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The Journal of Supercomputing

Formal unlinkability analysis of message authentication protocols based on authentic channels

Mahdi R. Alagheband, Atefeh Mashatan

Published Dec 14, 2022• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11227-022-04993-4

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As messaging applications are becoming increasingly popular, it is of utmost importance to analyze their security and mitigate existing weaknesses. This paper focuses on one of the most acclaimed messaging applications: Signal. Signal is a protocol that provides end-to-end channel security, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security. These features are achieved thanks to a key-ratcheting mechanism that updates the key material at every message. Due to its high security impact, Signal's key-ratcheting has recently been formalized, along with an analysis of its security. In this paper, we revisit Signal, describing some attacks against the original design and proposing SAID: Signal Authenticated and IDentity-based. As the name indicates, our protocol relies on an identity-based setup, which allows us to dispense with Signal's centralized server. We use the identity-based long-term secrets to obtain persistent and explicit authentication, such that SAID achieves higher security guarantees than Signal. We prove the security of SAID not only in the Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) model (as done by previous work), but also in the Authenticated and Confidential Channel Establishment (ACCE) model, which we adapted and redefined for SAID and asynchronous messaging protocols in general into a model we call identity-based Multistage Asynchronous Messaging (iMAM). We believe our model to be more faithful in particular to the true security of Signal, whose use of the message keys prevents them from achieving the composable guarantee claimed by previous analysis.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an enormous ubiquitous-network, which connects the objects through various sensors. The IoT technology promotes the interconnection and fusion between the physical world and information space, and it facilitates the day-to-day life of people. However, since a lot of equipped sensors are unattended and open, the IoT must face and overcome the main problems of security and privacy. Authentication is one of the paramount security concerns in the IoT environment, in which a user could directly access data from the sensors. Therefore, we propose an authentication and key agreement scheme providing unlinkability for the IoT environment based on bilinear pairings. The formal security proof demonstrates that the proposed protocol is unforgeable under the adaptively chosen message attack, and the session key exchange is semantic secure under the eCK model. In addition, the computation and communication costs of the proposed scheme are evaluated and compared with some existing similar schemes, which exhibits that it pleasantly addresses the needs of the IoT as far as security properties and computation expenses.
Authentication key exchange protocols enable communication entities to agree on a shared secret value over an insecure public channel. Conventional authentication key exchange protocols rely on mathematical problems that can be broken by Shor's algorithm executed on a quantum computer. This study proposes a quantum-safe authentication protocol that uses the CRYSTALS-Kyber post-quantum cryptographic primitive and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography. The primary application area of the proposed scheme is smart-city infrastructures and resource-constrained environments. This protocol is motivated by the scheme of Parameswarath et al. Their solution lacks perfect forward secrecy and protection against denial-of-service attacks, and it is practically infeasible. The proposed scheme addresses those limitations. The scheme presented in this study was analyzed in the Real-or-Random formal security model. Additionally, the formal security verifier ProVerif was used to verify security properties, including message integrity, strong authentication, and session key secrecy. Moreover, this document includes an informal security analysis that demonstrates a wide range of security features. This study also contains a performance analysis of the proposed scheme along with other recently published schemes. The total computation costs at the IoT device and the Cloud Server are 0.2014 and 0.216 milliseconds, respectively. The storage cost for both the IoT device and the Cloud Server is 2545 bytes. The total communication cost for authentication messages is 1687 bytes. Finally, the presented protocol was simulated using the NS3 network simulator. The measured values for Packet Delivery Ratio, End-to-End delay, and Throughput in a scenario with 40 devices are 99.07\%, 3.54 ms, and 162.92 kbps, respectively.