A physical theory, in the narrow sense of the word, is a logical structure based on assumptions and definitions which permits one to predict the outcome of a maximum number of different experiments on the basis of a minimum number of postulates. One usually desires the postulates to be as self-evident as possible; one demands simplicity, beauty, and even elegance. A physical theory seems to have only a finite lifetime. Newtonian mechanics was replaced by relativistic mechanics, thermodynamics by statistical mechanics, classical by quantum mechanics. There is a logical order in theoretical physics. Indeed, such an order is necessary if the endeavor of theoretical physics is to be meaningful and is to succeed in the direction of more and more general axiomatic deductive systems. The relationship between classical and quantum mechanics is especially interesting. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.
A physical theory, in the narrow sense of the word, is a logical structure based on assumptions and definitions which permits one to predict the outcome of a maximum number of different experiments on the basis of a minimum number of postulates. One usually desires the postulates to be as self-evident as possible; one demands simplicity, beauty, and even elegance. A physical theory seems to have only a finite lifetime. Newtonian mechanics was replaced by relativistic mechanics, thermodynamics by statistical mechanics, classical by quantum mechanics. There is a logical order in theoretical physics. Indeed, such an order is necessary if the endeavor of theoretical physics is to be meaningful and is to succeed in the direction of more and more general axiomatic deductive systems. The relationship between classical and quantum mechanics is especially interesting. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in this book.
The Statistics of Non-Boolean Event Structures.- Possibility and Probability.- Some Remarks on Hamiltonian Systems and Quantum Mechanics.- The Possibility Structure of Physical Systems.- Quantum Mechanical Physical Quantities as Random Variables.- On the Interference of Probabilities.- Classical and Quantum Probability and Set Theory.- Discussion.- A Generalized Measure and Probability Theory for the Physical Sciences.- Discussion.- Quantum Logic, Convexity, and a Necker-Cube Experiment.- On the Applicability of the Probability Concept to Quantum Theory.- Discussion.- A Mathematical Setting for Inductive Reasoning.- Discussion.- Classical Statistical Mechanics Versus Quantal Statistical Thermodynamics: A Study in Contrasts.- Discussion.- A Semantic Analysis of Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Theory.
A deductive physical theory should in principle be a pure mathematical theory together with an identification of certain quantities/concepts (“observables”) in the theory and corresponding observable entities in the real world. This identification – the “interpretation” of the theory – should be unproblematic, both for the theoretician and the experimentalist. A general basis for a deductive physical theory, comprising both classical and quantum physics in a unified way, is proposed. The theory is based on successive confidence estimates on quantum-mechanical wave functions corresponding to space-localizations of particles. This allows a direct and simple way of describing both macroscopic and microscopic phenomena by means of the same basic concepts. Central in the axiomatics of the outlined theory is a concept called equiangular sequences of projection operators. It describes a successive sequence of “collapses of the wave function”. The proposed theory gives a basis for a general theory of irreversible processes based directly on quantum mechanics. It gives an alternative definition of entropy and an alternative derivation of entropy increase in irreversible processes.
Although, the main objective of this book has been to expose the facts that underpin formal description of quantum mechanics and to make quantum mechanics seem natural, in going about this process we have tried to provide the young student with a guideline on how to approach learning a new theory. Thus, somewhat unconventionally, we start the discourse with a discussion on the meaning of theory and its formal description. This allows us to demonstrate, in concrete terms, how quantum mechanics is just another theoretical framework that conforms to the standard definition of a theory in the natural sciences. In this first chapter, we start with a nontechnical discussion of what one means by a theoretical framework and its formal description. We clarify what qualifies as a theory, and list the questions whose answers one must seek in trying to learn it. A notion of what amounts to understanding a theory is thus conveyed. The meaning of law, axiom, postulate, theorem, falsifiability etc., are thus discussed. We try to draw out the purpose of constructing a formal description of a theory. We also outline the role of abstraction and generalization in its construction. Finally, we discuss the sense in which the terms “philosophy” and “fundamental theorem” are used in the construction of a theoretical framework.
