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Information security and cryptography

Authentication and Key Transport Using Public Key Cryptography

Colin Boyd, Anish Mathuria, Douglas Stebila

Published Nov 6, 2019• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-58146-9_4

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Certificateless public-key cryptography has conquered both the certificate management problem in the traditional public-key cryptography and the key escrow problem in the ID-based public-key cryptography. Certificateless authenticated key exchange (CLAKE) protocol is an important primitive of the certificateless public-key cryptography. A CLAKE protocol is employed to provide both mutual authentication and establishing a session key between two participators. Indeed, all conventional public-key cryptographies have encountered a new kind of attack, named “side-channel attacks”. Fortunately, leakage-resilient cryptography is a flexible approach to withstand such attacks. However, the design of leakage-resilient CLAKE (LR-CLAKE) protocols is not studied. In the article, by extending the well-known extended-Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, we present the security notions (adversary model) of LR-CLAKE protocols, called continual-leakage-resilient eCK (CLReCK) model. The first LR-CLAKE protocol withstanding side-channel attacks is proposed. By employing the proof technique of the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we formally prove the security of our protocol in the CLReCK model.
Certificateless public key cryptography was introduced to overcome the key escrow limitation of the identity-based cryptography. It combines the advantages of the identity-based cryptography and the traditional PKI. Many certificateless public key encryption and signature schemes have been proposed. However, the key agreement in CL-PKE is seldom discussed. In this paper, we present a new certificateless two party authentication key agreement protocol and prove its security attributes. Compared with the existing protocol, our protocol is more efficient.
Signcryption is comparatively new approach in public key cryptography. Signcryption has the virtue to provide the services of digital signature and public key encryption in a single step. So when we compare it in terms of cost and ease of use, signcryption is better than “signature then encryption” (or encryption then signature) approach. So signcryption protocols are obvious choice for WTLS where authentication along with savings of computational overheads is always desired. In this paper we present a signcryption protocol for WTLS using bit commitment scheme with its security analysis.