The problem of existence in philosophy and modern fundamental physics is discussed. In quantum mechanics, the attribute of existence is attributed not only to objects and physical fields, but also to wave packets, the main functions of which are to indicate the list of possibilities that can be realized after the reduction of the wave packet. At the same time, the wave packets gravitate . Therefore, from the point of view of philosophy, wave packets ( Possible ) should be ranked among the Being as its separate element in addition to objects and physical fields. Further, using an example from mechanics, the statement is made that the true reality is described precisely by quantum mechanics, while the classical theory gives only a description of reality that is close to reality, but nevertheless an illusory description. In this sense, the complementarity principle of N. Bohr is not an addition or a contradiction but must be resolved by the primacy in favor of quantum mechanics.
The problem of existence in philosophy and modern fundamental physics is discussed. In quantum mechanics, the attribute of existence is attributed not only to objects and physical fields, but also to wave packets, the main functions of which are to indicate the list of possibilities that can be realized after the reduction of the wave packet. At the same time, the wave packets gravitate . Therefore, from the point of view of philosophy, wave packets ( Possible ) should be ranked among the Being as its separate element in addition to objects and physical fields. Further, using an example from mechanics, the statement is made that the true reality is described precisely by quantum mechanics, while the classical theory gives only a description of reality that is close to reality, but nevertheless an illusory description. In this sense, the complementarity principle of N. Bohr is not an addition or a contradiction but must be resolved by the primacy in favor of quantum mechanics.
The present study is concerned with the problem of realism in quantum mechanics. Contrary to the prevailing view that quantum mechanics forces us to abandon the concept of realism and reality, the author attempts to substantiate another standpoint. Quantum objects indeed exist in a different way from classical bodies. Before the act of measurement begins, one cannot attribute any specific properties to the quantum object observed, as they only occur in the course observation. The concept of observation, however, should not be interpreted as the inclusion of subjective traits in the description of nature. Observation records processes in space and time and establishes the fact of transition from the potential to the reality. The potential is described by a wave function, which in its meaning does not fall in the habitual space and time, whereas the actual is described in terms of a reduction of the wave function, i.e. the transition from a range of possible states to the single one, the observed. Whatever has been observed, in contrast, already belongs to ordinary space and time and can be detected. What follows is that, in quantum mechanics, it is the notion of reality which needs to be reconsidered, not the realism as such rejected. A reconsideration of this sort is conducted here within the framework of a double-modus picture of reality including both potential and actual being, where the quantum level of existence is distinguished from the observed modi of being as described by means of classical concepts. Such a scheme can be described in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics (the fact first pointed out by Heisenberg). The act of transition from potential to actual can be accounted for both in the language of Aristotle’s metaphysics and the language of modern science. In traditional metaphysics it is called the 'principle of individuation', while in modern science it is known as the extended Mach principle. It is argued that the development of these ideas leads to the rejection of Cartesian paradigm in which the existence of a material object always means an existence in space and time.
On the assumptions of completeness, conceptual economy, and universality of quantum mechanics, and taking into account the developments linked to decoherence, one concludes that physical reality has only an epistemic nature. It is fundamental then to make a distinction between ontological reality, constituted by everything that does not depend at all on the collectivity of human beings, nor on their decisions or limitations, nor on their existence, and empirical reality, constituted by everything that not being ontological is, however, intersubjective. The fact that the direct presence of consciousness is not required to complete a quantum phenomenon implies that quantum phenomena are not mere “appearances to consciousness”. Empirical reality, as conceived in this paper, is not reducible to mere “appearances to consciousness”. Complementarity, that was proposed by Niels Bohr as a conceptual framework to answer the problems presented by the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is considered here as a way of talking about the empirical reality that goes beyond the simple description of experimental results, or better still, the observer’s perceptions of such results. It aims to describe not ontological reality, but empirical reality. It is proposed that the state vector represents, in general, infinite potentialities that are actualized when a quantum phenomenon is completed. Such potentialities, unlike the Aristotelian and the one suggested by Heisenberg, are epistemic and not ontological. The infinite potentialities of empirical reality are taken as an argument to claim that ontological reality is infinite, complementarity being the manner in which infinite ontological reality is manifested to the finite mind. The possibility that complementarity constitutes a general framework that can be applied to other areas of knowledge is based on an analysis of the relationship between theory and observation. Two possible examples of the use of complementarity in areas different from quantum mechanics are presented, one in thermodynamics and another in biology. Given that logic does not impose the mutual exclusion of two complementary concepts, there isn’t any inconsistency implied by complementarity from the point of view of classical or ordinary logic: one uses ordinary logic in each experimentally defined context. Consequently, there is no need for any new logic.
