The security of the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol through untrusted nodes has been directly proven using fundamental entropy uncertainty relations. Reasons for the amazing coincidence of the expressions for the secrete key length in the BB84 and MDI protocols are presented.
The security of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is fundamentally constrained by vulnerabilities of single-photon detectors. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) was proposed to remove this limitation by allowing all measurements to be performed by a completely untrusted party, under the assumption that the measurement node can be treated as adversarial but does not compromise the security guarantees of the protocol.
Here we show that this assumption is insufficient under realistic adversarial control of the measurement device. We present an attack in which an adversary exploits active control of the measurement node (Charlie) to obtain significant information about the secret key. The attack enables recovery of up to 70\% of the sifted key while introducing only 5.6\% quantum bit error rate. Unlike previously reported attacks targeting specific implementations of MDI-QKD, our results demonstrate a limitation of the standard security model underlying the protocol.
These findings indicate that additional constraints on the measurement-device independence assumption, or refined security analyses incorporating stronger adversarial capabilities, are required to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in realistic scenarios.
The aim of the research is to analyze the secrecy of quantum key distribution through untrusted nodes in quantum networks. Research method: the use of entropy uncertainty relations. Result(s) of the study: the secrecy of quantum key distribution through untrusted nodes in quantum networks is proved. The use of entropy uncertainty relations makes it possible to obtain an accurate solution for the length of the secret key in the single-photon case. A comparison with the exact solution for the BB84 protocol is made and the fundamental difference in the logical structure of proof of the secrecy of keys in these protocols is clearly shown, which, in our opinion, is important for the development of quantum cryptography systems. Scientific novelty: the article proves the secrecy of quantum key distribution through untrusted nodes in quantum networks.
Abstract A proof of the secrecy of the quantum key distribution through an untrusted node is given. The use of entropy uncertainty relations allows us to obtain an exact solution for the length of the secret key in the single-photon case. Comparison with the exact solution for the BB84 protocol is made and the principal difference in the logical structure of the key secrecy proofs in these protocols is clearly shown, which, in our opinion, is important for the development of quantum cryptography systems.
This report reviews two quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols: the BB84 protocol and the measurement device independent (MDI) QKD protocol. The goal of this report is to recreate the security proof of the BB84 protocol, to generate the secret key rate for a practical application of the BB84 protocol, both with and without decoy states, and to review the MDI-QKD protocol and look at the advantages it has for practical QKD. The proof security of the BB84 protocol is done by designing an equivalent theoretical protocol and proving its security by bounding the information of the eavesdropper to an exponentially small number. The best distance over which secret key rate can be generated with the practical model of the BB84 protocol that is presented in this report, is 165 km. This is achieved by employing decoy states and is more than three times as far as the model can achieve without decoy states, which gave a distance of 52 km at best. The zero distance key rate of the model with decoy states is R = 1.21 · 10-2 bits per pulse (bpp), at best. This is an order of magnitude larger than R =1.02 · 10-3 bpp, which is what the model without decoy states could produce. The decoy state method is therefore an improvement for practical QKD. By reviewing the MDI-QKD protocol it can be concluded that because it eliminates the measurement device side channels, it is very useful for practical QKD, since it makes security analysis simpler and more precise. It also necessarily employs decoy states, which improves the secret key rate. MDI-QKD therefore is a promising protocol to use for future quantum communications.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are unconditionally secure, providing that quantum devices are truthful. Device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD) protocols offer the prospect of distributing secret keys with minimal assumptions. The DI-QKD protocols are hard to implement using the current technologies as they require all the quantum devices to be uncharacterized. Measurement device independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocols assume that the measurement devices are not truthful; the adversary might make them. MDI-QKD is secure but more challenging to implement. Receiver-device-independent quantum key distribution (RDI-QKD) protocols assume that the receiver's measurement devices can be viewed as a black box while the sender's device can be trusted. RDI-QKD relies on reasonable assumptions that make it easy to implement using the current state-of-the-art technology. We propose an RDI-QKD protocol, called DGL22. DGL22 is secure against all known attacks that are allowed by quantum mechanics. DGL22 provides several benefits over previous protocols, including the capability to attain high communication and sifting efficiency.