Guerra Bobo (2013) has questioned whether Lüders conditionalization for quantum probabilities supplies a notion of conditional probability worthy of the name. I agree in large part with Guerra Bobo's critique; indeed, I show how her critique can be sharpened. But while valuable in itself, the main virtue of the critique derives from the fact that it prompts questions about the nature of quantum probabilities that engage some of the more important and contentious issues in the foundations of QM. I show how understanding the role of Lüders conditionalization in quantum probability theory helps to illuminate these issues.
In a recent paper (arXiv:2107.04761), Sen critiques a superdeterministic model of quantum physics, Invariant Set Theory, proposed by one of the authors. He concludes that superdeterminism is `unlikely to solve the puzzle posed by the Bell correlations'. He also claims that the model is neither local nor
ψ-epistemic. We here detail multiple inaccuracies with Sen's arguments - notably that the hidden-variable model of quantum physics he uses to critique Invariant Set Theory bares no relation to Invariant Set Theory - and use this opportunity to lay out the properties of Invariant Set Theory as clearly as possible.