humanity. Currently, cryptographic algorithms serve as the backbone of cybersecurity, safeguarding a wide array of data from personal emails and instant messages to online banking and national secrets, by ensuring Confidentiality, Integrity, and Trust within our digital infrastructure. However, with Quantum Computing's significant high-speed advancement, classical encryption algorithms risk becoming obsolete posing an imminent threat to data security. This paper delivers a technical review of recent reputable academic research on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to provide further understanding of why PQC – a new generation of algorithms designed to withstand quantum attacks, could be crucial in safeguarding digital infrastructure as quantum computing continues to evolve. On August 13, 2024, NIST released the first 3 finalized post-quantum encryption standard (CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Shinks+), while emphasizing the importance for relevant leadership to prepare and start implementing the appropriate system timely.