Introduction/purpose: The problem of efficient distribution of cryptographic keys in communication systems has existed since its first days and is especially emphasized by the emergence of mass communication systems. Defining and implementing efficient protocols for symmetric cryptographic keys establishment in such circumstances is of great importance in raising information security in cyberspace. Methods: Using the methods of Information Theory and Secure Multiparty Computation, protocols for direct establishment of cryptographic keys between communication parties have been defined. Results: The paper defines two new approaches to the problem of establishing cryptographic keys. The novelty in the protocol defined in the security model based on information theory is based on the source of common randomness, which in this case is the EEG signal of each subject participating in the communication system. Experimental results show that the amount of information leaking to the attacker is close to zero. A novelty in the second case, which provides security with keys at the level of computer security by applying Secure Multiparty Computation, is in the new application field, namely generation and distribution of symmetric cryptographic keys. It is characteristic of both approaches that within the framework of formal theories, it is possible to draw conclusions about their security characteristics in a formal way. Conclusions: The paper describes two new approaches for establishing cryptographic keys in symmetric cryptographic systems with experimental results. The significance of the proposed solutions lies in the fact that they enable the establishment of secure communication between communication parties from end to end, avoiding the influence of a trusted third party. In that way, the achieved communication level security significantly increases in relation to classical cryptographic systems.
Introduction/purpose: The problem of efficient distribution of cryptographic keys in communication systems has existed since its first days and is especially emphasized by the emergence of mass communication systems. Defining and implementing efficient protocols for symmetric cryptographic keys establishment in such circumstances is of great importance in raising information security in cyberspace. Methods: Using the methods of Information Theory and Secure Multiparty Computation, protocols for direct establishment of cryptographic keys between communication parties have been defined. Results: The paper defines two new approaches to the problem of establishing cryptographic keys. The novelty in the protocol defined in the security model based on information theory is based on the source of common randomness, which in this case is the EEG signal of each subject participating in the communication system. Experimental results show that the amount of information leaking to the attacker is close to zero. A novelty in the second case, which provides security with keys at the level of computer security by applying Secure Multiparty Computation, is in the new application field, namely generation and distribution of symmetric cryptographic keys. It is characteristic of both approaches that within the framework of formal theories, it is possible to draw conclusions about their security characteristics in a formal way. Conclusions: The paper describes two new approaches for establishing cryptographic keys in symmetric cryptographic systems with experimental results. The significance of the proposed solutions lies in the fact that they enable the establishment of secure communication between communication parties from end to end, avoiding the influence of a trusted third party. In that way, the achieved communication level security significantly increases in relation to classical cryptographic systems.
For a secure communication through the public network, cryptographic encryption must be applied. The key establishment issue is the most important part in cryptographic encryption. Only the legitimate principals who have the key can encrypt messages and decrypt cryptograms. A secure multi-party communication held through the public network can only take place after a multi-party key establishment protocol has been executed. The multi-party key establishment protocol is designed so that the principals can receive a common key and use it to securely exchange the messages.\nIn this thesis, the secure multi-party key establishment protocols are discussed. W e start from investigating properties of two-party key establishment protocols such as motivation of using session key, adversaries in the protocols, attacks of the protocol and security analysis of the protocol. Then we give the requirements of a multi-party key establishment protocol and summarize about what should be considered in designing a multi-party key establishment protocol. After that we review some of the previous proposed multi-party key establishment protocol. The existing multi-party key establishment protocols are either impractical ( not efficient enough) or missing some important security goals such as authentication of principals. Three new protocols are proposed in this thesis. The first protocol addresses how to hold a conference for members of two hierarchical groups in an efficient way. The message broadcasting is used to reduce the cost of secure message transport.\nThe second and the third protocols manage the authentication problem by using a secret sharing scheme. We replace the principal authentication with the group authentication so that the computational overhead and communication overhead will be reduced especially in reuse of the protocol for new communication. Again, message broadcasting is used for replacing the expansive secure communication channel.\nPart of this thesis appeared in ACSC'99(Australian Computer Science Conference) and ACISP'99(Australian Conference of Information Security and Privacy).
The development of modern computer technologies endangers the confidentiality of information, which is usually ensured by traditional cryptographic means. This circumstance forces us to look for new methods of protection. In view of modern trends, quantum cryptography methods can become such alternatives, which allow solving a number of important cryptographic problems, for which the impossibility of solving using only classical (that is, non-quantum) communication has been proven. Quantum cryptography is a branch of quantum informatics that studies methods of protecting information by using quantum carriers. The possibility of such protection is ensured by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. One of the promising directions of quantum cryptography is Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) that offers secure communication without any shared key. A characteristic feature of this method is the absence of cryptographic transformations, accordingly, there is no key distribution problem. The purpose of this work is a general overview of quantum cryptography protocols, finding their weak points for further development and improvement, as well as identifying vulnerabilities to different attacks. The article analyzes new methods and protocols, as well as presents their advantages and disadvantages. Based on partial generalizations of theoretical provisions and practical achievements in the field of quantum cryptography, a generalized classification was developed. By comparing various factors of the protocols, and their resistance to certain cyberattacks, we have the opportunity to identify several problems in this field and expand the possibilities for choosing appropriate methods for building modern quantum information protection systems. In accordance with this, conclusions were presented regarding the use of protocols and increasing the level of their effectiveness.
