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Routledge eBooks

The hole argument and the nature of space-time: A critical review from a constructivist perspective

C. S. Unnikrishnan

Published Jun 23, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter examines the nature of physical reality in the context of unavoidable unobservables in physics. One of the features of science, especially physical science, is a powerful urge to construct theories of phenomena, instead of just cataloging and classifying phenomena and their spatio-temporal patterns. The concept of fields' of various kinds dominates physical theory and modern physics, and fields are essential to both classical and quantum theories. The concept of physical reality in the context of the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) assertion of the incompleteness of quantum mechanics is perhaps appropriate. Quantum theory of physical systems consisting of large number of particles led to the concept of a quantum field associated with the particles, a generalisation of the wave function itself. Space and time are supreme and primary unobservables in physics, without any reality independent of matter, notwithstanding their modern status as the dynamical arena of gravitational effects as described in Einstein's general theory of relativity.

DOI
10.4324/9781315543352-8

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The fundamental physical theories that interpret and explain behaviour of matter in nature are dependent on several unobservables and insensibles in their construction.While a rigorous natural philosophy cannot take them for granted, there does not seem to be a way of avoiding such unobservables in our theories.While a program to banish all unobservables from physical theory is unlikely to succeed, and perhaps even unnecessary, they are both the strong and weak points of the theoretical descriptions of physical nature.Analyzing them for empirical and philosophical consistency and integrity is always a promising path towards a better theory.In this paper, I examine the nature of physical reality in the context of unobservables in physics and discuss three examples.One is about the apparent loss of physical reality due to the need for a consistent quantum mechanical representation.The second example deals with the conflict between the assumed reality of quantum fields, so fundamental and essential to our standard physics worldview, and the dynamics of the observable universe.The third deals with an allimportant difference between conventional modern physics constructed in the unreal and unobservable empty 'space' and an empirically and logically determined physics with matter-filled universe as its arena.The acknowledgment of the observable matter-filled universe necessitates reformulation of dynamics with total relativity.Not surprisingly, this paradigm with its universal cosmic links also holds human concepts of harmony and beauty.

Routledge eBooks•Jun 23, 2016•0 citations

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Taking into account the results that we have been obtained during the last decade in the foundations of quantum mechanic we put forward a view on reality that we call the 'creation discovery view'. In this view it is made explicit that a measurement is an act of a macroscopic physical entity on a microphysical entity that entails the creation of new elements of reality as well as the detection of existing elements of reality. Within this view most of the quantum mechanical paradoxes are due to structural shortcomings of the standard quantum theory, which means that our analysis agrees with the claim made in the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paper, namely that standards quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory. This incompleteness is however not due to the absence of hidden variables but to the impossibility for standard quantum mechanics to describe separated quantum entities. Nonlocality appears as a genuine property of nature in our view and makes it necessary to reconsider the role of space in reality. Our proposal for a new interpretation for space makes it possible to put forward an new hypothesis for why it has not been possible to unify quantum mechanics and relativity theory.

