The Bohr formulation—the original one—is now largely a matter of history. The usual career of a theory was its fate. It explained much, but it failed at the first signs of complication, even for the simplest molecules as hydrogen and helium. Some results were either only approximate in a loose or incomplete fashion, e.g. in the application of the correspondence principle to intensities, the only reliable predictions being only for an absence of certain lines, or they quite disagreed with experiment, e.g. in the case of the hydrogen molecule and the hydrogen molecule ion, the normal and excited states of helium, the anomalous Zeeman effect, the Ramsauer effect (the phenomenon of the deflection of electrons at low speeds being less than at higher speeds in atomic collisions), and in the treatment of problems where more than one electron was involved. In the last mentioned cases the perturbation method, so successful in solving “many-body” problems in celestial mechanics, failed completely because systems of several electrons, possessing frequencies of the order of light waves, cannot interact classically. A bit of much forced pragmatism was practiced in treating the many electron atom as a variation of the hydrogen atom. Besides, there were technical oddities, like ½ quantum numbers, and impenetrated anologies between visible and X-ray spectra.
The Bohr formulation—the original one—is now largely a matter of history. The usual career of a theory was its fate. It explained much, but it failed at the first signs of complication, even for the simplest molecules as hydrogen and helium. Some results were either only approximate in a loose or incomplete fashion, e.g. in the application of the correspondence principle to intensities, the only reliable predictions being only for an absence of certain lines, or they quite disagreed with experiment, e.g. in the case of the hydrogen molecule and the hydrogen molecule ion, the normal and excited states of helium, the anomalous Zeeman effect, the Ramsauer effect (the phenomenon of the deflection of electrons at low speeds being less than at higher speeds in atomic collisions), and in the treatment of problems where more than one electron was involved. In the last mentioned cases the perturbation method, so successful in solving “many-body” problems in celestial mechanics, failed completely because systems of several electrons, possessing frequencies of the order of light waves, cannot interact classically. A bit of much forced pragmatism was practiced in treating the many electron atom as a variation of the hydrogen atom. Besides, there were technical oddities, like ½ quantum numbers, and impenetrated anologies between visible and X-ray spectra.
Abstract Bohr’s theory of the atom did a fine job of explaining the absorption and em1ss10n spectra of one-electron atoms in terms of the quantum rules. Schrodinger’s wave mechanics did better in the sense that the rules of quantization were given a firm mathematical basis. However, problems still abounded. Experimental spectra revealed quite a number of problems for which wave mechanics (and matrix mechanics) appeared to have no solutions. In particular, some atomic emission lines predicted by the theory were seen to be split in the presence of a magnetic field into several quite distinct lines (a phenomenon known as the Zeeman effect). Neither wave mechanics nor matrix mechanics could explain this phenomenon without some further, largely ad hoc, assumptions. Worse still, when the spectra of atoms with two or more electrons were studied, certain predicted lines were found to be missing.
Our goal in this treatment of quantum theory is to provide those aspects of the theory which are most needed for a modem understanding of the world of our experience. Central to this are the many approximations which have turned out to be successful for estimating the properties of matter and predicting the events which occur on a microscopic scale. In that sense the goal is entirely pragmatic, but any study of quantum theory cannot help but raise deep philosophical questions. Perhaps the only real understanding of the theory is through a familiarity with how it works out for many different problems. It seems unlikely that understanding comes from thinking about some complicated extreme case, such as Schroedinger's cat. The approach we take here bypasses much of the question by starting with a single premise of wave-particle duality, from which follows all of quantum theory and its interpretation. Any remaining problems are made moot by the quantum-mechanical view that questions are meaningful only if there is some conceivable experimental way to test the answers. In keeping with this pragmatic approach we will not emphasize mathematical derivations, nor carry out the detailed analysis of harmonic-oscillator states, hydrogen wavefunctions, or angular momentum, which are part of almost all texts in quantum theory. We treat the simplest case in detail, state the general results, and see that they are the plausible generalizations. We leave the more detailed analysis to other texts. The one we used for the course at Stanford was Kroemer's Quantum Mechanics for Engineers and Materials Scientists , which served very well.
