Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Routledge eBooks

Relativity theory and indeterminism

Karl Popper, Jørgen Mejer, Arne Petersen

Published Dec 16, 2013• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.4324/9781315824482-58

Related papers

Relativity and indeterminism

Patrick H. Byrne

Foundations of Physics•Dec 1, 1981•1 citation

On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future

Howard Stein

It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or “becoming”) that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered.

Philosophy of Science•Jun 1, 1991•260 citations

Determinism and Relativity

Jose J. Valdes

Science News•May 10, 1975•0 citations

How to Be a Relationalist

Shamik Dasgupta

Relationalism in metaphysics leads to indeterminism and non-locality in physics. This is widely thought to be a problem for relationalism, but here I argue that it is in fact a?virtue. More specifically, I distinguish two senses in which a physical theory can be indeterministic and non-local. Relationalism does imply indeterminism and non-locality in one sense, but this is a virtue since indeterminism and non-locality in this sense is precisely what empirical observation confirms. There is a second sense of the terms on which indeterminism and non-locality would be a problem, but I argue that relationalism does not imply indeterminism or non-locality in that sense. With respect to indeterminism and non-locality, then, relationalism gets things exactly right. This defense of relationalism rests on distinguishing these two senses of indeterminism and non-locality. Since both terms are intimately connected to metaphysical possibility, this requires distinguishing two species of the latter. The distinction between two senses of metaphysical possibility I offer may be of interest to metaphysicians regardless of its bearing on relationalism, determinism, and locality.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Dec 21, 2020•10 citations

Einstein and indeterminism

Stephen G. Brush

•Sep 1, 1979•4 citations

Probability Theory as a Physical Theory Points to Superdeterminism

Louis Vervoort

Probability theory as a physical theory is, in a sense, the most general physics theory available, more encompassing than relativity theory and quantum mechanics, which comply with probability theory. Taking this simple fact seriously, I argue that probability theory points towards superdeterminism, a principle that underlies, notably, ‘t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton Interpretation of quantum mechanics. Specifically, I argue that superdeterminism offers a solution for: (1) Kolmogorov’s problem of probabilistic dependence; (2) the interpretation of the Central Limit Theorem; and (3) Bell’s theorem. Superdeterminism’s competitor, indeterminism (“no hidden variables”), remains entirely silent regarding (1) and (2), and leaves (3) as an obstacle rather than a solution for the unification of quantum mechanics and general relativity. This suggests that, if one wishes to stick to the standard position in physics and adopt the principles with the highest explanatory power, one should adopt superdeterminism and reject indeterminism. Throughout the article precise questions to mathematicians are formulated to advance this research.

arXiv:1811.10992•Entropy•Aug 30, 2019•16 citations
It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or “becoming”) that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered.
Relationalism in metaphysics leads to indeterminism and non-locality in physics. This is widely thought to be a problem for relationalism, but here I argue that it is in fact a?virtue. More specifically, I distinguish two senses in which a physical theory can be indeterministic and non-local. Relationalism does imply indeterminism and non-locality in one sense, but this is a virtue since indeterminism and non-locality in this sense is precisely what empirical observation confirms. There is a second sense of the terms on which indeterminism and non-locality would be a problem, but I argue that relationalism does not imply indeterminism or non-locality in that sense. With respect to indeterminism and non-locality, then, relationalism gets things exactly right. This defense of relationalism rests on distinguishing these two senses of indeterminism and non-locality. Since both terms are intimately connected to metaphysical possibility, this requires distinguishing two species of the latter. The distinction between two senses of metaphysical possibility I offer may be of interest to metaphysicians regardless of its bearing on relationalism, determinism, and locality.
Probability theory as a physical theory is, in a sense, the most general physics theory available, more encompassing than relativity theory and quantum mechanics, which comply with probability theory. Taking this simple fact seriously, I argue that probability theory points towards superdeterminism, a principle that underlies, notably, ‘t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton Interpretation of quantum mechanics. Specifically, I argue that superdeterminism offers a solution for: (1) Kolmogorov’s problem of probabilistic dependence; (2) the interpretation of the Central Limit Theorem; and (3) Bell’s theorem. Superdeterminism’s competitor, indeterminism (“no hidden variables”), remains entirely silent regarding (1) and (2), and leaves (3) as an obstacle rather than a solution for the unification of quantum mechanics and general relativity. This suggests that, if one wishes to stick to the standard position in physics and adopt the principles with the highest explanatory power, one should adopt superdeterminism and reject indeterminism. Throughout the article precise questions to mathematicians are formulated to advance this research.