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The Ninth Marcel Grossmann Meeting

A glimpse to Feynman’s contributions to the debate on the foundations of quantum mechanics

Mario Di Mauro, Salvatore Esposito, Adele Naddeo

Published Jan 24, 2023• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The broad debate on foundational issues in quantum mechanics, which took place at the famous 1957 Chapel Hill conference on The Role of Gravitation in Physics , is here critically analyzed with an emphasis on Richard Feynman’s contributions. One of the most debated questions at Chapel Hill was whether the gravitational field had to be quantized and its possible role in wave function collapse. Feynman’s arguments in favor of the quantization of the gravitational field, based essentially on a series of gedanken experiments, are here discussed. Then the related problem of the wave function collapse, for which Feynman hints to decoherence as a possible solution, is discussed. Finally, another topic is analyzed, concerning the role of the observer in a closed Universe. In this respect, Feynman’s many-worlds characterization of Everett’s approach at Chapel Hill is discussed, together with later contributions of his, including a kind of Schrödinger’s cat paradox, which are scattered throughout the 1962-63 Lectures on Gravitation. Philosophical implications of Feynman’s ideas in relation to foundational issues are also discussed.

DOI
10.1142/9789811269776_0302

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The broad debate on foundational issues in quantum mechanics, which took place at the famous 1957 Chapel Hill conference on The Role of Gravitation in Physics , is here critically analyzed with an emphasis on Richard Feynman’s contributions. One of the most debated questions at Chapel Hill was whether the gravitational field had to be quantized and its possible role in wave function collapse. Feynman’s arguments in favor of the quantization of the gravitational field, based essentially on a series of gedanken experiments, are here discussed. Then the related problem of the wave function collapse, for which Feynman hints to decoherence as a possible solution, is discussed. Finally, another topic is analyzed, concerning the role of the observer in a closed Universe. In this respect, Feynman’s many-worlds characterization of Everett’s approach at Chapel Hill is discussed, together with later contributions of his, including a kind of Schrödinger’s cat paradox, which are scattered throughout the 1962-63 Lectures on Gravitation. Philosophical implications of Feynman’s ideas in relation to foundational issues are also discussed.
The broad debate on foundational issues in quantum mechanics, which took place at the famous 1957 Chapel Hill conference on \textit{The Role of Gravitation in Physics}, is here critically analyzed with an emphasis on Richard Feynman's contributions. One of the most debated questions at Chapel Hill was whether the gravitational field had to be quantized and its possible role in wave function collapse. Feynman's arguments in favor of the quantization of the gravitational field, based essentially on a series of gedanken experiments, are here discussed. Then the related problem of the wave function collapse, for which Feynman hints to decoherence as a possible solution, is discussed. Finally, another topic is analyzed, concerning the role of the observer in a closed Universe. In this respect, Feynman's many-worlds characterization of Everett's approach at Chapel Hill is discussed, together with later contributions of his, including a kind of Schrödinger's cat paradox, which are scattered throughout the 1962-63 Lectures on Gravitation. Philosophical implications of Feynman's ideas in relation to foundational issues are also discussed.
A recent development in the understanding of conceptual foundations of quantum theory is discussed, giving particular attention to the analysis of the so called Schroedinger’s cat paradox. The solution of this problem in the frameworks of Everett-Wheeler many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is considered, as well as the philosophical and theological consequences following from this interpretation. The recommendations are given, concerning the use of questions related with conceptual foundations of quantum theory in the education when introducing students and senior class pupils in problems of the dialogue between science and religion. \nKEY WORDS: science, religion, dialogue, foundations of quantum theory, many-worlds interpretation
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been disputed ever since the advent of the theory in the 1920’s. Famous are the discussions over long time between Einstein and Bohr. Einstein refused to accept the so‐called Copenhagen interpretation, where the wave function collapses at a measurement and where the outcome of the measurement is essentially accidental (“God does not play dice”). Alternative interpretations have appeared, but the Copenhagen school has dominated the thoughts throughout the decades. One interesting interpretation was formulated in 1957 by Hugh Everett at Princeton, a student of John Wheeler, which abandons the wave‐function collapse. In this model the universe is governed entirely by the Schrödinger equation, which does not allow for any collapse. In Everett’s model after a measurement the wave function is separated into different branches that do not interact. This model was left unnoticed for long time until Bryce DeWitt took it up in 1970 and termed it “Many‐Worlds Interpretation”, a term that in some sense is misleading. Everett’s model is incomplete, and it was later supplemented by the theory of decoherence, which explains how the different branches decouple as a result of the interaction with the environment. This extended model has in recent years gained increased respect, and some believe that it is the only model made available so far that is fully consistent with quantum mechanics. This interpretation can also shed some light on the development of the universe and, in particular, on the so‐called Anthropic principle, which puts human beings at the center of the development.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.
Quantum theory underpins much of modern physics and its implications draw the attention of industry, academia and public funding agencies. However there are many unsettled conceptual and philosophical problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics which are a matter of extensive debate. These hotly debated topics include the meaning of the wave function, the nature of the quantum objects, the role of the observer, the non-locality of the quantum world, and the emergence of classicality from the quantum domain. Containing chapters written by eminent researchers from the fields of physics and philosophy, this book provides interdisciplinary, comprehensive and up-to-date perspectives of the problems related to the interpretation of quantum theory. It is ideal for academic researchers in physics and philosophy working on the ontology of quantum mechanics.