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Quantum Science and Technology

External magnetic effect for the security of practical quantum key distribution

Hao Tan, Weiyang Zhang, Li‐Kang Zhang, Wei Li, Sheng‐Kai Liao, Feihu Xu

Published Jun 29, 2022• 24 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows remote parties to share secret keys with proven security. To guarantee the security of practical QKD, the imperfections in realistic devices need to be characterized and considered in practical security analysis. Particularly, a standard QKD system normally uses optical isolator or optical circulator in the transmitter to prevent the injection from external light. Here we find that the optical isolators and circulators, commonly based on the Faraday effect, are subject to the perturbation from external magnetic fields. With this, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the security for practical QKD due to external magnetic effect. We experimentally demonstrate the influence of magnetic fields on both the transmittance and the isolation of standard optical isolators and circulators. We analyze the security risks caused by the potential magnetic attacks, together with the corresponding countermeasures.

DOI
10.1088/2058-9565/ac7d07

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Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows remote parties to share secret keys with proven security. To guarantee the security of practical QKD, the imperfections in realistic devices need to be characterized and considered in practical security analysis. Particularly, a standard QKD system normally uses optical isolator or optical circulator in the transmitter to prevent the injection from external light. Here we find that the optical isolators and circulators, commonly based on the Faraday effect, are subject to the perturbation from external magnetic fields. With this, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the security for practical QKD due to external magnetic effect. We experimentally demonstrate the influence of magnetic fields on both the transmittance and the isolation of standard optical isolators and circulators. We analyze the security risks caused by the potential magnetic attacks, together with the corresponding countermeasures.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics can allow the distribution of secure keys between distant users. However, imperfections in realistic devices may lead to potential security risks, which must be accurately characterized and considered in practical security analysis. High-speed optical modulators, being one of the core components of practical QKD systems, can be used to prepare the required quantum states. Here, we find that optical modulators based on LiNbO\mathrm{Li}\mathrm{Nb}\mathrm{O}LiNbO3{}_{3}3​, including phase modulators and intensity modulators, are vulnerable to photorefractive effects caused by external light injection. By changing the power of external light, eavesdroppers can control the intensities of the prepared states, posing a potential threat to the security of QKD. We have experimentally demonstrated the influence of light injection on LiNbO\mathrm{Li}\mathrm{Nb}\mathrm{O}LiNbO3{}_{3}3​-based optical modulators and analyzed the security risks caused by the potential light-injection attack, along with the corresponding countermeasures.
Abstract Quantum random number generator (QRNG) based on the inherent randomness of fundamental quantum processes can provide provable true random numbers which play an important role in many fields. However, the security of practical QRNGs is linked to the performance of realistic devices. In particular, devices based on the Faraday effect in a QRNG system may be affected by external magnetic fields, which will inevitably open a loophole that an eavesdropper can exploit to steal the information of generated random numbers. In this work, the effects of external magnetic fields on the security of practical QRNGs are analyzed. Taking the quantum phase fluctuation based QRNG with unbalanced Michelson interferometer as an example, we experimentally demonstrate the rotation angle of the Faraday rotation mirror (FRM) is influenced by external magnetic fields. Then, we develop a theoretical model between the rotation angle deviation of FRM and conditional min-entropy. Simulation results show that the imperfect FRM leads to a reduction in the variance of measured signal and extractable randomness. Furthermore, the impacts of practical sampling device on the extractable randomness are analyzed in the presence of imperfect FRM, which indicates suitable parameters of the sampling device can improve the security of practical QRNGs. Potential countermeasures are also proposed. Our work reveals that external magnetic fields should be carefully considered in the application of practical QRNGs.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the optical amplifier can be used to improve the performance of the system by compensating for the imperfections of the detectors. However, the eavesdropper Eve can actively utilize a reverse external magnetic field to deteriorate the performance of the optical amplifier, which may affect the practical security of the system. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with an optical amplifier under the effect of the reverse external magnetic field. Based on the investigation of the parameter estimation under the above influence, we find that the evaluation of the secret key rate may be overestimated, which will open a security loophole for Eve to successfully launch an intercept-resend attack in the practical CVQKD system with an optical amplifier. In order to close this security loophole, we can monitor the reverse external magnetic field or change the type of the optical isolator to make the secret key rate of the system evaluated exactly.
In general, quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved unconditionally secure for perfect devices due to quantum uncertainty principle, quantum noncloning theorem and quantum nondividing principle which means that a quantum cannot be divided further. However, the practical optical and electrical devices used in the system are imperfect, which can be exploited by the eavesdropper to partially or totally spy the secret key between the legitimate parties. In this article, we first briefly review the recent work on quantum hacking on some experimental QKD systems with respect to imperfect devices carried out internationally, then we will present our recent hacking works in details, including passive faraday mirror attack, partially random phase attack, wavelength-selected photon-number-splitting attack, frequency shift attack, and single-photon-detector attack. Those quantum attack reminds people to improve the security existed in practical QKD systems due to imperfect devices by simply adding countermeasure or adopting a totally different protocol such as measurement-device independent protocol to avoid quantum hacking on the imperfection of measurement devices [Lo, et al ., Phys. Rev. Lett., 2012, 108: 130503].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics and idealized device models. Practical implementations, however, deviate from these models due to unavoidable device imperfections, and existing security proofs fall short of capturing the complexity of real-world systems. Here we introduce a versatile numerical finite-key security framework valid against general coherent attacks and applicable to a broad class of practical QKD setups. It accommodates most relevant imperfections at both transmitter and receiver, including non-independent-and-identically-distributed (non-IID) signals arising in high-speed QKD systems due to the limited bandwidth of optical modulators, while requiring only partial characterization of the apparatuses. We demonstrate the power of our framework by proving the security of a realistic decoy-state QKD implementation with laser sources, providing a practical route towards rigorous security certification of real-world QKD setups.