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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Measurements I

Robert B. Griffiths

Published Nov 29, 2001• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Introduction I place a tape measure with one end on the floor next to a table, read the height of the table from the tape, and record the result in a notebook. What are the essential features of this measurement process ? The key point is the establishment of a correlation between a physical property (the height) of a measured system (the table) and a suitable record (in the notebook), which is itself a physical property of some other system. It will be convenient in what follows to think of this record as part of the measuring apparatus, which consists of everything essential to the measuring process apart from the measured system. Human beings are not essential to the measuring process. The height of a table could be measured by a robot. In the modern laboratory, measurements are often carried out by automated equipment, and the results stored in a computer memory or on magnetic tape, etc. While scientific progress requires that human beings pay attention to the resulting data, this may occur a long time after the measurements are completed. In this and the next chapter we consider measurements as physical processes in which a property of some quantum system, which we shall usually think of as some sort of “particle”, becomes correlated with the outcome of the measurement, itself a property of another quantum system, the “apparatus”. Both the measured system and the apparatus which carries out the measurement are to be thought of as parts of a single closed quantum mechanical system. This makes it possible to apply the principles of quantum theory developed in earlier chapters.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511606052.018

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Introduction I place a tape measure with one end on the floor next to a table, read the height of the table from the tape, and record the result in a notebook. What are the essential features of this measurement process ? The key point is the establishment of a correlation between a physical property (the height) of a measured system (the table) and a suitable record (in the notebook), which is itself a physical property of some other system. It will be convenient in what follows to think of this record as part of the measuring apparatus, which consists of everything essential to the measuring process apart from the measured system. Human beings are not essential to the measuring process. The height of a table could be measured by a robot. In the modern laboratory, measurements are often carried out by automated equipment, and the results stored in a computer memory or on magnetic tape, etc. While scientific progress requires that human beings pay attention to the resulting data, this may occur a long time after the measurements are completed. In this and the next chapter we consider measurements as physical processes in which a property of some quantum system, which we shall usually think of as some sort of “particle”, becomes correlated with the outcome of the measurement, itself a property of another quantum system, the “apparatus”. Both the measured system and the apparatus which carries out the measurement are to be thought of as parts of a single closed quantum mechanical system. This makes it possible to apply the principles of quantum theory developed in earlier chapters.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is acknowledged as the fundamental theory on which the whole fabric of physics is supposed to rely. And yet, the features of quantum measurements, processes that provide information about microscopic objects, seem to contradict the principles of quantum mechanics. We make a qualitative presentation of this long standing problem and give an idea of recent progress in the elucidation of the paradox. Although governed solely by the quantum equations of motion, the dynamical process involving the tested system and the measuring apparatus veils the quantum oddities that oppose our standard logic and gives rise to the expected properties of measurements. In spite of the irreducibly probabilistic nature of the underlying quantum physics, classical concepts emerge, such as standard probabilities, ordinary correlations, disappearance of quantum fluctuations, and the possibility of making statements about individual systems.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. 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To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. 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This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? 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Aim of the book The overall aim of this book is to develop a theory of measurement that incorporates the observer into the phenomenon under measurement. By this theory, the observer becomes both a collector of data and an activator of the physical phenomenon that gives rise to the data. These ideas have probably been best stated by J. A. Wheeler (1990), (1994): All things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe … Observer participancy gives rise to information; and information gives rise to physics. The measurement theory that will be presented is largely, in fact, a quantification of these ideas. However, the reader might be surprised to find that the ‘information’ that is used is not the usual Shannon or Boltzmann entropy measures, but one that is relatively unknown to physicists, that of R. A. Fisher. During the same years that quantum mechanics was being developed by Schroedinger (1926) and others, the field of classical measurement theory was being developed by R. A. Fisher (1922) and co-workers (see Fisher Box, 1978, for a personal view of his professional life). According to classical measurement theory, the quality of any measurement(s) may be specified by a form of information that has come to be called Fisher information.Since these formative years, the two fields - quantum mechanics and classical measurement theory - have enjoyed huge success in their respective domains of application. And until recent times it has been presumed that the two fields are distinct and independent.
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In the last chapter we saw how the measurement problem in quantum theory arises when we try to treat the measurement apparatus as a quantum system. We need more apparatus to measure which state the first apparatus is in, and we have a measurement chain that seems to go on indefinitely. There is, however, one place where this apparently infinite sequence certainly seems to end and that is when the information reaches us. We know from experience that when we look at the photon detector we see that either it has recorded the passage of a photon or it hasn't. When we open the box and look at the cat either it is dead or it is alive; we never see it in the state of suspended animation that quantum physics alleges it should be in until its state is measured. It might follow, therefore, that human beings should be looked on as the ultimate measuring apparatus. If so, what aspect of human beings is it that gives them this apparently unique quality? It is this question and its implications that form the subject of the present chapter.
Abstract Measurement lies at the core of the quantum formalism. This may seem a statement of the intuitively obvious for any theoretical structure with a pretension to predict the outcomes of observations made or experiments performed on objects in the real world. But classical mechanics is a theorys of the physical properties of objects and their behaviour when exposed to different kinds of forces, and there is no particularly significant role for measurement other than a passive role involving the recording of those properties or behaviour. In contrast, measurement in quantum theory takes on a far deeper, almost ominous, significance