Industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT for short) which is the basis of Industry 4.0, extends Internet connectivity beyond traditional computing devices, for example, smartphones, computers, laptops, webcams, etc., to the physical world for improving accuracy and efficiency while reducing the production cost. However, there exists large numbers of security threats, such as data leakage and privacy threats. To solve these issues, we first present a system model, security requirements and then proposed a post quantum secure multi-party collaborative signature with deterability in the IIoT environment. In this scheme, formal security proofs are given in the random oracle assuming that AMLWE and AMSIS problem are hard. We also demonstrate the potential utility of our proposed scheme by evaluating its performance.
Industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT for short) which is the basis of Industry 4.0, extends Internet connectivity beyond traditional computing devices, for example, smartphones, computers, laptops, webcams, etc., to the physical world for improving accuracy and efficiency while reducing the production cost. However, there exists large numbers of security threats, such as data leakage and privacy threats. To solve these issues, we first present a system model, security requirements and then proposed a post quantum secure multi-party collaborative signature with deterability in the IIoT environment. In this scheme, formal security proofs are given in the random oracle assuming that AMLWE and AMSIS problem are hard. We also demonstrate the potential utility of our proposed scheme by evaluating its performance.
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) integrates control systems with IoT technology to enable automation and intelligent operations in industrial environments. As IIoT deployments expand, reliance on wireless communication channels increases the attack surface and exposes systems to various security and privacy threats. Moreover, the limited computational capabilities of IIoT devices and the need to preserve device anonymity introduce additional security requirements. Insufficient protection against these challenges can result in operational disruption and significant economic losses. Existing symmetric-key and hash-based schemes are lightweight but lack scalability for large IIoT deployments, whereas public-key methods provide stronger security. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens the long-term security of such protocols, as quantum algorithms can efficiently break conventional number-theoretic cryptosystems. To address these challenges, we propose a quantum-resistant three-party authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for the IIoT. The ring learning with errors (RLWE)-based protocol provides quantum-safe and efficient mutual authentication and secure session key establishment between workers and devices. Comprehensive security and performance analyses demonstrate that the proposed protocol is robust against security attacks. Performance evaluations confirm lower computational and communication overhead than existing post-quantum schemes, proving its practicality for IIoT.
The Edge-enabled Industrial Internet of Things (Edge-IIoT) has emerged as a fundamental architecture for intelligent manufacturing by enabling low-latency data collection, processing, and communication among distributed industrial devices. However, the open and distributed nature of Edge-IIoT introduces significant challenges to secure data authentication and privacy preservation. Meanwhile, conventional public key infrastructure incurs considerable certificate management overhead and is not well suited for future industrial environments in the presence of quantum computing. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a lattice-based certificateless blind signature scheme for secure and privacy-preserving authentication in Edge-IIoT. The proposed scheme integrates the Dilithium signature algorithm with certificateless public key cryptography and blind signature techniques to simultaneously provide anonymous authentication, data integrity, conditional identity revocation, and post-quantum security while eliminating the certificate management overhead associated with traditional public key infrastructures. Furthermore, the proposed construction improves existing lattice-based certificateless blind signature schemes by addressing identified security weaknesses and strengthening resistance against forgery attacks, while effectively avoiding the key escrow problem inherent in identity-based cryptography. The correctness, blindness, and unforgeability of the proposed scheme are formally proved in the random oracle model based on the hardness of the Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS) problem. In addition, theoretical performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme incurs acceptable computational, communication, and storage overhead while providing comprehensive security properties, including certificateless operation, identity anonymity, no key escrow, conditional revocation, and post-quantum security. Overall, the proposed scheme achieves an effective balance between security, privacy preservation, and efficiency, which exhibits favorable theoretical security-efficiency trade-offs for secure industrial data authentication in resource-constrained Edge-IIoT environments. Practical implementation is left for future investigation.
