This paper is devoted to detailing, mastering for use, checking cryptanalytic properties and demonstrating the use of Grover’s method for cryptanalysis of symmetric cryptographic transformations. The essence of the method and its refinement are presented in order to implement Grover’s quantum algorithm on a classical computer.
This paper is devoted to detailing the possibilities and features of quantum computer use for cryptological problems, their demonstration, justification of approaches to the possibilities analysis and studying features of cryptanalysis problems programming on quantum computers. The possibilities and availability of hardware for solving cryptanalysis problems through quantum methods are analyzed and existing restrictions of their use are determined. The quantum computer and quantum computer programming features are considered. The possibilities of quantum computer use for cryptanalysis are also considered with the Grover’s method example. The essence of Grover’s method and features of its application for cryptanalysis are given. An example of its application to the search space which is represented by a quantum register of 56 qubits is given as well. The quantum computer application of Grover’s method on quantum computer accessible through a loud service is considered. Schemes for conducting a search by Grover's method for quantum computer application are developed, containing a different number of Grover iterations to study the need for executing a full cycle, the possibility to stop and evaluate search results at a certain stage. The developed circuits are tested on quantum computers with different architectures and on a quantum simulator provided for the analysis of circuits intended to run on a quantum computer. The comparison of the expected and obtained results of the Grover’s method application at different search stages on quantum computer is given.
This chapter evaluates the stability of the modern cryptographic algorithms to clarify the tasks of cryptanalysis of asymmetric encryption schemes and digital signature based on factorization and discrete logarithm problems in various algebraic structures in a quantum computing model. It considers the features of modeling quantum cryptanalysis algorithms on a quantum scheme, and shows the differences between these algorithms and classical algorithms. The quantum algorithm is performed by implementing a series of sequential unitary operations. Grover's algorithm provides a quadratic increase in speed, while some other quantum algorithms, for example, the Shor factorization algorithm, give an exponential gain compared to the corresponding classical algorithms. Grover's algorithm is modified into an algorithm for recovering the symmetric encryption key from the message text and ciphertext. The stability of the RSA asymmetric encryption system is based on the super-polynomial computational complexity of factorization of natural numbers. However, there is a quantum algorithm whose complexity is polynomial.
Quantum computing poses a fundamental threat to modern cryptographic protocols by exploiting quantum algorithms that surpass classical computational limits. Shor’s algorithm can efficiently factor large integers, breaking RSA and other public-key cryptosystems, while Grover’s algorithm accelerates brute-force attacks against symmetric encryption. As quantum hardware advances, traditional cryptographic schemes risk obsolescence, necessitating the development of quantum-resistant cryptographic techniques. This paper explores the theoretical foundations of quantum cryptanalysis, examining key algorithms, their implications for cybersecurity, and the current state of post-quantum cryptographic solutions. By analyzing resource estimates for quantum attacks and potential mitigation strategies, this study provides a comprehensive overview of the evolving cryptographic landscape in the quantum era.
The advent of quantum computing presents a paradigm shift in the field of cryptanalysis, challenging the security of classical encryption schemes that underpin modern digital communications. This study explores the capabilities of quantum algorithms, particularly Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm, in undermining widely used cryptographic systems. Shor's algorithm poses a direct threat to publickey cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC by enabling efficient integer factorization and discrete logarithm computation, which are computationally infeasible for classical computers. Meanwhile, Grover's algorithm provides a quadratic speedup for bruteforce attacks on symmetric-key cryptosystems like AES, significantly reducing their effective security. Through theoretical analysis and simulation-based evaluation, this paper highlights the vulnerabilities of classical encryption in the face of quantum advances and underscores the urgent need for post-quantum cryptographic solutions. The findings emphasize the critical importance of transitioning to quantum-resistant algorithms to ensure long-term data confidentiality in a future dominated by quantum technologies.
Quantum Algorithms reduce the computational complexity or solve certain difficult problems that were originally impossible to solve with classical computers. Grover’s search algorithm is a Quantum computation algorithm that can find target elements from a set of unstructured data with the best possible,O(N)queries. Grover’s search Quantum circuits implemented accurately can be used to successfully search and find the keys of Symmetric ciphers. However, very few demonstrations of such practical cryptanalysis are available. In this paper, practical Quantum cryptanalysis circuits for Affine Cipher are proposed and demonstrated, that successfully break the cipher by finding the keys.
Motivated by Shor’s algorithm and its attractive features, the milestone results in quantum cryptanalysis were the discovery of quantum differential and linear cryptanalysis. In quantum cryptanalysis, quantum distinguishers imitate the classical setting. Details differ; however, as the distinguisher in the quantum setting can take maximum coset superposition of all possible subsets of plaintext pairs. Using quantum measurements, the winning gap of the game is exploited so that a distinguisher can still guess the secret key perfectly with a constant probability. Symmetric primitives also suffer reduced ideal security in the quantum world, but this security reduction is less drastic than for most asymmetric primitives. Stream ciphers, block ciphers, and cryptographic hash functions are primitives that are believed to resist quantum attacks. Analogs to Shor’s algorithm may say how hard it is to build a quantum computer, but devising quantum algorithms to outperform the best classical attacks for widely-used cryptographic primitives is probably outside the reach of current even if exponentially growing noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) computers.