The book investigates the ontology and logic of quantum physics. The first part discusses the relationship of theory and observation and different views on the ontological status of scientific theories. It introduces the fundamentals of quantum mechanics and some of its interpretations and their compatibility with various ontological positions. In the second part, implications of quantum mechanics on classical logic, especially on the distributive law and bivalence, as discussed by Garrett Birkhoff & John von Neumann (1936) and Hilary Putnam (1968), and their counterarguments are reconstructed and discussed. It is concluded that classical logic is sufficient for dealing with quantum mechanical propositions.
The mind of man is central to the structure and functioning of the physical world. Modern physical theory indicates that the mind stands in a relationship of equals to the physical world. Both are fundamental, neither can be reduced to the other, and both require each other for their full understanding. This thesis is at odds with the view of the universe found in Newtonian mechanics as well as the generally held view among contemporary physicists of modern physical theory. Since the Renaissance, people have come to understand a great deal about the physical world, and they have gained significant control over it. This increased power over the physical world has occurred hand in hand with the assumption that the structure and functioning of the physical world is essentially independent from human cognition. According to this assumption, if a person’s cognitive capacity did not exist, the functioning of the physical world would not be fundamentally altered. This last statement is not in fact correct, and modern physical theory, and even fundamentals underlying Newtonian mechanics, provide evidence to attest to this. Nonetheless, contemporary physicists for the most part do not see that the relationship of human cognition to the physical world is radically altered in their own modern theory, theory that is supported by a great deal of empirical data. Instead, attempting to preserve the thesis that the structure and functioning of the physical world is independent of the mind while on a practical level relying on modern theory that contradicts this thesis, physicists have placed themselves in the position of wondering at times exactly what is the nature of the physical world at the same time they obtain experimental results concerning the physical world that can only be labeled astonishing in their precision and the scope of their implications. Modern physical theory consists of three main components: 1) the special and general theories of relativity; 2) quantum mechanics; and 3) statistical mechanics. There are very successful theories that have been developed on the basis of these three bedrock areas. An example is quantum electrodynamics. But these theories owe their conceptual foundation to the three components mentioned. The basic issues at the core of these three components also are expressed in these later theories. In addition, there are new unresolved issues of a fundamental nature concerning the conceptual integrity of these later theories that do not apply to quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and statistical mechanics. Quantum mechanics and relativity theory are areas I have written about for over twelve years. The nature of statistical mechanics has also been of interest to me during this time. But when I took a serious look in 1993 at Tolman’s (1938) The Principles of Statistical Mechanics, it became clear that the mind is linked to the physical world in statistical mechanics, a relationship I had found earlier in both relativity theory and quantum mechanics. It was after reading Tolman’s justification of the method of statistical mechanics in the original that I decided to write this book. When I found that the three components of modern physical theory all pointed to the same relationship between mind and the physical world, it became clear that the fundamental isolation of the mind from the physical world that has characterized our experience since the development of Newtonian mechanics is unfounded. Based on empirically supported principles of modern physical theory, I determined that the appropriate assumption for one’s experience, that the mind is linked to the physical world, could be stated with confidence. The impact of this change in assumption concerning the relationship of man to the cosmos in modern physical theory will find its way into our everyday experience. It will perhaps have no greater effect than in reducing the sense of isolation of man from the world that has characterized modern existence.
First Published in 1982 Philosophy and the New Physics is a compact and yet remarkably rich excursion through the history of physics from Newtonian mechanics to quantum physics. The theory of relativity, quantum mechanics and ideas about the ‘fundamental constituents’ of matter have attracted a great deal of philosophical comment. Indeed, the originators of some of these theories thought they were solving philosophical problems as well as scientific ones. Classical physics is often portrayed as epitomizing ‘mechanistic materialism’, and the revolution in modern physics is variously claimed to vindicate ‘logical positivism’, ‘operationalism’, ‘organicism’, ‘dialectical materialism’ and ‘Buddhist metaphysics’. In this book Jonathan Powers criticizes all of these claims and argues that such varied and conflicting interpretations are possible because of ineradicable elements of conventionality in scientific theories. This is a must read for scholars and researchers of philosophy of science and philosophy in general.