Group signatures, due to their inherent advantages in anonymous authentication, have been widely adopted in privacy-preserving multi-device authentication and related scenarios, establishing themselves as a fundamental cryptographic building block for securing communications in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems. However, existing post-quantum group signature schemes suffer from excessively large signature sizes, lack of strong non-frameability, and insufficient privilege separation, making them difficult to meet the efficiency and security requirements of IIoT. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a hash-based post-quantum group signature scheme (HPGS) for IIoT, which employs the SPHINCS+variant CEDRUS and MPC-in-the-Head zero-knowledge proofs. Specifically, we optimize the zero-knowledge proof circuit and Merkle tree parameters, and introduce an epoch-based Merkle tree accumulator to constrain the signature size to the kilobyte scale while supporting dynamic enrollment and revocation. Next, we design a member self-key-generation mechanism, where each member independently generates the signing key and only registers a public commitment, guaranteeing strong non-frameability. Furthermore, we distribute credential issuance and signature opening to two independent entities, enforcing protocol-level privilege separation. Experimental results show that, under NIST Level 1 post-quantum security, the scheme achieves a signature size of 47.07 KB, an online signing time of 104 μs, and a verification time of 1.4 ms, outperforming existing schemes in signing speed, verification efficiency, and functional completeness.
The explosive growth of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) technologies has been reshaping manufacturing, energy, transportation and infrastructure with real-time monitoring and automation supported by predictive analytics. The more interconnected machines are, the more vulnerable they become to advanced cyberattacks. RSA and ECC are two of the dominant cryptographic algorithms that 60% of the IIoT communications today. They are still susceptible to quantum computing attacks, especially from Shor, which can easily break public-key encryption. This new risk, and the threat it represents, calls for a monitoring of the quantum situation by adding Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to guarantee data privacy and resilient systems. This work studies the quantum-empowered security approach to IIoT environment and considers lattice-based, hash-based and code-based cryptography techniques immune to quantum attacks. This paper investigates the industrial system design demands, identifies some of these weaknesses, and presents a secure communication architecture including post-quantum cryptography for device authentication, secure firmware updates and data encryption. Studies show that due to constraints in resources, triage for IIoT devices is difficult, especially because of limitations of processors, among others; latency and scalability are two issues. The approach proposed showcases a means for industrial cybersecurity to benefit from post-quantum cryptography without losing efficiency.
The emergence of Industry 4.0 emphasizes automation, interconnectivity, and data-driven intelligence across industrial infrastructures, with the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) serving as a critical enabler. However, the proliferation of connected smart devices and the advent of quantum computing pose significant challenges to security and authentication mechanisms in such environments. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a lightweight, lattice-based authentication protocol for post-quantum IIoT environments. The proposed protocol enables secure mutual authentication and session key establishment between IIoT sensing devices and the gateway node. It integrates Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to provide hardware-level device trust, eliminates the need to store long-term cryptographic keys in device memory, and uses one-time challenge-response pairs to prevent CRP reuse. The security of the proposed protocol is based on the hardness of the Ring LearningWith Errors (RLWE) problem, ensuring resistance against quantum adversaries. The protocol is formally validated under the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and evaluated for its resistance to impersonation, replay, desynchronization, and device forgery attacks. Performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme reduces computational cost by 43.11% and communication overhead by 12.67% compared to existing lattice-based authentication protocols. These results confirm its suitability as an efficient and quantum-resilient authentication solution for future Industry 4.0-driven IIoT systems.
A lightweight, robust, and efficient security mechanism is necessary to combat quantum-generation threats across multiple domains, including healthcare, transportation, and industrial automation, in the Internet of Things (IoT). Post-quantum cryptography has emerged in response to the increasing vulnerability of traditional cryptographic methods, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks. Taking advantage of the hardness of Short Integer Solutions (SIS) and Learning with Errors (LWE), we propose a lattice-based signature scheme for IoT applications. A computationally efficient IoT device model that maintains authenticated, integrity, and anonymity is proposed. The scheme has the advantage of being faster and more efficient than existing key size schemes such as IBS, CLS, and FALCON, according to a detailed security assessment. The proposed scheme maintains practical deployment ability while reducing post-quantum security in IoT ecosystems.