The philosophical goal is to characterize ‘path dependence’ (PAD) in science by comparison to PAD in technology where the concept was initially introduced. I rely on quantum mechanics to substantiate the analyses, exploiting the contrast between standard versus Bohmian quantum physics (NQP/BQP). To achieve the goal, counterfactual history is mobilized as a means to generate instructive virtual alternatives to the actual scientific path: I design a ‘permuted-situations counterfactual scenario’ in which it is BQP, instead of NQP, that first acquires a monopoly on physics and is exclusively practiced in science education, before NQP is introduced. Then, I endeavor to ‘reenact’ – as forensic investigators carry out the re-enactment of a crime scene – how virtual mainstream Bohmians would assess NQP. Contrasting the two ‘views from inside’ – ‘what it is like to be’ a standard quantum physicist in our world (a physicist trained in NQP) and what it would be like to be a physicist exclusively trained in BQP – I attempt to come as close as possible to an ‘experience’ of the gestalt switch involved when shuttling back and forth between one scientific worldview to the other. The effects of PAD in physics are discussed on this basis.
The philosophical goal is to characterize ‘path dependence’ (PAD) in science by comparison to PAD in technology where the concept was initially introduced. I rely on quantum mechanics to substantiate the analyses, exploiting the contrast between standard versus Bohmian quantum physics (NQP/BQP). To achieve the goal, counterfactual history is mobilized as a means to generate instructive virtual alternatives to the actual scientific path: I design a ‘permuted-situations counterfactual scenario’ in which it is BQP, instead of NQP, that first acquires a monopoly on physics and is exclusively practiced in science education, before NQP is introduced. Then, I endeavor to ‘reenact’ – as forensic investigators carry out the re-enactment of a crime scene – how virtual mainstream Bohmians would assess NQP. Contrasting the two ‘views from inside’ – ‘what it is like to be’ a standard quantum physicist in our world (a physicist trained in NQP) and what it would be like to be a physicist exclusively trained in BQP – I attempt to come as close as possible to an ‘experience’ of the gestalt switch involved when shuttling back and forth between one scientific worldview to the other. The effects of PAD in physics are discussed on this basis.
Abstract David Bohm has put forward the first deterministic interpretation of quantum physics, and for this he seems to be regarded as a champion of determinism by physicists (both his contemporaries and the supporters of his interpretation, the so-called “Bohmians”) as well as by historians of physics. The standard narrative is that he underwent a “conversion” from being a supporter of Bohr to being a staunch determinist, due to his interaction with Einstein and his commitment to Marxism. Here we show that Bohm actually upheld with continuity throughout his career some philosophical tenets that included a strong rejection of mechanistic determinism. As such, we conclude that Bohm was never a Bohmian and that his philosophical views have been largely misinterpreted.
The article is devoted to the problem of time in modern science, where in recent years there have been major changes related to the latest discoveries in the field of the foundations of quantum theory. The author refers to works of K.-F. von Weizsacker (which works are not well-known in Russian-speaking field). Weizsacker deploys a large-scale program of building modern physics, while starting (not only as a physicist, but also a professional philosopher) with questions of philosophical interpretation of postulates of modern physics, especially quantum mechanics. His key thesis is that time in physics is fundamentally distinct, which represents the whole physics as an integral scientific discipline. Weizsacker comes from physical and philosophical reflections, that give a special value to his work. Analyzing the conclusions of theoretical physics, namely the issues of substantiation of statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and, above all, quantum mechanics, Weizsacker comes to the key idea of the structure of time in the substantiation of physical theory. The author in this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of most modern physicists that time has a subjective character, and the modus of the past, present and future reflects its essential character. The allocation of the time structure requires special logic. Such a logic is temporal and quantum. Starting from temporal logic, introducing the concept of possibility and probability, he comes to the substantiation of quantum mechanics. Being modal logic, it is based on the concept of possibility and probability. Key concept for Weizsacker is a binary alternative (Uralternative), closely related to the principle of superposition in quantum mechanics. By introducing the concept of certain alternatives, essentially actualized alternatives, Weizsacker shows how one can get the theory of relativity with its space-time structure. Further, he shows that based on its structure, you can get the theory of relativity. The space-time structure in this case is secondary, relational, as understood by Leibniz, Mach, and Einstein.
Since its inception Bohmian mechanics has been generally regarded as a hidden-variable theory aimed at providing an objective description of quantum phenomena. To date, this rather narrow conception of Bohm’s proposal has caused it more rejection than acceptance. Now, after 65 years of Bohmian mechanics, should still be such an interpretational aspect the prevailing appraisal? Why not favoring a more pragmatic view, as a legitimate picture of quantum mechanics, on equal footing in all respects with any other more conventional quantum picture? These questions are used here to introduce a discussion on an alternative way to deal with Bohmian mechanics at present, enhancing its aspect as an efficient and useful picture or formulation to tackle, explore, describe and explain quantum phenomena where phase and correlation ( entanglement ) are key elements. This discussion is presented through two complementary blocks. The first block is aimed at briefly revisiting the historical context that gave rise to the appearance of Bohmian mechanics, and how this approach or analogous ones have been used in different physical contexts. This discussion is used to emphasize a more pragmatic view to the detriment of the more conventional hidden-variable (ontological) approach that has been a leitmotif within the quantum foundations. The second block focuses on some particular formal aspects of Bohmian mechanics supporting the view presented here, with special emphasis on the physical meaning of the local phase field and the associated velocity field encoded within the wave function. As an illustration, a simple model of Young’s two-slit experiment is considered. The simplicity of this model allows to understand in an easy manner how the information conveyed by the Bohmian formulation relates to other more conventional concepts in quantum mechanics. This sort of pedagogical application is also aimed at showing the potential interest to introduce Bohmian mechanics in undergraduate quantum mechanics courses as a working tool rather than merely an alternative interpretation.
