Is wave function monism, the view that the wave function completely \ndescribes physical objects, a sensible view? GRW, one candidate \nto solve the measurement problem, might be taken to be an \nexample of such view. I argue in this paper that it not so obviously \nso. I first show that a bare version of wave function monism is impossible, \nand even if one can construct monistic theories with additional \nrules (but no additional ontologies), they are not to be taken seriously. \nInstead, a preferable choice is that of a quantum theory in which physical \nobjects are represented by entities in three–dimensional space or \nin four-dimensional space-time.
In the previous chapter, we referred to dual-aspect monism frames; we observe here that whether the psycho-physically neutral reality in such frames may refer to consciousness is an open question. By consciousness, however, we mean fundamental awareness, not functional consciousness, which is conventionally meant by materialistic or physicalist frames. We will turn to the issue of fundamental consciousness in the next two chapters. In this chapter, we explore possible links between consciousness (fundamental or not) and quantum mechanics (QM), and insights for quantum-like framework (QLF) or psycho-physical reality in general. Consciousness is, by far, the most enigmatic issue to conceptualise in modern science. The mainstream direction is materialism, where consciousness is an emergent phenomenon from matter, which has been given the name the hard problem. Emergence can be of different types, for example, weak and strong (goes by other names like epistemic and ontic or metaphysical, respectively). While in the case of weak emergence, in principle, higher-level descriptions of realities can be reduced to fundamental descriptions, in the strong emergence view, higher-level descriptions of realities have their own effective dynamical laws which are irreducible.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
This paper explores the intricate relationship between the observer, consciousness, and quantum mechanics, attempting to defend the interpretation of the wave function as a representation of consciousness. More precisely, in our framework, a quantum state, represented by a wave function, determines a state of consciousness related to the first-person experiences,
w, of the events
E, detected by senses. Building on Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, we argue that the wave function is not an objective universal entity, but rather one that is inherently associated with the first-person experiences
w∈P of an observer
O . The set
P also includes other observers,
O′, as subsets. We demonstrate that this proposal does not lead to solipsism, because there is no unique hierarchy of observers, as indicated above, but there are many possible hierarchies of observers, such that, e.g., the roles of the first-person observer,
O, and the third-person observer,
O′ are interchanged. The corresponding quantum states,
ψO and
ψO′, are elements of the space of all possible quantum states, the Hilbert space,
H. It is this larger space that we identify as the objective reality. Thus, our approach overcomes the main obstacle faced by researchers who tried to make sense of quantum mechanics, namely, the wall of solipsism. In this framework, the Everett many-worlds interpretation and the wave function collapse interpretation are not mutually exclusive but instead represent complementary perspectives within the hierarchy of observers, each offering insight into the underlying physics from a different vantage point.
The ontological meaning of the wave function is an important problem in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. The conventional view is wave function realism, according to which the wave function represents a real physical field in a fundamental high-dimensional space. In this chapter, I present a new analysis of the meaning of the wave function, and the analysis suggests a particle ontological interpretation of the wave function. According to this interpretation, the wave function of a quantum system describes the state of random discontinuous motion of particles in three-dimensional space, and in particular, the modulus squared of the wave function gives the probability density that the particles appear in every possible group of positions in space. Moreover, I argue that the difference between particle ontology and field ontology may result in different predictions under certain reasonable assumption, and it is the former, not the latter, that is consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics. Finally, I discuss similar pictures of motion of particles suggested by others. It is argued that Bell’s Everett (?) theory also implies the picture of random discontinuous motion of particles.