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Journal of Organizational and End User Computing

An Entropy-View Secure Multiparty Computation Protocol Based on Semi-Honest Model

Yun Luo, Yuling Chen, Tao Li, Yilei Wang, Yixian Yang, Xiaomei Yu

Published Jul 14, 2022• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Data interaction scenarios involving multiple parties in network communities have problems of trust, data security, and reliability of the parties, and secure multiparty computation(SMPC) can effectively solve these problems. To address the security and fairness issues of SMPC, this study considers that semi-honest participants can lead to deviations in the security and fairness of the protocol, and combines information entropy and mutual information to present an n-round information exchange protocol in which each participant broadcasts a relevant information value in each round without revealing other information. The uncertainty of the correct outcome value is blurred by the interaction information in each round, and each participant is not sure of the correct outcome value until the end of the protocol, which effectively prevents malicious behavior and ensures the correct execution of the protocol. Security and fairness analysis shows that our protocol guarantees the security and relative fairness of the output obtained by the participants after completing the protocol.

DOI
10.4018/joeuc.306752

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Data interaction scenarios involving multiple parties in network communities have problems of trust, data security, and reliability of the parties, and secure multiparty computation(SMPC) can effectively solve these problems. To address the security and fairness issues of SMPC, this study considers that semi-honest participants can lead to deviations in the security and fairness of the protocol, and combines information entropy and mutual information to present an n-round information exchange protocol in which each participant broadcasts a relevant information value in each round without revealing other information. The uncertainty of the correct outcome value is blurred by the interaction information in each round, and each participant is not sure of the correct outcome value until the end of the protocol, which effectively prevents malicious behavior and ensures the correct execution of the protocol. Security and fairness analysis shows that our protocol guarantees the security and relative fairness of the output obtained by the participants after completing the protocol.
Secure multi-party computation(SMPC) is an important research field in cryptography, secure multi-party computation has a wide range of applications in practice. Accordingly, information security issues have arisen. Aiming at security issues in Secure multi-party computation, we consider that semi-honest participants have malicious operations such as collusion in the process of information interaction, gaining an information advantage over honest parties through collusion which leads to deviations in the security of the protocol. To solve this problem, we combine information entropy to propose an n-round information exchange protocol, in which each participant broadcasts a relevant information value in each round without revealing additional information. Through the change of the uncertainty of the correct result value in each round of interactive information, each participant cannot determine the correct result value before the end of the protocol. Security analysis shows that our protocol guarantees the security of the output obtained by the participants after the completion of the protocol.
Many distributed interaction scenarios exist in big data networks, which require joint computation in different environments. In the traditional secure multiparty computation(SMPC), there exist constant rounds or even more rounds of interaction, which greatly increases the communication overhead. In this paper, we address the problem of optimizing the complexity of rounds by constructing a secure computation protocol that achieves semi-honest static security based on a polynomial puzzle assumption. The multiparty interactive computation is performed using multilinear maps operation, and the obtained results are transmitted over the broadcast channel. The security analysis shows that the protocol achieves static security.
Secure multiparty computation is valuable for studying data privacy protection issues due to its decentralization, input privacy, fairness, etc. One of the most fundamental problems is to confidentially compute the maximum and the minimum of multiple data. In this paper, an efficient secure multipart computation scheme that can compute the maximum and the minimum simultaneously without a trusted third party was proposed to address the problems of existing secure multi-party computation protocols, such as inability of computing the maximum and the minimum at one time, low efficiency, and security risks caused by unique designated decryption key holder. In the scheme, an encoding method that can simultaneously compute the maximum and the minimum was first provided, whose basic idea was to give a complete set of ordinal numbers with potential l (l ≥ the number of participants n), and each participant encodes its data into an array with length l where the location of the data in the complete set was coded as a random number and the other positions were coded as 1. The positions of the leftmost and rightmost non-1 values in the product array were the positions of the maximum and minimum in the whole set. Based on the proposed encoding method, the ElGamal homomorphic encryption algorithm was used to guarantee the confidentiality of all participants’ data, and the maximum threshold decryption was used to make each participant hold part of the decryption key, which avoids the security threats caused by centralized decryption of calculation result by designated key holder. The proposed scheme was proven to be resistant to collusive attacks by any participant under a semi-honest model based on an ideal-realistic simulation paradigm. Finally, the efficiency analysis and performance comparison with related maximum (minimum) computing schemes were given, which showed that the proposed protocol has advantages over existing schemes in terms of computational complexity and communication complexity under the premise of higher security.