This chapter considers key establishment protocols and related cryptographic techniques which provide shared secrets between two or more parties, typically for subsequent use as symmetric keys for a variety of cryptographic purposes including encryption, message authentication, and entity authentication. The main focus is two-party key establishment, with the aid of a trusted third party in some cases. While many concepts extend naturally to multi-party key establishment including conference keying protocols, such protocols rapidly become more complex, and are considered here only briefly, as is the related area of secret sharing. Broader aspects of key management, including distribution of public keys, certificates, and key life cycle issues, are deferred to Chapter 13 .
Currently, theoretical and experimental work in the field of quantum cryptography is being carried out in many research centers around the world. Over the past two decades since the start of active research, many quantum cryptographic protocols have been proposed, a significant number of laboratory experiments have been performed on their practical implementation, important work has been done to prove the resistance of the proposed protocols to certain types of attacks, and the first commercial quantum key distribution systems have been developed. However, there are still many tasks and problems in the field of quantum cryptography, the solution of which is of great scientific and technical importance. So, in particular, such a promising direction as quantum protocols for direct secure communication requires further development, allowing, under certain conditions, to transfer secret information without encryption, both between two and between a large number of users. Currently, such protocols have been developed using two-and three-particle entangled states, but there are almost no similar protocols with entangled states of a larger number of qubits that do not require large quantum memory for their implementation and, at the same time, have a large information capacity. Therefore, the development of new quantum direct secure communication protocols with increased information capacity, the analysis of their resistance to attacks, as well as the determination of the best protocols according to the criteria of resistance and information capacity.
Currently many symmetric key cryptographic tools which are known to be quantum-safe. They all share Secret symmetric keys through an untrusted medium which is usually done with public key methods which are prone to quantum attacks. One among the recommended solutions to the key distribution problem is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). QKD utilizes an authenticated Communication channel along with a quantum communication channel so that a secret key is generated. Whatever may be the protocol to implement proposed QKD, they all need both a quantum channel, and an authenticated classical. OTP (One Time Pad) is used when two parties wish to communications have to share a key called pad. This pad is a randomly generated key and the length of the key should be equal to the message so it can be sent. The proposed QKD parameters that result in almost 35.67% smaller keys for quantum security and an implementation of QKD in network which is publicly available and usable in practice.
Quantum cryptography provides an ensemble of protocols, such as quantum key distribution [1-3], quantum random number generation [4], closed group digital signatures [5], long-term secure data storage [6] and multi-party secure computation [7], which are robust against future algorithmic and computational advances, including the emergence of quantum computers. This is because its security is information-theoretic, i.e., it can be proven based only on models of the local devices operated by legitimate users and does not require any assumptions on the resources available to an adversary [8-12]. Information-theoretic security will be important for data confidentiality in the future when we expect more powerful computers and new algorithms to be at the fingertips of our digital foes. Of particular concern is the advent of quantum computers that can be used to launch efficient attacks on conventional techniques, such as the widely-used forms of public key cryptography. Well before more powerful conventional and quantum computers become available, quantum cryptography will be important to protect against a generic vulnerability inherent to current cryptographic techniques based on computational complexity: encrypted data can be stored today and decrypted in the future, when suitable technology becomes available. This leads to the possibility of retrospectively breaking encryption keys established with computational techniques, such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. This becomes a serious threat if data confidentiality must be maintained for several years, especially as it is now feasible to store large volumes of information.Although the quantum cryptographic protocolsare information-theoretic secure, real systemsmay still possess side channels, i.e. security vulnerabilities, if their implementation deviates significantly from the idealised models used in the security analysis [12-15]. This is a common threat to any cryptosystem, irrespective of whether it is based on quantum theory [16-23] or computational complexity [24-28]. For example, timing attacks can threaten implementations of both quantum [16] and non-quantum [24] systems. Therefore, the security analysis of a cryptosystem’s implementation, for simplicity called “implementation security”, is anatural and important development in the evolution of all cryptographic technologies, including quantum cryptography.Since the security of quantum cryptography depends only on the legitimate users’ local equipment, the fundamental task in quantum cryptography implementation security is to estimate how much information such equipment leaks to a potential adversary. When this information leakage can be bounded below a certain value, security can be restored [29, 30] using a technique called privacy amplification[31, 32, 33]. This compresses a partially secret bit sequence into a highly secure key, with the amount of compression depending upon the estimated information leakage. Thus, by adequately characterising a real system, it is possible to restore the security promise of the theoretical protocol against technology available at the time that secret key is being created. It is a specific feature of quantum cryptography that this security statement does not change with future technological advances.Privacyamplification is not the only resource available to enforce the implementation security of quantum cryptography. Modifications to hardware and protocols can dramatically reduce the information leakage and the potential occurrence of side-channels and active attacks [34-38]. Moreover, quantum correlations can be used to test the hardware of a real system [39-40]. Such tests can be quite demanding to implement but have the advantage of immunity against a large class of implementation issues. The importance of analysing the implementation security of quantum cryptography is widely recognised and is a very active area of research. National metrology institutes, government organisations, universities and private companies fully acknowledge the importance of thissubject and are supporting its effective development. ETSI has established an Industry Specification Group (ISG) to coordinate these efforts and to set forward-looking standards in quantum cryptography implementation security [41]. These will guide security evaluation by qualified third parties, as part of a security certification of quantum cryptographic products.