To date, quantum mechanics has proven to be our most successful theoretical model. However, it is still surrounded by a "mysterious halo" that can be summarized in a simple but challenging question: Why quantum phenomena are not understood under the same logic as classical ones? Although this is an open question (probably without an answer), from a pragmatist's point of view there is still room enough to further explore the quantum world, marveling ourselves with new physical insights. We just need to look back in the historical evolution of the quantum theory and thoroughly reconsider three key issues: (1) how this has developed since its early stages at a conceptual level, (2) what kind of experiments can be performed at present in a laboratory, and (3) what nonstandard conceptual models are available to extract some extra information. This contribution is aimed at providing some answers (and, perhaps, also raising some issues) to these questions through one of such models, namely Bohmian mechanics, a hydrodynamic formulation of the quantum theory, which is currently trying to open new pathways of understanding. Specifically, the Chapter constitutes a brief and personal overview on the historic and contextual evolution of this quantum formulation, its physical meaning and interest (leaving aside metaphysical issues), and how it may help to overcome some preconceived paradoxical aspects of the quantum theory.
Several experiments have suggested that the complete indistinguishability of quantum systems is to be considered a real phenomenon. Experiments such as the HOM effect, the existence of BECs, the path identity cases, and many others are physical realities of today. Physicists `explain’ these phenomena using different models, such as Bohmian mechanics, relational quantum mechanics or the QBism approach. Most of these models are constructed within a standard mathematical framework, meaning standard mathematics, where all things can, even if only in principle, be distinguished from one another, so complete indistinguishability can only be mimicked. These approaches may work for physical purposes but are debatable regarding logical and metaphysical questions. If we accept that such questions are at least part of the philosophical aspect of quantum physics, then we are authorised to analyse them and try to offer an alternative. Looking for an alternative, we consider Alain Aspect’s and Anton Zeilinger’s views about quantum realism, opting for Aspect’s acceptance of some kind of reality behind the wave-function, while Zeilinger suggests that everything comes from information. In our opinion, the case is the opposite: it is information that comes from the existence of things. The aim of this paper is to justify why we think that the underlying reality (in Aspect’s sense) can be seen as a quantum ontology of non-individuals.
This thesis develops a detailed account of the emergence of for all practical purposes continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the discontinuous, stochastic micro dynamics of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics (MBM). MBM is a non-relativistic quantum theory. It results from excising the guiding equation from standard Bohmian Mechanics (BM) and reinterpreting the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a stochastic guidance law for the random actualization of configurations of Bohmian particles. On MBM, there are no continuous trajectories linking up individual configurations. Instead, individual configurations are actualized independently of each other, carving out the decoherence-induced branching structure of the universal wave function. Yet, by contrast to the Everett interpretation, branches of the universal wave function are not actualized in parallel, i.e. all at the same time. Rather, world branches, on MBM, are actualized sequentially. For an introduction to MBM, the transition from BM to MBM is described, and their empirical equivalence is established. I present the conditions under which MBM can be classified as a primitive ontology (PO) theory, regarded as crucial for the acceptance of a theory as Bohmian by many proponents of BM. While rendering MBM compatible with the PO approach, it must not fall prey to the problem of communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. The issue of temporal solipsism, identified by Bell as a serious problem for his “Everett (?) theory” – the historic predecessor of MBM – is discussed. I argue that Barbour’s time capsule approach does not provide a satisfactory solution. In particular, his adopting a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism between brain processes and experience of macroscopic change is argued to be reasonable in light of our current best neuroscience, yet problematic for theories relying solely on time capsules, understood as highly structured, individual, internally static configurations. As a solution, I introduce worlds, and world histories, as key concepts in providing a link between MBM’s micro dynamics and macroscopic phenomena. Worlds, other than time capsules, are coarse-grained regions in phase- or configuration space, defined as sets of possible micro states satisfying a relation of sufficient similarity from a macroscopic perspective, with respect to a given micro state. Hence, worlds may overlap. I argue that worlds thus construed are a reasonable option for replacing the disjoint macro regions of phase space, resulting from the usual way of partitioning phase space in the standard framework of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. This move solves the issue of discontinuous change of macro variables upon the micro state crossing the boundary between different macro regions. I adapt this move for MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics in configuration space. Issues revolving around the microscopic-macroscopic distinction, particle identity, impenetrability and haecceity in light of the desideratum of particle number conservation, etc., are discussed. I provide a detailed explanation of how overlapping worlds in MBM form world histories, thereby linking up macroscopically distinct worlds. Thus, the problem of temporal solipsism is resolved in a way that is compatible with a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism.