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“When language goes on holiday”: Reflection on the problems of language in QM through Wittgenstein's philosophy

Patrizia Piredda

Published Apr 6, 2023• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The new discoveries of QM led to re-assessing, broadening the meanings of many physical concepts, and formulating a new logic that was no longer based on the classical principles of non-contradiction, identity, and causality. Heisenberg considered the classical logic and the conception of language expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus inadequate for the understanding of the problems of language with which the physicists of the Copenhagen school had had to deal in order to define the foundations of Quantum Mechanics. On the contrary, he saw in Wittgenstein’s posthumous Philosophical Investigations the key to solving those problems. One may formulate a proportion and state that the use of language described in the Tractatus fits the use of language in Classical Mechanics, as the use of language described in PI fits the use of language in QM. I interpret the reflections of the physicists of the Copenhagen school on the limits of language relative to QM by highlighting how the epistemological revolution of quantum physics shares a conception of language similar to that expressed by late Wittgenstein in PI. I also aim to explain why Heisenberg considered it inappropriate to subsume the propositions and concepts of QM under the rules of the propositional logic of Tractatus. I explain why the philosophy of language expounded in PI, which is based on language games and resemblance families, sheds a light on how and why QM has contributed to renewing existing concepts (such as space, trajectory, observer, etc.) and to formulate a new logic (quantum logic).

