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Wiley eBooks

Advanced Protocols

Bruce Schneier

Published Oct 6, 2015• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter discusses zero-knowledge proofs of identity, blind signatures, identity-based public-key cryptography, oblivious transfer and signatures, simultaneous contract signing, digital certified mail, and simultaneous exchange of secrets. Using a zero-knowledge proof, a person can prove that he knows his private key and therefore proves his identity. An essential feature of digital signature protocols is that the signer knows what he is signing. Identity-based cryptosystems, sometimes called Non-Interactive Key Sharing (NIKS) systems, help the sender send a secure message to another person, without wanting to get his public key from a key server. No one really cares about being able to do oblivious transfer in practice, but the notion is an important building block for other protocols. Simultaneous contract signing takes place in a situation where two parties who have entered into an agreement, agree on the wording, but neither wishes to sign unless the other signs as well.

DOI
10.1002/9781119183471.ch5

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arXiv:2509.02189•Sep 2, 2025•1 citation
This chapter discusses zero-knowledge proofs of identity, blind signatures, identity-based public-key cryptography, oblivious transfer and signatures, simultaneous contract signing, digital certified mail, and simultaneous exchange of secrets. Using a zero-knowledge proof, a person can prove that he knows his private key and therefore proves his identity. An essential feature of digital signature protocols is that the signer knows what he is signing. Identity-based cryptosystems, sometimes called Non-Interactive Key Sharing (NIKS) systems, help the sender send a secure message to another person, without wanting to get his public key from a key server. No one really cares about being able to do oblivious transfer in practice, but the notion is an important building block for other protocols. Simultaneous contract signing takes place in a situation where two parties who have entered into an agreement, agree on the wording, but neither wishes to sign unless the other signs as well.
If two parties want to sign a contract C over a communication network, they must “simultaneously” exchange their commitments to C Since simultaneous exchange is usually impossible in practice, protocols are needed to approximate simultaneity by exchange partial commitments in a piece by piece manner The party of secondly sending commitments may have a slight advantage; a “fair” protocol must keep this advantage within acceptable limits The protocol for signing a contract is improved based on the research result of secure multiparty computation In this protocol, the parties obliviously transfer the signed bit and the committed bit; the other parties can prove the validity of this bit based on the confirming sub protocol, but he can't gain more information about the whole signature by accumulating the signed bit or the committed bit After the parties exchange the whole signed information, they declare the commitment about the signature respectively, and gain the whole signature of the other party At this moment, the party doesn't care about the advance quit of the other party, because he has gained the whole signed information Finally, it is proved that this protocol is quit fairness
Randomized protocols for signing contracts, certified mail, and flipping a coin are presented. The protocols use a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer subprotocol which is axiomatically defined. The 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer allows one party to transfer exactly one secret, out of two recognizable secrets, to his counterpart. The first (second) secret is received with probability one half, while the sender is ignorant of which secret has been received. An implementation of the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, using any public key cryptosystem, is presented.
Over the past four decades, computational power and algorithmic strategies have advanced tremendously resulting in an enormous increase in the key sizes required for secure cryptosystems such as RSA. At the same time, the electronic devices have grown smaller and portable requiring algorithms running on them to be optimized in size and efficiency while providing security, at least, equivalent to that provided on a typical desktop computer. As a result, the industry is moving towards newer cryptosystems such as ECC and NTRU that are well suited for resource constrained environments. While, ECC claims to provide security equivalent to that of RSA for a fraction of key size, NTRU is inherently suited for embedded systems technology. However, implementation of new cryptosystems requires the development of protocols analogous to those developed using older cryptosystems. In this thesis, we fulfill a part of this requirement by providing protocols for Oblivious Transfer using ECC and NTRU. Oblivious Transfer, in turn, has applications in simultaneous contract signing, digital certified mail, simultaneous exchange of secrets, secure multiparty computations, private information retrieval, etc. Furthermore, we introduce the idea of basing Oblivious Transfer on public-key exchange protocols. The presentation in the thesis uses Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, but the scheme is generalizable to any cryptosystem that has a public-key exchange strategy. In fact, our proposal may especially be suited for Quantum Cryptography where the security of key exchange protocols has been proven.
Oblivious transfer protocol,which is an important and useful cryptographic protocol,has been widely applied in cryptographic field,especially in construction of secure multi-party computation protocol.However,all of present oblivious transfer protocols have two drawbacks for requirement of their secrets: ① the receiver does not know whether message received is one of the messages held by the sender;② the sender does not know whether message received by the receiver is one of the messages designated by himself.In order to conquer these drawbacks,we firstly introduce the notion of verifiable oblivious transfer protocol,and firstly construct it by using proof protocol of knowledge,i.e.,∑-protocol,as main tool.
Key agreement and digital signature are two significant and most useful contributions of modern cryptography. Such protocols and schemes allow two or more parties to establish a common session key securely in the presence of a malicious adversary and provide means of ensuring data origin authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. Thus, secure key agreement protocols and signature schemes are fundamental building blocks for constructing complex higher-level protocols. In this thesis, we deal with security analysis of existing key agreement protocols and digital signature schemes. We examine ten authenticated key agreement protocols without key confirmation, out of which half are two-party and the other half are three-party, and one deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme. By giving concrete attacks, we show that these protocols and the scheme do not possess the desirable security attributes or security attributes claimed by their authors. We also present a secure deterministic identity-based signature scheme that supports partial aggregation. First, we show that Okamoto's and Chen et al.’s protocol cannot withstand the key-compromise impersonation attack and that Tan et al.’s, Lim et al.’s and two protocols of Holbl et al. are insecure against the impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. Next, we prove that one protocol of Holbl et al. is vulnerable to the insider attack, one to the unknown key-share attack, one protocol allows an adversary to compute the private key of any user and one protocol allows her to compute the shared session key. We also show that Selvi et. al.'s deterministic identity-based aggregate signature scheme is universally forgeable, i.e., anyone is able to easily generate valid signatures on any messages of his choice having on average twelve genuine digital signatures. In the end, we introduce a new deterministic identity-based signature scheme and formally prove its security in the random oracle model. The scheme is a major improvement of the signature scheme proposed by Selvi et. al. and offers the same tight security reduction to the underlying gap Diffie-Hellman problem. Because the newly proposed scheme is deterministic it allows partial aggregation, i.e., all the signatures from the same signer can be aggregated into one single short signature.
Blind signatures were first introduced by David Chaum. They allow a user to have a message signed by a signer without revealing the message itself. This property is particularly useful in applications such as electronic voting and digital cash, where user anonymity is important. In a blind signature scheme, the user blinds their message before sending it to the signer, who signs the blinded message. The user then unblinds the signed message to obtain a valid signature that can be verified publicly, ensuring that the signer cannot trace the signed message back to the original unblinded version. A good analogy is placing the message inside an envelope and having the envelope signed. Once the envelope is opened, the signature remains valid for the enclosed message, ensuring that the content remains confidential. Such constructions provide anonymity and privacy to the user but given a practical quantum computer, the security of traditional crypto-systems providing such features will be broken. To address this, the development of quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols is essential for maintaining the security of digital transactions and data. Aligning with the same goal, this work aims to thoroughly review the background of lattice-based blind signatures. We start with the foundations of digital signatures in the classical settings and then move on to lattice-based constructions.