With the emergence of quantum physics in the 1920s, the major philosophical question was, do the unobservables in quantum system have ontological status or are mere instruments for scientific prediction? The Copenhagen interpretation developed an instrumentalist thesis, contending that the unobservables are tools for making predictions concerning the observables. Thus, we cannot have knowledge of the quantum particles. However, Popper attempts a realist and an objective interpretation. As such, he criticizes the Copenhagen interpretation, developing the propensity view, which accords ontological status to subatomic particles. The main thrust of our argument in this paper is that by replacing probability possibilities with propensities, Popper positions himself as a proponent of the metaphysics of modality. It is then our objective to establish the parallelism between Popper’s Propensity Interpretation and Modal Metaphysics. To establish this contention we proceeded analytically: firstly by situating the seismic shift from macro to quantum physics, secondly by examining Popper’s critique of the Copenhagen Interpretation and thirdly by attempting a demonstration of the correlation between Popper’s propensity interpretation and modal metaphysics. The merit of this paper resides in its elucidation of the importance of metaphysics in science. It is a double challenge at the same time for antimetaphysical philosophy of science and for antiscientific metaphysics, to rethink the relationship between Metaphysics and science and invest in finding how both disciplines nurture each other. Finally, it is hoped that policy makers in Philosphy and science uses our findings to revamp the conceptualisation and practice of interdisciplinarity.
With the emergence of quantum physics in the 1920s, the major philosophical question was, do the unobservables in quantum system have ontological status or are mere instruments for scientific prediction? The Copenhagen interpretation developed an instrumentalist thesis, contending that the unobservables are tools for making predictions concerning the observables. Thus, we cannot have knowledge of the quantum particles. However, Popper attempts a realist and an objective interpretation. As such, he criticizes the Copenhagen interpretation, developing the propensity view, which accords ontological status to subatomic particles. The main thrust of our argument in this paper is that by replacing probability possibilities with propensities, Popper positions himself as a proponent of the metaphysics of modality. It is then our objective to establish the parallelism between Popper’s Propensity Interpretation and Modal Metaphysics. To establish this contention we proceeded analytically: firstly by situating the seismic shift from macro to quantum physics, secondly by examining Popper’s critique of the Copenhagen Interpretation and thirdly by attempting a demonstration of the correlation between Popper’s propensity interpretation and modal metaphysics. The merit of this paper resides in its elucidation of the importance of metaphysics in science. It is a double challenge at the same time for antimetaphysical philosophy of science and for antiscientific metaphysics, to rethink the relationship between Metaphysics and science and invest in finding how both disciplines nurture each other. Finally, it is hoped that policy makers in Philosphy and science uses our findings to revamp the conceptualisation and practice of interdisciplinarity.
Popper's program in the foundations of quantum mechanics defending objectivity and realism developed out of a profound dissatisfaction with the point of view associated with Bohr, which is usually designated the Copenhagen interpretation. Here I will argue that while Popper's aim is a noble one, his program does not succeed on two counts: he does not succeed in showing that Bohr's philosophy must be rejected as a variety of subjectivism, and his alternative interpretation of indeterminacy rests on a highly questionable assumption according to which simultaneously precise conjugate parameters are possible. Nevertheless I like Popper's propensity interpretation of probability and think that the propensity idea deserves further research. Quanta 2012; 1: 33–57.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
This chapter repeats for quantum mechanics the comparison carried out for relativity in Chapter 5. Its thesis is that the same three interpretative families, neo-Kantian, empiricist and scientific realist, reappear in the philosophical reception of quantum mechanics, but in a more radical form, because the dispute now reaches the meaning of the quantum state, of probability and of measurement. The chapter first identifies what the formalism established in Chapter 4 leaves open and treats the Copenhagen framework as a point of departure rather than a unified doctrine. It then reconstructs the neo-Kantian interpretation (the Kantian affinities of Bohr’s complementarity, Cassirer, Grete Hermann and contemporary transcendental perspectives), the empiricist interpretation (Heisenberg’s observability principle, instrumentalism, Schlick, Frank, Reichenbach and van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) and, on equal terms, the realist interpretation: Einstein and the EPR argument, Popper’s propensities, the de Broglie–Bohm theory, Bell’s beables and local causality, realist modal interpretations, and the Everett and collapse programmes. The realist family is the most developed of the three in quantum mechanics, but it is also internally plural: it affirms that the theory refers to a mind-independent reality while disagreeing about whether that reality consists of particles, fields, propensities, branching worlds or definite and possible properties. On this basis the chapter compares the three interpretations of causality and of stationary action. Causality appears as a relativized condition of objective description, as a statistical relation without surplus content, or as an objective but non-local structure; stationary action appears as a coordination axiom of quantum dynamics, as an empirically equivalent formulation, or as a real dynamical structure that in Bohm’s theory directly guides motion. The result confirms the pattern of Chapter 5 and identifies the precise point, the relation between quantum possibility and actuality, from which the BBMT bridge of Chapter 7 will start.
The philosophical tradition has long sought an ineffable substratum of physical reality—something more fundamental than the world of appearances, prior to experience, the ground of all that is. Plato reached for it with his theory of forms. The attempt was genuine but the logic was inverted: mind was installed as the source of the fundamental, and the physical world was rendered derivative. This paper argues that quantum mechanics, read without presupposition and without the interpretive additions of the Copenhagen tradition, delivers precisely what the philosophical tradition was seeking—but with the arrow pointing in the opposite direction. The possibility space of quantum mechanics—the Hilbert space structure of the universal wave function, evolving unitarily under the Schrödinger equation, holistic in its composition, non-local in its correlations, geometric in its dynamics—is the genuine ineffable substratum: more fundamental than the classical world of appearances, prior to experience, the ground of all physical dispositions. Mind is not the source of this reality. It is the instrument through which this reality generates the appearance of a classical world. The modal ontology presented here holds that physical reality has a fundamentally modal structure. The microcosm is a universe of structured possibilities. The classical world is its emergent surface. Eigenvalues are its currency of contact with experience. The Schrödinger equation is the law of its rotation. Born rule probabilities are structurally grounded propensities—objective dispositional properties of the possibility structure, uniquely characterized by Gleason’s theorem as the only consistent probability measure on Hilbert space. The holism and non-locality enforced by the tensor product structure of composite systems are genuine structural features of physical reality, confirmed by Bell’s theorem and experiment. The Copenhagen tradition’s interpretive apparatus—collapse postulate, classical observer, Heisenberg cut, instrumentalism—is set aside, and the formalism is allowed to speak for itself. What it says is stranger, more precise, and more beautiful than two and a half millennia of philosophical tradition imagined. It has been saying it all along.
Foundational attitudes towards quantum theory have recently thrown off much of the old philosophical baggage largely associated with Niels Bohr to which Einstein famously objected, including the central ‘collapse of the wavefunction’ concept. A ‘neo-Copenhagen’ interpretation, it is suggested, has arisen. This development is placed in its historical context and contrasted to philosophical allegations of anti-realism. The neo-Copenhagen interpretation remains wedded to Heisenberg's uncertainty and observer-dependent values of particles. However a discussion of Nick Herbert's ‘rainbow analogy’ suggests that subatomic particles are emergent from a ‘nonlocal’ level of reality outside the domain of space and time. Critical realism recognizes that emergent systems have an irreducibly ontologically character, and in its combination of epistemological relativism and ontological realism, provides a basis for the proposition that realists who support Einstein's objections must now recognize that their realism must be redefined.