Abstract The lattice-based cryptographic accumulators, which enable short zero-knowledge arguments of membership, have numerous applications in post-quantum privacy-preserving protocols. However, most efficient quantum-safe zero-knowledge arguments are PCP-based systems and rely on non-falsifiable assumptions. For non-PCP-based constructions using the state-of-the-art techniques on compressing lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs, the concrete size of the resulting proof for accumulators with $2^{32}$ members is at least 500 KB. In this paper, we propose a compact non-PCP zero-knowledge proof for the lattice-based Merkle-tree, which leads to an efficient post-quantum cryptographic accumulator. The complexity of our construction is logarithmic in $l\cdot n_{s}$, where $l$ and $n_{s}$ denote the depth of the underlying Merkle-tree and the size of a node, respectively, and the concrete size is only $143.7\ $KB when $l=32$. In particular, we provide an improved lattice-based Bulletproof with efficient knowledge extraction, which allows large challenge space but small soundness slack. Furthermore, the amortized technique can be applied to the Bulletproof without breaking the knowledge soundness due to our improved knowledge extraction. As a direct application, we present a practical lattice-based ring signature, which can achieve logarithmical signing/verifying computational complexity with the number of the ring, while the state-of-the-art constructions (CRYPTO 21) have linear computational complexity.
Abstract The lattice-based cryptographic accumulators, which enable short zero-knowledge arguments of membership, have numerous applications in post-quantum privacy-preserving protocols. However, most efficient quantum-safe zero-knowledge arguments are PCP-based systems and rely on non-falsifiable assumptions. For non-PCP-based constructions using the state-of-the-art techniques on compressing lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs, the concrete size of the resulting proof for accumulators with 232 members is at least 500 KB. In this paper, we propose a compact non-PCP zero-knowledge proof for the lattice-based Merkle-tree, which leads to an efficient post-quantum cryptographic accumulator. The complexity of our construction is logarithmic in l⋅ns, where l and ns denote the depth of the underlying Merkle-tree and the size of a node, respectively, and the concrete size is only 143.7KB when l=32. In particular, we provide an improved lattice-based Bulletproof with efficient knowledge extraction, which allows large challenge space but small soundness slack. Furthermore, the amortized technique can be applied to the Bulletproof without breaking the knowledge soundness due to our improved knowledge extraction. As a direct application, we present a practical lattice-based ring signature, which can achieve logarithmical signing/verifying computational complexity with the number of the ring, while the state-of-the-art constructions (CRYPTO 21) have linear computational complexity.
The development of proof systems whose security relies on the hardness of lattice problems has been a fruitful research area in recent years. By leveraging the techniques introduced in LaBRADOR (Beullens, Seiler, Crypto 2023), the state-of-the-art lattice-based schemes have very fast provers and have output sizes under 100KB for arbitrarily large statements. These proofs are in fact the smallest, and often have the fastest provers, out of all post-quantum schemes. In addition to succinctness, many applications also require witness privacy. Achieving this can, in theory, be done by combining LaBRADOR with a linear-size zero-knowledge proof. While such a combination has already been described in the LaBRADOR paper itself, as well as in the works of Albrecht et al. (Eurocrypt 2024) and del Pino et al. (Crypto 2025), its concrete costs remained unexplored. In this work, we provide the first concrete construction and implementation that adds zero-knowledge proofs to LaBRADOR by integrating the linear-size zero-knowledge proof from (Lyubashevsky, Nguyen, Plançon, Crypto 2022) into the protocol. We describe the non-trivial challenges that this entails and show practicality of the construction by benchmarking several use-cases. We make the proof system and primitives accessible by extending the LaZer library (Lyubashevsky, Seiler, Steuer, CCS 2024) in a way that they can easily be used in other applications.
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates for designing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that resist emerging quantum computing attacks. The recent NIST PQC standardization process is nearing its completion, with practical lattice-based algorithms for basic cryptographic functionalities (namely digital signature and public-key encryption) selected for standardization in the near future. However, practical lattice-based solutions for more advanced privacy-preserving protocols, in particular, Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), have only emerged recently and are an active area of research. We discuss some recent developments in design and analysis of practical lattice-based post-quantum ZKPs and their applications. In particular, we review some challenges that arise in designing ZKPs in the lattice setting and some recent progress on efficient lattice-based Schnorr-like proofs for important relations, such as binary/range proofs, one-out-of-many proofs and rounding proofs [1, 2, 4]. We discuss applications and optimization of such proof systems as building blocks for practical advanced cryptographic protocols such as ring signatures and balance proofs for privacy-preserving cryptocurrency payment protocols [2, 3]. We also discuss our recent work on succinct designated-verifier ZKPs (DV-ZKSNARKS) for verifying correctness of general delegated computations [5].
