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Bernard d’Espagnat

Published Mar 5, 2018• 0 citations
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Abstract

This chapter discusses some comments, and the rules of quantum mechanics. The quantum mechanics is universally valid for all the ensembles to which the more general formalism just alluded to is applicable. Any ensemble of systems the specification of which involves no reference to the results of future measurements that are to be performed on these systems obeys the quantum rules. One of the views most often expressed by the supporters of the "Copenhagen interpretation" is that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. The main motivation for the assumption is that the splitting of ensemble and subensembles cannot be made in any straightforward manner. However, this assumption implies the existence of particular, hitherto unknown forces, and it is therefore quite generally considered as unattractive. Thus the probabilities, or statistical distributions, that conventional quantum mechanics introduces into physics are inherently different from those found in classical mechanics, for example, in the kinetic theory of gases.

DOI
10.1201/9780429501449-5

Related papers

Is quantum mechanics complete?

James T. Cushing

When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 29, 1998•0 citations

The Formal Theory of Quantum Mechanics

In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Sep 16, 2026•0 citations

Quantum mechanics

Carlo Rovelli C

Quantum mechanics (QM) is not just a theory of micro-objects: it is our current fundamental theory of motion. It expresses a deeper understanding of Nature than classical mechanics. Precisely as classical mechanics, the conventional formulation of QM describes evolution of states and observables in time. Precisely as classical mechanics, this is not sufficient to deal with general relativistic systems, because these systems do not describe evolution in time; they describe correlations between observables. Therefore, a formulation of QM slightly more general than the conventional one – or a quantum version of the relativistic classical mechanics discussed in the previous chapter – is needed. In this chapter I discuss the possibility of such a formulation. In the last section I discuss the general physical interpretation of QM.QM can be formulated in a number of more or less equivalent formalisms: canonical (Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators), covariant (Feynman's sum-over-histories), algebraic (states as linear functionals over an abstract algebra of observables) and others. Generally, but not always, we are able to translate these formalisms into one another, but often what is easy in one formulation is difficult in another. A generalrelativistic sum-over-histories formalism has been developed by Jim Hartle. Here I focus on the canonical formalism, because the canonical formalism has provided the mathematical completeness and precision needed to explicitly construct the mathematical apparatus of quantum gravity. Later I will consider alternative formalisms.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 15, 2004•0 citations

2. Basic quantum physics

Arnold Neumaier

Quantum physics consists of a formal core that is universally agreed upon (basically being a piece of mathematics with suggestive names for concepts matching related concepts of experimental culture) and an interpretational halo (trying to make this relation more precise) that remains highly disputed even after more than 90 years of modern quantum physics. The latter is the subject of the interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Part II), where many interpretations coexist and compete for the attention of those interested in what quantum physics really means. In this chapter, an axiomatic introduction to the undisputed formal core of quantum physics is given. The axioms described present nonrelativistic quantum statistical mechanics in the Schrödinger picture. The relativistic case is outside the scope of these axioms, as it must be treated by quantum field theory; see Chapter 7. As in any axiomatic setting (necessary for a formal discipline), there are a number of different but equivalent sets of axioms or postulates that can be used to define formal quantum physics. Since they are equivalent, their choice is a matter of convenience. The choice presented here is a formulation featuring three aspects: It emphasises the similarity of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, gives most direct access to statistical mechanics, and is free from allusions to measurement. The reason for the first is that this similarity serves as a guide to meaning. From the axiomatic setting for quantum mechanics presented below, classical mechanics (in the Koopman setting discussed in Section 7.10) is obtained by simply restricting the operators to be diagonal, so that all operations happen pointwise on the diagonal elements. Thus, multiplication is commutative, and one can identify operators and functions. In particular, the density operator degenerates into a probability density. Therefore, the quantum case appears as a generalization of the classical case allowing for noncommutativity, so that both q-observables and the density operator are (usually infinite-dimensional) operators. The reason for the second is that statistical mechanics is the main tool for applications of quantum physics to the macroscopic systems we are familiar with. The reason for the third is that realistic measurements constitute a complex process involving macroscopic detectors, hence should be explained by quantum statistical mechanics rather than be part of the axiomatic foundations themselves. (This is in marked contrast to other foundations, and distinguishes the present system of axioms.)