The objective of this article is to demonstrate how the historical debate between materialism and idealism, in the field of Philosophy, extends, in new clothes, to the field of Quantum Physics characterized by realism and anti-realism. For this, we opted for a debate, also historical, between the realism of Albert Einstein, for whom reality exists regardless of the existence of the knowing subject, and Niels Bohr, for whom we do not have access to the ultimate reality of the matter, unless conditioning it to the existence of an observer endowed with rationality, position adopted in the Interpretation of Complementarity (1927) – posture that was expanded in 1935 when Bohr assumed a “relationalist” conception, according to which the quantum state is defined by the relationship between the quantum object and the entire measuring device. This is an extremely important debate, as it further consolidates the results of nascent Quantum Mechanics, guaranteeing Bohr the leadership of the orthodoxy based on the interpretation of complementarity. Here, when dealing with Quantum Theory, we will not make any distinction between the terms Quantum Physics, Quantum Theory or Quantum Mechanics. The entire discussion will be held under the name “Quantum Theory”. Theory that tries to analyze and describe the behavior of physical systems of reduced dimensions, close to the sizes of molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. We hope that the reader will appreciate the genius of these two titans in this field of Physics when they magnificently formulate the arguments that support the object of their defenses.
The theory of complementarity became prominent during the last century (primarily as a result of the ideas of Niels Bohr and quantum physics). It gradually developed into a dominant paradigm un-derlying research into the nature of existence. Bohr’s exposition of the principle also emphasized its epistemological value for providing more accurate information regarding what seem to be paradoxical aspects of reality. The principle of complementarity has proven to have far reaching philosophical im-plications concerning such basic notions as subject and object, space-time and causality, chance and necessity, and more. However, scholars also acknowledge that it contributes to resolving the problem of the discontinuity between underlying reality and the human ability to conceptualize the ontological nature of existence. It has grown in popularity because it seems to off er a means of addressing dichoto-mies in other sciences and in philosophy.When analysts scrutinize the factors that infl uenced Bohr’s understanding of the principle of comple-mentarity they fi nd that one source clearly stems from the infl uence of American Pragmatism. Although the Pragmatist infl uence is traced primarily to William James there is at the roots of the philosophy of Pragmatism reference made to concepts that refl ect the principle of complementarity explicating how to gain reliable knowledge concerning the nature of existence. From the very inception of American Prag-matism there was the recognition that Western philosophy faced a problem connected with
Introduction In order to develop the insight that is worked out by Brock (Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Logos, 2003), that the philosophy of quantum mechanics should parallel Kant's philosophy of natural science, some preliminary analyses of key concepts need to be done. Initiated by Niels Bohr (Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, John Wiley and Sons, 1958), the concept of ‘complementarity’ has played a major role in the interpretation of quantum theory. However, the exact place it occupies in respect of the logical form of the relation of complementarity between descriptive predicates has not been spelled out in detail to my knowledge. Complementary predicates exclude one another as simultaneous attributions to the same subject. Exactly what form does this exclusion take? How is it related to the basic exclusion-of-predicates principle, the logical law of non-contradiction?
As we know the main results of quantum physics in 1900 Planck began to obtain mainly because of the need to describe the experimental data. Therefore, it further became necessary to obtain theoretical justifications for these results. This means to obtain proofs of these results on the basis of the basic equations of theoretical physics, i.e. equations that are obtained on the way where the right choice of results is made performing the role of the basis of the theory of thought. As is known, these problems began to be solved, taking as a basis the possibilities of the following new ideas of Bohr. That quantum physics should be considered as a generalization of classical physics. But as we know, this path led to the results of matrix mechanics. Results for which such contradiction as non-commutativity of multiplication is inherent. In this paper for obtaining proofs for the results of Planck's quantum physics the fundamental ideas in the field of scientific philosophy were taken as a basis. That is philosophy where from the very beginning for the basis of the theory of thinking the possibilities of equations of algebra and arithmetic are accepted.