Abstract An outstanding defect of the old quantum theory was its inability to treat the phenomena occurring in the collision of electrons with atoms, and Born’s theory showed how the new quantum mechanics was capable of removing this defect. The original theory of Born was a method of successive approximations to the solution of the wave equation representing the colliding systems, and could be applied to both elastic and inelastic collisions. In its actual applications, which could be worked out to the first approximation, the theory fell far short of expectations. The Ramsauer effect, the most interesting phenomenon exhibited in the elastic scattering of electrons, could not be explained, and in the field of inelastic collisions, it failed to provide a means of explaining the excitation of levels of a term system which does not combine with the ground state system, e. g., the excitation of the triplet lines of helium. These failures are, of course, failures of the theory in its first approximation. The first approximation in Born’s method of successive approximations neglected the disturbance of the electron waves by the field of the scatterer, and also the possibility of exchange of electrons between the atoms and the colliding beam. The neglect of both these effects becomes important for low velocity impacts, and it was clear that the Ramsauer effect, which is only observed for low velocity electrons, could only be explained by more accurate theory. The question was whether both effects, the distortion of the electron waves by the atomic field, and the exchange of electrons was important, or only one of them.
“Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist, but he understood that natural philosophy ... carries weight only if its every detail can be subjected to the ... test of experiment” (Heisenberg in [59], p. 95). As a result his approach differed from that of theschool-philosopherswhom he regarded with a somewhat “sceptical attitude, to say the least” ([59], p. 129) and whose lack of interest in “the important viewpoint which had emerged during the development of atomic physics” he noticed with regret ([59], p. 183).But it also differed, and to a considerable degree, from the spirit of what Professor T. S. Kuhn has called a “normal science.” Looking at Bohr's method of research we see that technical problems, however remote, are always related to a philosophical point of view; they are never treated as “tiny puzzles” whose solution is valuable in itself, even if one has not the faintest idea what it means, and where it leads: “For me” Bohr writes to Sommerfeld in 1922 ([59], p. 71) “[the quantum theory] is not a matter for petty didactic details, but a serious attempt to reach ... an inner coherence.” Emphasis is put on matters of principle ([59], p. 36) and minor discrepancies, or “puzzles” in the sense of Kuhn, instead of being deemphasized, and assimilated to the older paradigm,are turned into fundamental difficultiesby looking at them from a new direction, and by testing their background “in its furthest consequences by exaggeration” ([59], p. 329). A noteworthy example of Bohr's “non-normal” and rather metaphysical approach to physics is his scepticism in the face of the success of his own atomic model.
One of the main aims of the quantum theory was to clarify the atomic structure by making use of the various atomic phenomena as clues. On the basis of the success of Bohr's theory of the hydrogen atom, many kinds of challenge were made one after another. Generally speaking, the clarification of the atomic structure was proceeded through two ways. One way was based on the results in the spectroscopy of X-rays as well as light. The other was one that brought the phenomenological summaries of valuable chemical knowledge, such as represented by Mendelev's table of periodicity in 1869, to a substantialistic stage by analyzing them in connection with the atomic structure. This was the stage that became at length realizable on account of the progress in the quantum theory. The old quantum mechanics, which was developed on the basis of the quantum condition and selection rule, encountered with the difficulty of the factor 2. That is, firstly, the analyses of the anomalous Zeeman effect required half-integer quantum numbers and the anomalous coefficient 2 of magnetic moment. Secondly, in Stern-Gerlach's experiment, which was interpreted as proving the directional quantization, the atomic beam split into two components, instead of three components as in the normal Zeeman effect. Thirdly, the results of experiments on magnetization of matter demanded such a value for the specific charge of the electron as was twice as large as the value hitherto known. The analysis of X-ray spectra brought into existence another kind of spectral fine structure different from the relativistic fine structure. Of the substantialistic processes in which these problems were thrown into relief, not enough analyses have hitherto been made in the field of the history of science. Of the developments through which these problems were brought to solution, more or less similar situation has been seen. Bohr was in doubt about the half-integer quantum number and thus sought to solve the problem in terms of "non-mechanical constraint", introducing two kinds of azimuthal quantum numbers to treat the atomic structure. It was made clear by Landé and by Millikan and Bowen, however, that this was contradictory to experimental observations. Stoner then revised, with the use of half-integer quantum number, Bohr's scheme of configuration of electrons in atoms. This revision opened the way to Pauli's proposal of the exclusion principle and Uhlenbeck-Goudsmidt's introduction of the spin of the electron.
What is it about quantum mechanics that continues to make its interpretation so difficult and controversial? It is now more than 70 years after its inception and at least half a century since the verification of its predictions of physical phenomena that range from the motion of electrons in solids to the basic structure and properties of the atomic nucleus. After reading the first half of this book one could be forgiven for believing that it has been just our unwillingness or inability to understand properly what Niels Bohr said from the beginning, and to update these ideas in the light of later experience. The aim of the present book is to do just this: to restate the Copenhagen interpretation and to show us how it has been developed to take modern results and ideas into account.