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most active research topics in cryptography in recent years. In many cryptographic constructions based on lattice assumptions, the building block is a proof of knowledge of a solution to an instance of the Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS) problem. However, all known such proof \n \nsystems have relatively weak security guarantees: Breaking each of these protocols is potentially easier than solving the underlying instance of the ISIS problem. As a consequence, cryptographic constructions relying on these proof systems typically inherit the sub-optimal security guarantees. Therefore, proof systems with stronger security guarantees are highly desirable. Such protocols are not only interesting from a theoretical point of view, but they also lead to lattice-based cryptographic constructions relying on weaker hardness assumptions than the contemporary schemes. \n \n \n \nIn this thesis, we construct a series of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge with strong security guarantees and reasonable communication costs, that can find various applications in lattice-based cryptography. Our constructions rely on a simple, yet versatile and effective technique, called Decomposition-Extension. When adapting this technique to the Stern-KTX proof system (Stern ‘96 - Kawachi, Tanaka, Xagawa ‘08), we obtain a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the ISIS problem (in the infinity norm) with a very strong security guarantee: Breaking the protocol is as least as hard as solving the underlying ISIS instance. We then develop our technique to design the following lattice-based cryptographic constructions: \n \n \n \n- Efficient zero-knowledge proofs of plaintext knowledge with strong security guarantees \n \nfor 4 encryption schemes based on the Learning with Errors problem: Regev’s scheme (Regev ‘05); the Dual-Regev scheme (Gentry, Peikert, Vaikuntanathan ‘08); the PVW scheme (Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, Waters ‘08); and the GHV scheme (Gentry, Halevi, Vaikuntanathan ‘10). Our results immediately yield 4 lattice-based interactive encryption protocols that are secure under chosen ciphertext attacks. Previously, only zero-knowledge proofs of plaintext knowledge for Regev’s scheme were known, and they are relatively inefficient with rather weak security guarantees. \n \n \n \n- A lattice-based identity-based identification scheme relying on a weaker hardness assumption than in the previous works. Furthermore, we introduce an identity-based ring identification scheme based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such scheme. \n \n \n \n- An improved lattice-based group signature scheme relying on relatively weak hardness assumptions, in which the signature size is logarithmic in the number of group users. Earlier lattice-based group signature schemes, which were published before 2013, rely on relatively weak hardness assumptions but have the undesirable property that the size of the signature is linear in the number of group users. A recent scheme (Laguillaumie, Langlois, Libert, Stehlé ‘13) achieves logarithmic signature size but it has to rely on relatively strong hardness assumptions. Our construction, thus, simultaneously achieves the good features of the existing schemes.
Abstract Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs) are cryptographic protocols that offer efficient and privacy-preserving means of verifying NP language relations and have drawn considerable attention for their appealing applications, e.g., verifiable computation and anonymous payment protocol. Compared with the pre-quantum case, the practicability of this primitive in the post-quantum setting is still unsatisfactory, especially for the space complexity. To tackle this issue, this work seeks to enhance the efficiency and compactness of lattice-based zk-SNARKs, including proof length and common reference string (CRS) length. In this paper, we develop the framework of square span program-based SNARKs and design new zk-SNARKs over cyclotomic rings. Compared with previous works, our construction is without parallel repetition and achieves shorter proof and CRS lengths than previous lattice-based zk-SNARK schemes. Particularly, the proof length of our scheme is around 23.3% 23.3 % smaller than the recent shortest lattice-based zk-SNARKs by Ishai et al. (in: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security, pp 212–234, 2021), and the CRS length is 3.6× 3.6 × smaller. Our constructions follow the framework of Gennaro et al. (in: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security, pp 556–573, 2018), and adapt it to the ring setting by slightly modifying the knowledge assumptions. We develop concretely small constructions by using module-switching and key-switching procedures in a novel way.
In this work, we present a concretely efficient lattice-based zero-knowledge proof system that satisfies straight-line extractability. At the heart of our construction is a novel, non-generic application of the Katsumata transform (CRYPTO 2021) to the widely adopted zero-knowledge framework of Lyubashevsky, Nguyen and Plançon (CRYPTO 2022). Our approach significantly optimizes the proof size, achieving a 2X reduction compared to prior generic techniques. This makes our scheme particularly well-suited for anonymous credential systems, secure multi-party computation, and proving quantum security, where straight-line extractability is essential.
With the standardization of post-quantum signature schemes such as Dilithium and Falcon, lattice-based ring signatures have become a promising tool for anonymous authentication and privacy-preserving encryption in big data environments. Specifically, the DualRing-LB scheme (CRYPTO’ 21), despite its short signatures and elegant structure, suffers from the large public key size, which dominates its communication cost and hinders scalability. There are two methods to reduce the public key size: the first is a compression technique, and the second is the bimodal distribution. The former discards the lower bits of the public key while the latter utilizes a smaller modulus. However, the unforgeability proof of DualRing-LB is incompatible with these methods because they lead to a rapid increase in the norm bound of the module short integer solution (or MSIS) problem, thereby significantly reducing security. In this paper, we follow the original security method of DualRing-LB and apply the trapdoor sampling technique to derive a tighter upper bound of MSIS problem, yielding a fixed security level independent of the ring size. The new proof result enables the use of both the compression technique and the bimodal distribution to enhance the communication efficiency of lattice-based DualRing schemes. Based on this result, we propose three practical lattice-based instantiations that reduce the public key size by 56%, 67%, 50%, compared to DualRing-LB, respectively, and achieve overall size reductions of at least 52%, 56%, 38%, respectively, across different ring sizes. Our results can contribute to lightweight, privacy-preserving cryptographic mechanisms for secure data sharing and authentication in large-scale distributed systems.