De Gruyter eBooks•Oct 24, 2019•0 citations

Reviews of quantum foundations

L. E. Ballentine

I enjoyed the February 2019 issue of Physics Today on Reviews of Modern Physics at 90 but was disappointed with the article “Quantum foundations” by David DiVincenzo and Christopher Fuchs (page 50). The most useful part of that article was the reference list, which shows RMP’s diversity of papers on the subject. My 1970 article on the statistical-ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM),11. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358 which people tell me has encouraged them to continue research on quantum foundations (QF), was omitted from the list.Unfortunately, DiVincenzo and Fuchs continue to mystify measurement in QM, as if it were some deep philosophical concept that must be treated before QM has even been fully formulated. They assert that “physicists and philosophers are still debating what a ‘measurement’ really means.” What is important for QF is not the meaning of the word but an understanding of the physical process. The authors do not cite any of the published papers that provide such an understanding. And they give too much attention to two marginal interpretations: the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and quantum Bayesianism (QBism).In QM, a measurement of an observable should yield an eigenvalue of the observable. If the initial state of the measured object is a superposition of eigenstates corresponding to different eigenvalues, then the interaction of the measurement apparatus with the object will lead to a final state of the whole system—measured object plus apparatus—that is a superposition of different measurement results. The squared amplitude of each term yields the probability of obtaining that result in an individual measurement. That statistical prediction, the Born rule, is common to the Copenhagen and statistical-ensemble interpretations. But the MWI takes a radically different turn. It postulates that the universe branches into several parallel worlds, with each term of the superposition corresponding to the unique result of the measurement in one branch world.The usual role of an interpretation of QM is to begin with the established mathematical formalism and provide an intuitively comprehensible idea of the physical process that the math describes. The MWI does not do that. Instead, it adds a mysterious process of world-splitting, a strange new cosmology that is alien to the mathematics of QM and not really an interpretation of QM at all. A typical QM measurement, such as that of a spin component in the Stern–Gerlach experiment, is a local and very low energy event. It is not credible that the measurement could have the huge cosmological effect of bifurcating the universe.When I first heard of the world-splitting assumed in the MWI, I went back to Hugh Everett’s paper22. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454 to see if he had really said anything so absurd. I found that he had not said so explicitly, but he sometimes used words that could be interpreted in more than one way. The MWI is a possible interpretation of them, but not the most natural one, so I thought. And Everett’s framework still has value even without resorting to the MWI’s world-splitting. His concept of a “relative state” is useful, for instance, and he is correct in rejecting the notion of the quantum state “collapsing” after a measurement.QBism begins with the assumption that all kinds of probability can be regarded as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That assumption can be maintained only by ignoring the literature on interpretations of probability, from which it is clear that several different kinds—or interpretations—of probability exist. DiVincenzo and Fuchs may have ignored the classic philosophical writings on the subject because they were written by philosophers for philosophers and so do not address the needs of physicists.I have published a paper on the foundations of probability theory, written from the point of view of a quantum physicist.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 I classify the main kinds or interpretations of probability into three groups: inferential probability, of which Bayesian theory is an example; frequency or ensemble probability, commonly used in Gibbsian statistical mechanics and in QM; and propensity theory. Propensity, a degree of causality that is weaker than determinism, is not merely another interpretation of probability. Its mathematical theory must also differ from that of probability theory, as Paul Humphreys showed44. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246 in 1985. Although the axioms of propensity33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 differ from those of probability, the two axiom sets overlap. Both support the law of large numbers, so propensity theory is compatible with the most useful part of the frequency interpretation of probability.In general, QM states do not determine the results of a measurement, only the probabilities of the possible results. That a state’s influence on the results is not deterministic suggests strongly that the quantum probabilities given by the Born rule should be interpreted as propensities. They refer objectively to the physical system and its environment, not to any agent’s knowledge, so they are not naturally interpreted as subjective Bayesian probabilities.Interpretations of probability may differ not only in philosophy but also in substance. As I discuss in reference 33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, John Bell’s theorem illustrates how local hidden-variable theories are incompatible with QM. E. T. Jaynes was a well-known supporter of the Bayesian theory of probability. In 1989 he repeated Bell’s derivation of inequality but carefully treated all instances of probability as Bayesian. He found that the derivation could not be completed without invoking an extra assumption that was not justifiable in the Bayesian theory. Bell’s theorem involves questions about causality, so it is natural to use propensity theory to treat it. That method is successful in deriving Bell’s inequality.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0Not all probabilities occurring in QM can be treated as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That limitation disqualifies QBism, a Bayesian-based theory, as an interpretation of QM that can succeed in quantum foundations. The initial assumption of QBism is not valid.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358, Google ScholarCrossref2. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454, Google ScholarCrossref3. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, Google ScholarCrossref4. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246, Google ScholarCrossref© 2020 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Jun 1, 2020•2 citations

The Rules of Quantum Mechanics

Bernard d’Espagnat

Standard quantum mechanics—the theory that is made use of in practice and is, because of this, taught in university courses— is a theory that is weakly objective only. For this reason it is most conveniently and neatly expressed by means of a set of basic rules of calculation that enable physicists to make predictions concerning what will be observed. Classical and quantum physics both make considerable use of the expressions "physical system" and "state of a physical system." Quantum mechanics is essentially a probabilistic theory. Except in special cases it makes no predictions that bear on individual systems. Rather, it predicts statistical frequencies. In other words, it predicts, as a rule, the number n of times that a given event will be observed when a large number N of physical systems of the same type and satisfying specified conditions are subjected to a measurement process.

