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Routledge eBooks

How Classical and Quantum States Relate: Cartwright’s Views of Quantum Theory

Brigitte Falkenburg

Published Jun 3, 2008• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.4324/9780203895467-35

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I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space. Shakespeare , Hamlet, Act 2 Scene 2 Introduction As we saw in the last chapter, the received account of the relation between classical and quantum mechanics is a form of reductionism, where classical mechanics is supposed to emerge from quantum mechanics in the limit of some parameter. When we examine more closely the views of three of the key founders of quantum theory, however, we see that none of them took the relation between these theories to be adequately captured by such a reductionist limit. Indeed as we shall see presently, Werner Heisenberg's account of the relation between classical and quantum mechanics is actually a strong form of theoretical pluralism, quite similar to Nancy Cartwright's metaphysical nomological pluralism introduced in Section 1.3. Rather than viewing quantum mechanics as the fundamental theory that replaced classical mechanics, Heisenberg argues that both theories are required, each having its own proper domain of applicability and each being a perfectly accurate and final description of that domain. Throughout his career, Heisenberg held a highly original view in the philosophy of science, centered on his notion of a closed theory. Very briefly, a closed theory is a tightly knit system of axioms, definitions, and laws that provides a perfectly accurate and final description of a certain limited domain of phenomena. This notion has profound implications for Heisenberg's understanding of scientific methodology, theory change, intertheoretic relations, and realism.

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I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space. Shakespeare , Hamlet, Act 2 Scene 2 Introduction As we saw in the last chapter, the received account of the relation between classical and quantum mechanics is a form of reductionism, where classical mechanics is supposed to emerge from quantum mechanics in the limit of some parameter. When we examine more closely the views of three of the key founders of quantum theory, however, we see that none of them took the relation between these theories to be adequately captured by such a reductionist limit. Indeed as we shall see presently, Werner Heisenberg's account of the relation between classical and quantum mechanics is actually a strong form of theoretical pluralism, quite similar to Nancy Cartwright's metaphysical nomological pluralism introduced in Section 1.3. Rather than viewing quantum mechanics as the fundamental theory that replaced classical mechanics, Heisenberg argues that both theories are required, each having its own proper domain of applicability and each being a perfectly accurate and final description of that domain. Throughout his career, Heisenberg held a highly original view in the philosophy of science, centered on his notion of a closed theory. Very briefly, a closed theory is a tightly knit system of axioms, definitions, and laws that provides a perfectly accurate and final description of a certain limited domain of phenomena. This notion has profound implications for Heisenberg's understanding of scientific methodology, theory change, intertheoretic relations, and realism.
This paper deals with Nancy Cartwright's views on the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics, as exposed in her book How the Laws of Physics Lie. It will be argued that the fundamental object of Quantum Mechanics is not the transition rate, but the wave function, and that many laws of physics tell undisputable truths. Furthermore the positions she defends about the reduction of the wave packet do not address the fundamental issue, i.e. the duality of a world where quantum and classical objects coexist and interact. I suggest that the main problem with Nancy Cartwright's positions is her difficulty in accepting that the contradiction at the basis of Quantum Mechanics, i.e. the simultaneous corpuscular and wave like nature of quantum objects, is a fact of nature.
The so-called “orthodox” interpretation of quantum physics attributed to Niels Bohr is commonly regarded as abandoning realism. I have already opposed this view elsewhere (Folse 1985) but partially in response to criticism of my position (Shimony 1985), here I propose to relate Bohr’s realism to recent contributions to the realism debate given by Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), and Ellis (1985). Specifically, I argue that Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint requires a causal entity realism. Furthermore, labeling Bohr an anti-realist with respect to theories is misleading because it assumes the correspondence theory of truth that Bohr holds quantum theory forces us to reject. Although there are many realist views, I take the root of realism to be the quest for knowledge about the reality producing the phenomena we experience. It is realism in this sense that Bohr defended and that makes science significant to metaphysics.