This chapter discusses some comments, and the rules of quantum mechanics. The quantum mechanics is universally valid for all the ensembles to which the more general formalism just alluded to is applicable. Any ensemble of systems the specification of which involves no reference to the results of future measurements that are to be performed on these systems obeys the quantum rules. One of the views most often expressed by the supporters of the "Copenhagen interpretation" is that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. The main motivation for the assumption is that the splitting of ensemble and subensembles cannot be made in any straightforward manner. However, this assumption implies the existence of particular, hitherto unknown forces, and it is therefore quite generally considered as unattractive. Thus the probabilities, or statistical distributions, that conventional quantum mechanics introduces into physics are inherently different from those found in classical mechanics, for example, in the kinetic theory of gases.
This chapter discusses some comments, and the rules of quantum mechanics. The quantum mechanics is universally valid for all the ensembles to which the more general formalism just alluded to is applicable. Any ensemble of systems the specification of which involves no reference to the results of future measurements that are to be performed on these systems obeys the quantum rules. One of the views most often expressed by the supporters of the "Copenhagen interpretation" is that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. The main motivation for the assumption is that the splitting of ensemble and subensembles cannot be made in any straightforward manner. However, this assumption implies the existence of particular, hitherto unknown forces, and it is therefore quite generally considered as unattractive. Thus the probabilities, or statistical distributions, that conventional quantum mechanics introduces into physics are inherently different from those found in classical mechanics, for example, in the kinetic theory of gases.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.
In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.
Quantum mechanics (QM) is not just a theory of micro-objects: it is our current fundamental theory of motion. It expresses a deeper understanding of Nature than classical mechanics. Precisely as classical mechanics, the conventional formulation of QM describes evolution of states and observables in time. Precisely as classical mechanics, this is not sufficient to deal with general relativistic systems, because these systems do not describe evolution in time; they describe correlations between observables. Therefore, a formulation of QM slightly more general than the conventional one – or a quantum version of the relativistic classical mechanics discussed in the previous chapter – is needed. In this chapter I discuss the possibility of such a formulation. In the last section I discuss the general physical interpretation of QM.QM can be formulated in a number of more or less equivalent formalisms: canonical (Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators), covariant (Feynman's sum-over-histories), algebraic (states as linear functionals over an abstract algebra of observables) and others. Generally, but not always, we are able to translate these formalisms into one another, but often what is easy in one formulation is difficult in another. A generalrelativistic sum-over-histories formalism has been developed by Jim Hartle. Here I focus on the canonical formalism, because the canonical formalism has provided the mathematical completeness and precision needed to explicitly construct the mathematical apparatus of quantum gravity. Later I will consider alternative formalisms.
Quantum physics consists of a formal core that is universally agreed upon (basically being a piece of mathematics with suggestive names for concepts matching related concepts of experimental culture) and an interpretational halo (trying to make this relation more precise) that remains highly disputed even after more than 90 years of modern quantum physics. The latter is the subject of the interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Part II), where many interpretations coexist and compete for the attention of those interested in what quantum physics really means. In this chapter, an axiomatic introduction to the undisputed formal core of quantum physics is given. The axioms described present nonrelativistic quantum statistical mechanics in the Schrödinger picture. The relativistic case is outside the scope of these axioms, as it must be treated by quantum field theory; see Chapter 7. As in any axiomatic setting (necessary for a formal discipline), there are a number of different but equivalent sets of axioms or postulates that can be used to define formal quantum physics. Since they are equivalent, their choice is a matter of convenience. The choice presented here is a formulation featuring three aspects: It emphasises the similarity of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, gives most direct access to statistical mechanics, and is free from allusions to measurement. The reason for the first is that this similarity serves as a guide to meaning. From the axiomatic setting for quantum mechanics presented below, classical mechanics (in the Koopman setting discussed in Section 7.10) is obtained by simply restricting the operators to be diagonal, so that all operations happen pointwise on the diagonal elements. Thus, multiplication is commutative, and one can identify operators and functions. In particular, the density operator degenerates into a probability density. Therefore, the quantum case appears as a generalization of the classical case allowing for noncommutativity, so that both q-observables and the density operator are (usually infinite-dimensional) operators. The reason for the second is that statistical mechanics is the main tool for applications of quantum physics to the macroscopic systems we are familiar with. The reason for the third is that realistic measurements constitute a complex process involving macroscopic detectors, hence should be explained by quantum statistical mechanics rather than be part of the axiomatic foundations themselves. (This is in marked contrast to other foundations, and distinguishes the present system of axioms.)
Standard quantum mechanics—the theory that is made use of in practice and is, because of this, taught in university courses— is a theory that is weakly objective only. For this reason it is most conveniently and neatly expressed by means of a set of basic rules of calculation that enable physicists to make predictions concerning what will be observed. Classical and quantum physics both make considerable use of the expressions "physical system" and "state of a physical system." Quantum mechanics is essentially a probabilistic theory. Except in special cases it makes no predictions that bear on individual systems. Rather, it predicts statistical frequencies. In other words, it predicts, as a rule, the number n of times that a given event will be observed when a large number N of physical systems of the same type and satisfying specified conditions are subjected to a measurement process.