CRC Press eBooks•May 4, 2018•0 citations
This chapter discusses some comments, and the rules of quantum mechanics. The quantum mechanics is universally valid for all the ensembles to which the more general formalism just alluded to is applicable. Any ensemble of systems the specification of which involves no reference to the results of future measurements that are to be performed on these systems obeys the quantum rules. One of the views most often expressed by the supporters of the "Copenhagen interpretation" is that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. The main motivation for the assumption is that the splitting of ensemble and subensembles cannot be made in any straightforward manner. However, this assumption implies the existence of particular, hitherto unknown forces, and it is therefore quite generally considered as unattractive. Thus the probabilities, or statistical distributions, that conventional quantum mechanics introduces into physics are inherently different from those found in classical mechanics, for example, in the kinetic theory of gases.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.
In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.
Quantum mechanics (QM) is not just a theory of micro-objects: it is our current fundamental theory of motion. It expresses a deeper understanding of Nature than classical mechanics. Precisely as classical mechanics, the conventional formulation of QM describes evolution of states and observables in time. Precisely as classical mechanics, this is not sufficient to deal with general relativistic systems, because these systems do not describe evolution in time; they describe correlations between observables. Therefore, a formulation of QM slightly more general than the conventional one – or a quantum version of the relativistic classical mechanics discussed in the previous chapter – is needed. In this chapter I discuss the possibility of such a formulation. In the last section I discuss the general physical interpretation of QM.QM can be formulated in a number of more or less equivalent formalisms: canonical (Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators), covariant (Feynman's sum-over-histories), algebraic (states as linear functionals over an abstract algebra of observables) and others. Generally, but not always, we are able to translate these formalisms into one another, but often what is easy in one formulation is difficult in another. A generalrelativistic sum-over-histories formalism has been developed by Jim Hartle. Here I focus on the canonical formalism, because the canonical formalism has provided the mathematical completeness and precision needed to explicitly construct the mathematical apparatus of quantum gravity. Later I will consider alternative formalisms.
Quantum physics consists of a formal core that is universally agreed upon (basically being a piece of mathematics with suggestive names for concepts matching related concepts of experimental culture) and an interpretational halo (trying to make this relation more precise) that remains highly disputed even after more than 90 years of modern quantum physics. The latter is the subject of the interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Part II), where many interpretations coexist and compete for the attention of those interested in what quantum physics really means. In this chapter, an axiomatic introduction to the undisputed formal core of quantum physics is given. The axioms described present nonrelativistic quantum statistical mechanics in the Schrödinger picture. The relativistic case is outside the scope of these axioms, as it must be treated by quantum field theory; see Chapter 7. As in any axiomatic setting (necessary for a formal discipline), there are a number of different but equivalent sets of axioms or postulates that can be used to define formal quantum physics. Since they are equivalent, their choice is a matter of convenience. The choice presented here is a formulation featuring three aspects: It emphasises the similarity of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, gives most direct access to statistical mechanics, and is free from allusions to measurement. The reason for the first is that this similarity serves as a guide to meaning. From the axiomatic setting for quantum mechanics presented below, classical mechanics (in the Koopman setting discussed in Section 7.10) is obtained by simply restricting the operators to be diagonal, so that all operations happen pointwise on the diagonal elements. Thus, multiplication is commutative, and one can identify operators and functions. In particular, the density operator degenerates into a probability density. Therefore, the quantum case appears as a generalization of the classical case allowing for noncommutativity, so that both q-observables and the density operator are (usually infinite-dimensional) operators. The reason for the second is that statistical mechanics is the main tool for applications of quantum physics to the macroscopic systems we are familiar with. The reason for the third is that realistic measurements constitute a complex process involving macroscopic detectors, hence should be explained by quantum statistical mechanics rather than be part of the axiomatic foundations themselves. (This is in marked contrast to other foundations, and distinguishes the present system of axioms.)
I enjoyed the February 2019 issue of Physics Today on Reviews of Modern Physics at 90 but was disappointed with the article “Quantum foundations” by David DiVincenzo and Christopher Fuchs (page 50). The most useful part of that article was the reference list, which shows RMP’s diversity of papers on the subject. My 1970 article on the statistical-ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM),11. