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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Probability

Daniel F. Styer

Published Feb 24, 2000• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I interpreted the repeated measurement experiments of the previous chapter by saying that quantum mechanics can find probabilities only, not certainties (that is, that quantum mechanics is “probabilistic”, not “deterministic”). You may object, maintaining that the world is deterministic, but that my particular deterministic scheme (the “magnetic arrow”) is incorrect. The next chapter presents an ingenious argument, invented by Einstein, which shows that no local deterministic scheme could give the results observed by experiment. In order to understand that argument you need some background in probability.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781107050709.006

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I interpreted the repeated measurement experiments of the previous chapter by saying that quantum mechanics can find probabilities only, not certainties (that is, that quantum mechanics is “probabilistic”, not “deterministic”). You may object, maintaining that the world is deterministic, but that my particular deterministic scheme (the “magnetic arrow”) is incorrect. The next chapter presents an ingenious argument, invented by Einstein, which shows that no local deterministic scheme could give the results observed by experiment. In order to understand that argument you need some background in probability.
Since its inception, the many counter-intuitive aspects and results of quantum mechanics have provoked strong philosophical debates and many interpretations. Even fundamental issues, such as Max Born's basic rules concerning probability amplitudes and probability distributions, took decades to be appreciated by society and many leading scientists. Richard Feynman once said, think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.[48] According to Steven Weinberg, There is now in my opinion no entirely satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics. The Copenhagen interpretation - due largely to the Danish theoretical physicist Niels Bohr - remains the quantum mechanical formalism that is currently most widely accepted amongst physicists, some 75 years after its enunciation. According to this interpretation, the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is not a temporary feature which will eventually be replaced by a deterministic theory, but instead must be considered a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality. The full paper: http://www.iiste.org/PDFshare/APTA-PAGENO-307447-311734.pdf
Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
Abstract If we are not persuaded of the approach to recovering causality in quantum physics through the de Broglie-Bohm theory (perhaps because, like Einstein, we think this route ‘too cheap’) or Popper’s reinterpretation of the meaning of probability, we must seek alternative solutions to the problems of quantum probability and the collapse of the wave function. Even if we choose to accept what quantum probability tells us concerning the fundamental indeterminism and acausality of the quantum world, we are still left to trouble over quantum measurement.
An outline is given of the interpretation of quantum mechanical expressions if one assumes that what is called Quantum Mechanics today, refers to an underlying reality as in Chap. 2 , even if many authors claim to have evidence to the contrary, as is usually brought forward. If there exists a sub-microscopic classical world of real things, is that the same classical world as the world of large things such as planets, rocks and people? How does the notion of probability enter into quantum mechanics? These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
In the Einstein-Bohr debate, Einstein considered quantum mechanics incomplete and disagreed with Born’s probabilistic interpretation of wave-functions. Observers in the axioms of quantum mechanics also bothered Einstein. Inspired by Einstein, Bell and his followers intended to complete quantum mechanics within the framework of local realism. Regrettably, the deterministic correlation between distant components of a separable system in Einstein’s local-realist description of the world is mistaken for non-locality in the world described by Bell’s theorem, leading to incorrect interpretations of experimental results obtained by testing Bell inequalities. This article introduces a new principle, the general principle of measurements, which is proved as a mathematical theorem and allows quantum mechanics to be completed within the framework of local realism while keeping the formal axiomatic definition of a general Hilbert space unchanged. The completed theory can provide the same probabilistic predictions of empirical results as those provided by the current theory. Using disjunction (“or”) as the logical relation between superposed orthonormal vectors, the completed theory precludes observers in the axioms of the current theory and inexplicable collapses of wave-functions, thus it is intuitively comprehensible and alleviates much difficulty in understanding quantum mechanics. Among various world views, Einstein’s local-realist world view is correct.
Philosophers concerned with making physical sense of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics tend to distinguish between interpretations of the theory that aim to present a coherent picture of reality, and anti-realist (empiricist, operationalist, instrumentalist,…) interpretations, which content themselves with looking upon the theory’s formal apparatus as a tool for making predictions. It is rarely appreciated that these alternatives are not exclusive. There are other ways of presenting a coherent picture of reality than to invest with physical reality a calculational tool such as the wave function. In what follows we shall present a coherent picture of reality that explains why the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus, and why the events to which it serves to assign probabilities are the possible outcomes of measurements.