Phenomenology and Quantum theory have defined themselves against the subject-object tradition of thought and against the modern objectivistic attempt to unify explanation of reality or being. Scientific technology and calculative way of thinking have prevailed over meditative and qualitative thinking in modern times. Despite scientific efforts to eliminate any inconsistency caused by metaphysical speculations and systems, in everyday life and science we encounter such phenomena which cannot be explained unambiguously and fully on the basis of purely conventional criteria. This paper focuses on Bohr's framework of complementarity. The idea enables us exploring and describing a given phenomenon in such manner that we get adequate knowledge of the same phenomenon or subject of interest only by completing incompatible descriptions
Phenomenology and Quantum theory have defined themselves against the subject-object tradition of thought and against the modern objectivistic attempt to unify explanation of reality or being. Scientific technology and calculative way of thinking have prevailed over meditative and qualitative thinking in modern times. Despite scientific efforts to eliminate any inconsistency caused by metaphysical speculations and systems, in everyday life and science we encounter such phenomena which cannot be explained unambiguously and fully on the basis of purely conventional criteria. This paper focuses on Bohr's framework of complementarity. The idea enables us exploring and describing a given phenomenon in such manner that we get adequate knowledge of the same phenomenon or subject of interest only by completing incompatible descriptions
From the preceding exposition it follows that not only physics but natural science as a whole is basically dependent on ordinary language. The complementarity of quantum physics displays the fundamental interdependence of observation and description of natural phenomena, and the very objectivity of natural science relies directly on the differentiation of experiences into external and private phenomena afforded by ordinary language. Because of the extreme smallness of the quantum of action the complementarity of physical phenomena is not experienced either in daily life or in classical physics. But the interdependence of observation and description of phenomena prevails as much in classical science as in quantum physics. The very aim of experimental investigation is to perform observations in those particular ways which make possible the communication of information sufficient for the reproduction of the observed phenomena. Concordantly the elementary physical variables, which are indispensable to any systematic analysis in natural science, are defined through reference to measuring arrangements constructed so as to be unambiguously describable in ordinary language. Thus no scientific formula, law, or result of measurement can be given objective significance independent of ordinary language. Through every hierarchy of descriptions in natural science ordinary language penetrates as the unambiguity of propositions.
Facultyof Scienceof the CharlesUniversityin Prague Mgr.Filip Grygar Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Quantum Gomplementarity in the Philosophy of Science PhD ThesisSummary 2008 An ambition of the presenteddissertation is an interdisciplinary treatise of phenomenology and quantum theory; therefore an attemptto connect two seemingly independently forming disciplines that have been holding a leading position in philosophical and scientificthinking since the beginningof the 20th century. Specifically, I lay stresson Heidegger's hermeneuticphenomenology on one hand and on Bohr's philosophy and the frame of complementariý on the otherhand. I outlined, in Chapter d how a monolithlc modern scientific view of the world and mathematizationof naturewas developed.Concurrently to this topic, I showed two for,med possibilities of thinking - meditative thinking and calculative thinking that is linked to Heidegger's analyses of essence of technology qua Gestel/. Since the appearanceof Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenology,modern objectivist scientific notions and the subject-object paradigm oťcalculative thinking has been called in question.Modern thinking and its world view turned out to be insufficient and its thinking showed to be single-sided in its description of nature (especially in its description of subatomic...
Abstract: Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has been criticized as incoherent and opportunistic, and based on doubtful philosophical premises. If so Bohr’s influence, in the pre-war period of 1927-1939, is the harder to explain, and the acceptance of his approach to quantum mechanics over de Broglie’s had no reasonable foundation. But Bohr’s interpretation changed little from the time of its first appearance, and stood independent of any philosophical presuppositions. The principle of complementarity is itself best read as a conjecture of unusually wide scope, on the nature and future course of explanations in the sciences (and not only the physical sciences). If it must be judged a failure today, it is not because of any internal inconsistency. Despite the expenditure of much effort, I have been unable to obtain a clear understanding of Bohr’s principle of complementarity (Einstein). Bohr’s point- and the central point of quantum mechanics- is that no elemen-
Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...
On the assumptions of completeness, conceptual economy, and universality of quantum mechanics, and taking into account the developments linked to decoherence, one concludes that physical reality has only an epistemic nature. It is fundamental then to make a distinction between ontological reality, constituted by everything that does not depend at all on the collectivity of human beings, nor on their decisions or limitations, nor on their existence, and empirical reality, constituted by everything that not being ontological is, however, intersubjective. The fact that the direct presence of consciousness is not required to complete a quantum phenomenon implies that quantum phenomena are not mere “appearances to consciousness”. Empirical reality, as conceived in this paper, is not reducible to mere “appearances to consciousness”. Complementarity, that was proposed by Niels Bohr as a conceptual framework to answer the problems presented by the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is considered here as a way of talking about the empirical reality that goes beyond the simple description of experimental results, or better still, the observer’s perceptions of such results. It aims to describe not ontological reality, but empirical reality. It is proposed that the state vector represents, in general, infinite potentialities that are actualized when a quantum phenomenon is completed. Such potentialities, unlike the Aristotelian and the one suggested by Heisenberg, are epistemic and not ontological. The infinite potentialities of empirical reality are taken as an argument to claim that ontological reality is infinite, complementarity being the manner in which infinite ontological reality is manifested to the finite mind. The possibility that complementarity constitutes a general framework that can be applied to other areas of knowledge is based on an analysis of the relationship between theory and observation. Two possible examples of the use of complementarity in areas different from quantum mechanics are presented, one in thermodynamics and another in biology. Given that logic does not impose the mutual exclusion of two complementary concepts, there isn’t any inconsistency implied by complementarity from the point of view of classical or ordinary logic: one uses ordinary logic in each experimentally defined context. Consequently, there is no need for any new logic.
The article is devoted to the problem of scientific and philosophical status of complementarity principlef. The author analyzes its explication by N. Bohr and its comprehension by scientists and epistemologists. It is shown that generally, the complementarity principle is a set of ideas, which allows comprehending of specific situation in quantum mechanics. Some of ideas – the role of language of classical physics, the role of macro-instrument, the integrity of scientific experiment, the integrity of micro-object – could be seen as general scientific and epistemological principles. The prohibition of ontologisation of quantum phenomenon, which necessarily leads to contradictions is considered as the semantic core of Bohr’s approach. However, the attempts of its generalization in science and philosophy were not successful. The complementarity postulate is viewed as methodological principle of foundations of quantum mechanics in its Copenhagen interpretation.