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358 which people tell me has encouraged them to continue research on quantum foundations (QF), was omitted from the list.Unfortunately, DiVincenzo and Fuchs continue to mystify measurement in QM, as if it were some deep philosophical concept that must be treated before QM has even been fully formulated. They assert that “physicists and philosophers are still debating what a ‘measurement’ really means.” What is important for QF is not the meaning of the word but an understanding of the physical process. The authors do not cite any of the published papers that provide such an understanding. And they give too much attention to two marginal interpretations: the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and quantum Bayesianism (QBism).In QM, a measurement of an observable should yield an eigenvalue of the observable. If the initial state of the measured object is a superposition of eigenstates corresponding to different eigenvalues, then the interaction of the measurement apparatus with the object will lead to a final state of the whole system—measured object plus apparatus—that is a superposition of different measurement results. The squared amplitude of each term yields the probability of obtaining that result in an individual measurement. That statistical prediction, the Born rule, is common to the Copenhagen and statistical-ensemble interpretations. But the MWI takes a radically different turn. It postulates that the universe branches into several parallel worlds, with each term of the superposition corresponding to the unique result of the measurement in one branch world.The usual role of an interpretation of QM is to begin with the established mathematical formalism and provide an intuitively comprehensible idea of the physical process that the math describes. The MWI does not do that. Instead, it adds a mysterious process of world-splitting, a strange new cosmology that is alien to the mathematics of QM and not really an interpretation of QM at all. A typical QM measurement, such as that of a spin component in the Stern–Gerlach experiment, is a local and very low energy event. It is not credible that the measurement could have the huge cosmological effect of bifurcating the universe.When I first heard of the world-splitting assumed in the MWI, I went back to Hugh Everett’s paper22. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454 to see if he had really said anything so absurd. I found that he had not said so explicitly, but he sometimes used words that could be interpreted in more than one way. The MWI is a possible interpretation of them, but not the most natural one, so I thought. And Everett’s framework still has value even without resorting to the MWI’s world-splitting. His concept of a “relative state” is useful, for instance, and he is correct in rejecting the notion of the quantum state “collapsing” after a measurement.QBism begins with the assumption that all kinds of probability can be regarded as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That assumption can be maintained only by ignoring the literature on interpretations of probability, from which it is clear that several different kinds—or interpretations—of probability exist. DiVincenzo and Fuchs may have ignored the classic philosophical writings on the subject because they were written by philosophers for philosophers and so do not address the needs of physicists.I have published a paper on the foundations of probability theory, written from the point of view of a quantum physicist.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 I classify the main kinds or interpretations of probability into three groups: inferential probability, of which Bayesian theory is an example; frequency or ensemble probability, commonly used in Gibbsian statistical mechanics and in QM; and propensity theory. Propensity, a degree of causality that is weaker than determinism, is not merely another interpretation of probability. Its mathematical theory must also differ from that of probability theory, as Paul Humphreys showed44. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246 in 1985. Although the axioms of propensity33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 differ from those of probability, the two axiom sets overlap. Both support the law of large numbers, so propensity theory is compatible with the most useful part of the frequency interpretation of probability.In general, QM states do not determine the results of a measurement, only the probabilities of the possible results. That a state’s influence on the results is not deterministic suggests strongly that the quantum probabilities given by the Born rule should be interpreted as propensities. They refer objectively to the physical system and its environment, not to any agent’s knowledge, so they are not naturally interpreted as subjective Bayesian probabilities.Interpretations of probability may differ not only in philosophy but also in substance. As I discuss in reference 33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, John Bell’s theorem illustrates how local hidden-variable theories are incompatible with QM. E. T. Jaynes was a well-known supporter of the Bayesian theory of probability. In 1989 he repeated Bell’s derivation of inequality but carefully treated all instances of probability as Bayesian. He found that the derivation could not be completed without invoking an extra assumption that was not justifiable in the Bayesian theory. Bell’s theorem involves questions about causality, so it is natural to use propensity theory to treat it. That method is successful in deriving Bell’s inequality.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0Not all probabilities occurring in QM can be treated as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That limitation disqualifies QBism, a Bayesian-based theory, as an interpretation of QM that can succeed in quantum foundations. The initial assumption of QBism is not valid.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358, Google ScholarCrossref2. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454, Google ScholarCrossref3. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, Google ScholarCrossref4. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246, Google ScholarCrossref© 2020 American Institute of Physics.
Standard quantum mechanics—the theory that is made use of in practice and is, because of this, taught in university courses— is a theory that is weakly objective only. For this reason it is most conveniently and neatly expressed by means of a set of basic rules of calculation that enable physicists to make predictions concerning what will be observed. Classical and quantum physics both make considerable use of the expressions "physical system" and "state of a physical system." Quantum mechanics is essentially a probabilistic theory. Except in special cases it makes no predictions that bear on individual systems. Rather, it predicts statistical frequencies. In other words, it predicts, as a rule, the number n of times that a given event will be observed when a large number N of physical systems of the same type and satisfying specified conditions are subjected to a measurement process.