arXiv:quant-ph/0107044•Jul 7, 2001•3 citations
This chapter examines the nature of physical reality in the context of unavoidable unobservables in physics. One of the features of science, especially physical science, is a powerful urge to construct theories of phenomena, instead of just cataloging and classifying phenomena and their spatio-temporal patterns. The concept of fields' of various kinds dominates physical theory and modern physics, and fields are essential to both classical and quantum theories. The concept of physical reality in the context of the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) assertion of the incompleteness of quantum mechanics is perhaps appropriate. Quantum theory of physical systems consisting of large number of particles led to the concept of a quantum field associated with the particles, a generalisation of the wave function itself. Space and time are supreme and primary unobservables in physics, without any reality independent of matter, notwithstanding their modern status as the dynamical arena of gravitational effects as described in Einstein's general theory of relativity.
The fundamental physical theories that interpret and explain behaviour of matter in nature are dependent on several unobservables and insensibles in their construction.While a rigorous natural philosophy cannot take them for granted, there does not seem to be a way of avoiding such unobservables in our theories.While a program to banish all unobservables from physical theory is unlikely to succeed, and perhaps even unnecessary, they are both the strong and weak points of the theoretical descriptions of physical nature.Analyzing them for empirical and philosophical consistency and integrity is always a promising path towards a better theory.In this paper, I examine the nature of physical reality in the context of unobservables in physics and discuss three examples.One is about the apparent loss of physical reality due to the need for a consistent quantum mechanical representation.The second example deals with the conflict between the assumed reality of quantum fields, so fundamental and essential to our standard physics worldview, and the dynamics of the observable universe.The third deals with an allimportant difference between conventional modern physics constructed in the unreal and unobservable empty 'space' and an empirically and logically determined physics with matter-filled universe as its arena.The acknowledgment of the observable matter-filled universe necessitates reformulation of dynamics with total relativity.Not surprisingly, this paradigm with its universal cosmic links also holds human concepts of harmony and beauty.
The fundamental physical theories that interpret and explain behaviour of matter in nature are dependent on several unobservables and insensibles in their construction. While a rigorous natural philosophy cannot take them for granted, there does not seem to be a way of avoiding such unobservables in our theories. While a program to banish all unobservables from physical theory is unlikely to succeed, and perhaps even unnecessary, they are both the strong and weak points of the theoretical descriptions of physical nature. Analyzing them for empirical and philosophical consistency and integrity is always a promising path towards a better theory. In this paper, I examine the nature of physical reality in the context of unobservables in physics and discuss three examples. One is about the apparent loss of physical reality due to the need for a consistent quantum mechanical representation. The second example deals with the conflict between the assumed reality of quantum fields, so fundamental and essential to our standard physics worldview, and the dynamics of the observable universe. The third deals with an all-important difference between conventional modern physics constructed in the unreal and unobservable empty `space' and an empirically and logically determined physics with matter-filled universe as its arena. The acknowledgment of the observable matter-filled universe necessitates reformulation of dynamics with total relativity. Not surprisingly, this paradigm with its universal cosmic links also holds human concepts of harmony and beauty.
This thesis is a study of the notion of time in modern physics, consisting of two parts. Part I takes seriously the doctrine that modern physics should be treated as the primary guide to the nature of time. To this end, it offers an analysis of the various conceptions of time that emerge in the context of various physical theories and, furthermore, an analysis of the relation between these conceptions of time and the more orthodox philosophical views on the nature of time. In Part II I explore the interpretation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics in light of the suggestion that an overly Newtonian conception of time might be contributing to some of the difficulties that we face in interpreting the quantum mechanical formalism. In particular, I argue in favour of introducing backwards-in-time causal influences as part of an alternative conception of time that is consistent with the picture of reality that arises in the context of the quantum formalism. Moreover, I demonstrate that this conception of time can already be found in a particular formulation of classical mechanics. One might see that one of the central themes of Part II originates from a failure to heed properly the doctrine of Part I: study into the nature of time should be guided by modern physics and thus we should be careful not to insert a preconceived Newtonian conception of time unwittingly into our interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism. Thus, whereas Part I is intended as a demonstration of methodology with respect to the study of time, Part II in a sense explores a confusion that can be seen as arising in the absence of this methodology.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
Causal set theory starts out from a central result in general relativity according to which the causal structure determines, up to a so-called ‘conformal factor’, the geometry of a relativistic spacetime. Space and time, it seems, must be part and parcel of the ontology of any physical theory, of any theory with a credible claim to being a physical theory, that is. After all, physics is the science of the fundamental constitution of the material bodies, their motion in space and time, and indeed of space and time themselves. There are two areas in physics in which space or spacetime may emerge from something qualitatively rather different: wave function monism in quantum mechanics and quantum theories of gravity. The former case concerns a particular interpretative issue in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The severity and the characteristics of the disappearance of spacetime differ from one approach to quantum gravity to another.
Taking into account the results that we have been obtained during the last decade in the foundations of quantum mechanic we put forward a view on reality that we call the 'creation discovery view'. In this view it is made explicit that a measurement is an act of a macroscopic physical entity on a microphysical entity that entails the creation of new elements of reality as well as the detection of existing elements of reality. Within this view most of the quantum mechanical paradoxes are due to structural shortcomings of the standard quantum theory, which means that our analysis agrees with the claim made in the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paper, namely that standards quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory. This incompleteness is however not due to the absence of hidden variables but to the impossibility for standard quantum mechanics to describe separated quantum entities. Nonlocality appears as a genuine property of nature in our view and makes it necessary to reconsider the role of space in reality. Our proposal for a new interpretation for space makes it possible to put forward an new hypothesis for why it has not been possible to unify quantum mechanics and relativity theory.