Multi-party fair exchange (MFE) and fair secure multi-party computation (fair SMPC) are under-studied fields of research, with practical importance. In particular, we consider MFE scenarios where at the end of the protocol, either every participant receives every other participant’s item, or no participant receives anything. We analyze the case where a trusted third party (TTP) is optimistically available, although we emphasize that the trust put on the TTP is only regarding the fairness , and our protocols preserve the privacy of the exchanged items against the TTP. In the fair SMPC case, we prove that a malicious TTP can only harm fairness, but not security . We construct an asymptotically optimal multi-party fair exchange protocol that requires a constant number of rounds (in comparison to linear) and O(n 2 ) messages (in comparison to cubic), where n is the number of participating parties. In our protocol, we enable the parties to efficiently exchange any item that can be efficiently put into a verifiable encryption (e.g., signatures on a contract). We show how to apply this protocol on top of any SMPC protocol to achieve fairness with very little overhead (independent of the circuit size). We then generalize our protocol to efficiently handle any exchange topology (participants exchange items with arbitrary other participants). Our protocol guarantees fairness in its strongest sense: even if all n-1 other participants are malicious and colluding with each other, the fairness is still guaranteed.
Consider several parties that do not trust each other, yet they wish to correctly compute some common function of their local inputs while keeping these inputs private. This problem is known as "Secure Multi-Party Computation", and was introduced by Andrew Yao in 1982. Secure multi-party computations have some real world examples like electronic auctions, electronic voting or fingerprinting. In this thesis we consider the case where there are only two parties involved. This is known as "Secure Two-Party Computation". If there is a trusted third party called Carol, then the problem is pretty straightforward. The participating parties could hand their inputs in Carol who can compute the common function correctly and could return the outputs to the corresponding parties. The goal is to achieve (almost) the same result when there is no trusted third party. Cryptographic protocols are designed in order to solve these kinds of problems. These protocols are analyzed within an appropriate model in which the behavior of parties is structured. The basic level is called the Semi-Honest Model where parties are assumed to follow the protocol specification, but later can derive additional information based on the messages which have been received so far. A more realistic model is the so-called Malicious Model. The common approach is to first analyze a protocol in the semi-honest model and then later extend it into the malicious model. Any cryptographic protocol for secure two-party computation must satisfy the following security requirements: correctness, privacy and fairness. It must guarantee the correctness of the result while preserving the privacy of the parties’ inputs, even if one of the parties is malicious and behaves arbitrarily throughout the protocol. It must also guarantee fairness. This roughly means that whenever a party aborts the protocol prematurely, he or she should not have any advantage over the other party in discovering the output. The main question for researchers is to construct new protocols that achieve the above mentioned goals for secure multi-party computation. Of course, such protocols must be secure in a given model, as well as be as efficient as possible. In 1986, Yao presented the first general protocol for secure two-party computation which was applicable only to the semi-honest model. He uses a tool called "Garbled Circuit". Yao’s protocol uses the underlying primitives ("Pseudorandom Generator" and "Oblivious Transfer") as blackboxes which lead to efficient results. After Yao’s work many variants and improvements have been proposed for the malicious model. In this thesis, we design several new protocols for secure two-party computation based on Yao’s garbled circuit. Before we present the details of our new designs, we first show several weaknesses, security flaws or problems with the existing protocols in the literature. We first work in the semi-honest model and then extend it into the malicious model by presenting new protocols. Finally we add fairness to our protocol. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography which is useful for implementing protocols for secure multi-party computation. We study several variants of oblivious transfer in this thesis. We present a new protocol for the so-called "Committed OT". This protocol is very efficient in the sense that it is quite good in comparison to the most efficient committed OT protocols in the literature. The abovementioned flaw with the use of OT can be fixed with our committed oblivious transfer protocol. Furthermore, it is more general than all previous protocols, and, therefore, it is of independent interest. We also deal with fairness in this thesis. For protocols based on garbled circuit, so far only Benny Pinkas has presented a protocol in the literature for achieving fairness. We show a subtle problem with this protocol where the privacy of the inputs of one party can be compromised. We also describe this problem in detail which is in fact related to the fairness, and finally propose a more efficient scheme that does achieve fairness.
A secure multiparty number-product protocol is an important building block in the area of secure multiparty computation. With proper composition of the building block, most applications, such as circuit evaluation, data mining, and private information retrieval, can be executed securely and collaboratively by potentially dishonest parties. In this work, we propose a commodity-based secure number-product protocol, the security of which has been validated with the metrics proposed by Chiang et al. based on information theory. We prove that the protocol can be executed securely under the assumption of semi-honest behavior. Furthermore, if an extra semi-trusted party exists, the proposed protocol can resist any number of corrupt parties. In addition to the security issue, we compare the protocol's communication and computation costs with those of the theoretically secure solution proposed by Ben-Or et al.