DOI
10.20873/rpv8n1-67

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The new discoveries of QM led to re-assessing, broadening the meanings of many physical concepts, and formulating a new logic that was no longer based on the classical principles of non-contradiction, identity, and causality. Heisenberg considered the classical logic and the conception of language expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus inadequate for the understanding of the problems of language with which the physicists of the Copenhagen school had had to deal in order to define the foundations of Quantum Mechanics. On the contrary, he saw in Wittgenstein’s posthumous Philosophical Investigations the key to solving those problems. One may formulate a proportion and state that the use of language described in the Tractatus fits the use of language in Classical Mechanics, as the use of language described in PI fits the use of language in QM. I interpret the reflections of the physicists of the Copenhagen school on the limits of language relative to QM by highlighting how the epistemological revolution of quantum physics shares a conception of language similar to that expressed by late Wittgenstein in PI. I also aim to explain why Heisenberg considered it inappropriate to subsume the propositions and concepts of QM under the rules of the propositional logic of Tractatus. I explain why the philosophy of language expounded in PI, which is based on language games and resemblance families, sheds a light on how and why QM has contributed to renewing existing concepts (such as space, trajectory, observer, etc.) and to formulate a new logic (quantum logic).
This paper examines the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics through the lens of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, particularly the concept of “language games” and rule-following. The discourse surrounding quantum mechanics – characterized by terms like superposition, measurement, observer and entanglement – is deeply metaphoric and often stretches the bounds of classical language-use. This creates interpretative confusions not just in science, but in the metaphysical and epistemological debates that follow. Building on Philosophical Investigations, this paper argues that many foundational problems in quantum mechanics (e.g., the measurement problem, wave-function collapse, observer effect) are not exclusively ontological or physical but are entangled in language-use anomalies. The paper proposes that interpretative divergence among schools (Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, QBism, etc.) can be partly understood as conflicts between distinct language games with different rule-sets about what counts as a “measurement”, “reality”, or “causality”. By reading quantum discourse through Wittgensteinian criteria of meaning-as-use, the paper shows how the scientific community performs tacit normativity in deploying quantum terms – frequently without shared agreement on referents. Quantum mechanics, then, becomes a philosophical case study in the fragility and productivity of linguistic scaffolds in scientific theory. Finally, this paper makes a case for a deflationary yet clarifying approach: instead of seeking a “true” interpretation of quantum mechanics, we may better understand the philosophical stakes by analyzing the discursive rules, contextual boundaries, and pragmatic criteria that underlie quantum speech acts.
Recently we proposed the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation (or, quantum language), which has a great power to describe both classical and quantum systems.Thus we think that quantum language can be viewed as the language of science.Therefore, it makes sense to study, from the quantum linguistic point of view, Wittgenstein's picture theory, since he must have wanted to create a language of science.In this paper, we show that the proposition that Wittgenstein studied in his book "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" can be regarded as a binary projective measurement in classical quantum language.And thus, we conclude that Wittgenstein's language (i.e., the language that he supposed in his book) is realized by classical quantum language.Hence, now we can fully understand Wittgenstein's picture theory since the reason his book is incomprehensible is that he did not define his language.
We analyze the measurement problem in quantum mechanics from two aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. First, Wittgenstein emphasizes how the first false step can be voided so that a philosophical problem is dissolved, rather than solved. In the unsuccessful theories of the measurement problem, the postulate of classicality of apparatus(PCA) turned out to be the first false step implicitly adopted. By discarding the PCA and by adopting the microscopic quantum jump interpretation simultaneously, the measurement problem itself disappeared completely. Second, from Wittgenstein’s view of languages, the microscopic world is described by quantum mechanics whose language is Schrödinger equation, while the macroscopic world is described by classical physics whose language is either calculus for Newtonian mechanics or vector analysis for electromagnetism. Both worlds are described by mathematical languages, but they are distinct. The measurement problem deals with the transition from microscopic to macroscopic. There is no single physical theory to explain this transition and there is no corresponding mathematical language to describe it. This shows why the measurement problem must be described by an ordinary language in use. As concrete examples of the unsuccessful theories, we discuss the works of Niels Bohr and John von Neumann. This is a unique situation in which philosophy is used to assess the validity of physical theories.
We analyze the measurement problem in quantum mechanics from two aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. First, Wittgenstein emphasizes how the first false step can be voided so that a philosophical problem is dissolved, rather than solved. In the unsuccessful theories of the measurement problem, the postulate of classicality of apparatus (PCA) turned out to be the first false step implicitly adopted. By discarding the PCA and by adopting the microscopic quantum jump interpretation simultaneously, the measurement problem itself disappeared completely. Second, from Wittgenstein’s view of languages, the microscopic world is described by quantum mechanics, whose language is the Schrödinger equation, while the macroscopic world is described by classical physics, whose language is either calculus for Newtonian mechanics or vector analysis for electromagnetism. Both worlds are described by mathematical languages, but they are distinct. The measurement problem deals with the transition from microscopic to macroscopic. There is no single physical theory to explain this transition, and there is no corresponding mathematical language to describe it. This shows why the measurement problem must be described by an ordinary language in use. As concrete examples of the unsuccessful theories, we discuss the works of Niels Bohr and John von Neumann. This is a unique situation in which philosophy is used to assess the validity of physical theories. Finally, we show the classicality of a one-particle state with an extreme number of bosons. Therefore, there is no change in language in a macroscopic quantum jump.
Recently we proposed the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is called quantum language or measurement theory. This theory is valid for both quantum and classical systems. Thus we think that quantum language is one of the most powerful scientific theories, like statistics. In this paper we justify Zadeh’s fuzzy sets theory in quantum language, that is, fuzzy propositions are identified with binary measurements. This implies that the definition of “proposition” is, for the first time, acquired in the field of non-mathematics. Further, we assert that fuzzy logic is more natural than crisp logic in science. And furthermore, we discuss and solve Saussure’s linguistics, Moore’s paradox, Quine’s analytic-synthetic distinction and Lewis Carroll’s logical paradox. Therefore, from the philosophical point of view, our result gives a complete answer to Wittgenstein’s problem: “Why does logic work in our world?” and “What is a scientific proposition?” in his picture theory. That is, we simultaneously justify both Zadeh’s fuzzy sets and Wittgenstein’s picture theory in the quantum mechanical worldview.
The quantum mechanics instituted a completely new mathematical language. This change in physics required physicists and philosophers to rethink the concepts by which reality could be represented, since classical notions were limited in the understanding of atomic phenomena. The French philosopher G. Bachelard and the German physicist W. Heisenberg are authors who have discussed the major changes that have occurred in physics and have dealt with the problem of language in quantum mechanics. In this article, the objective is to resort to the arguments of both authors to evidence relations between their ideas about the referred subject. It is noteworthy that Bachelard and Heisenberg criticize the application of the usual language and philosophical concepts of modernity in the new physics, but, through his notion of rupture, the French philosopher proposes that quantum mechanics be restricted to mathematical language. This idea runs counter to Bohr's principle of complementarity, which Heisenberg acknowledges in the understanding of quantum phenomena and an interpretation of quantum physics.