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Harvard University Press eBooks

After Physics

David Z. Albert

Published Feb 2, 2015• 162 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Here the philosopher and physicist David Z Albert argues, among other things, that the difference between past and future can be understood as a mechanical phenomenon of nature and that quantum mechanics makes it impossible to present the entirety of what can be said about the world as a narrative of “befores” and “afters.”
DOI
10.4159/harvard.9780674735507

Related papers

On What Being a World Takes Away

Rob Clifton

In their article “On What It Takes To Be a World”, David Albert and Jeffrey Barrett raise “a rather urgent question about what the proponents of a many-worlds interpretation [of quantum mechanics] can possibly mean by the term ‘worlds’” (1995, 35). I argue that their considerations do not translate into an argument against the Many-Worlds conception of a world unless one requires that the dispositions that measurement devices display through the outcomes they record be explainable in terms of facts particular to the worlds in which those devices do their recording. Granting that their conception of a world takes away the possibility of such an explanation, a Many-Worlds proponent can claim that the Universal quantum state, which does not represent a fact about any world in particular, is enough to ground the dispositions of measurement devices.

Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 1996•3 citations

Book Symposium: David Albert, After Physics

Wayne C. Myrvold, David Z. Albert, Craig Callender +1 more

On April 1, 2016, at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, a book symposium, organized by Alyssa Ney, was held in honor of David Albert’s After Physics (Harvard University Press, 2015). All participants agreed that it was a valuable and enlightening session. We have decided that it would be useful, for those who weren’t present, to make our remarks publicly available. Please bear in mind that what follows are remarks prepared for the session, and that on some points participants may have changed their minds in light of the ensuing discussion.

•Apr 1, 2016•1 citation

Space, time and spooky action

Andrew Robinson

Albert Einstein's persistent opposition to quantum mechanics is a familiar, if still somewhat surprising, fact to all physicists, as David Bodanis observes in his latest book Einstein's Greatest Mistake: the Life of a Flawed Genius .

Physics World•Apr 1, 2017•0 citations

Some remarks on “externalisms”

Hilary Putnam

David Albert has proved an important theorem, a surprising one, which certainly has relevance to the way we will understand quantum mechanics in the future. Whether its moral is really the "non-narratibility" of the history of the quantum world is, however, dependent on interpretative questions about which philosophers and physicists – even philosophers and physicists who, like David Albert and myself, are looking for what the late, great, J. S. Bell called an "unromantic" interpretation of quantum mechanics – are sure to disagree. In this brief comment I want to say what Albert has certainly shown, and what depends on those interpretative questions (and, of course, what those questions are). By an "unromantic" interpretation, what Bell meant is an intelligible and mathematically precise interpretation in which there is no talk about "consciousness" reducing the wave packet, "measurements" are simply described as a subclass of physical interactions, and, of course, there is no loose talk about the world consisting of "information."

Routledge eBooks•Aug 21, 2012•0 citations

The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism

Alastair Wilson

Abstract Contingency is everywhere, but what is it? This book defends a radical new theory of contingency as a physical phenomenon. Drawing on the many-worlds approach to quantum theory and on cutting-edge metaphysics and philosophy of science, it argues that quantum theories are best understood as telling us about the space of genuine possibilities rather than as telling us solely about actuality. When quantum physics is taken seriously in the way first proposed by Hugh Everett III, it provides the resources for a new systematic metaphysical framework encompassing possibility, necessity, actuality, chance, counterfactuals, and a host of related modal notions. The framework is a modal realist one, in the tradition of David Lewis: all genuine possibilities are on a par, and the actual world is simply the one that we ourselves inhabit. It departs from Lewisian modal realism in that quantum possible worlds are not philosophical posits but scientific discoveries. Contingency and other modal notions have often been seen as beyond the limits of science. Rationalist metaphysicians argue that the metaphysics of modality is strictly prior to any scientific investigation: metaphysics establishes which worlds are possible, and physics merely checks which of these worlds is actual. Naturalistic metaphysicians respond that science may discover new possibilities and new impossibilities. This book’s quantum theory of contingency takes naturalistic metaphysics one step further, allowing that science may discover what it is to be possible. As electromagnetism revealed the nature of light, as acoustics revealed the nature of sound, as statistical mechanics revealed the nature of heat, so quantum physics reveals the nature of contingency.

•Feb 11, 2020•109 citations

Heisenberg and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: The Physicist as Philosopher

Kristian Camilleri

This book provides a new perspective on Heisenberg's interpretation of quantum mechanics for researchers and graduate students in the history and philosophy of physics.

•Feb 23, 2009•76 citations
In their article “On What It Takes To Be a World”, David Albert and Jeffrey Barrett raise “a rather urgent question about what the proponents of a many-worlds interpretation [of quantum mechanics] can possibly mean by the term ‘worlds’” (1995, 35). I argue that their considerations do not translate into an argument against the Many-Worlds conception of a world unless one requires that the dispositions that measurement devices display through the outcomes they record be explainable in terms of facts particular to the worlds in which those devices do their recording. Granting that their conception of a world takes away the possibility of such an explanation, a Many-Worlds proponent can claim that the Universal quantum state, which does not represent a fact about any world in particular, is enough to ground the dispositions of measurement devices.
On April 1, 2016, at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, a book symposium, organized by Alyssa Ney, was held in honor of David Albert’s After Physics (Harvard University Press, 2015). All participants agreed that it was a valuable and enlightening session. We have decided that it would be useful, for those who weren’t present, to make our remarks publicly available. Please bear in mind that what follows are remarks prepared for the session, and that on some points participants may have changed their minds in light of the ensuing discussion.
David Albert has proved an important theorem, a surprising one, which certainly has relevance to the way we will understand quantum mechanics in the future. Whether its moral is really the "non-narratibility" of the history of the quantum world is, however, dependent on interpretative questions about which philosophers and physicists – even philosophers and physicists who, like David Albert and myself, are looking for what the late, great, J. S. Bell called an "unromantic" interpretation of quantum mechanics – are sure to disagree. In this brief comment I want to say what Albert has certainly shown, and what depends on those interpretative questions (and, of course, what those questions are). By an "unromantic" interpretation, what Bell meant is an intelligible and mathematically precise interpretation in which there is no talk about "consciousness" reducing the wave packet, "measurements" are simply described as a subclass of physical interactions, and, of course, there is no loose talk about the world consisting of "information."
Abstract Contingency is everywhere, but what is it? This book defends a radical new theory of contingency as a physical phenomenon. Drawing on the many-worlds approach to quantum theory and on cutting-edge metaphysics and philosophy of science, it argues that quantum theories are best understood as telling us about the space of genuine possibilities rather than as telling us solely about actuality. When quantum physics is taken seriously in the way first proposed by Hugh Everett III, it provides the resources for a new systematic metaphysical framework encompassing possibility, necessity, actuality, chance, counterfactuals, and a host of related modal notions. The framework is a modal realist one, in the tradition of David Lewis: all genuine possibilities are on a par, and the actual world is simply the one that we ourselves inhabit. It departs from Lewisian modal realism in that quantum possible worlds are not philosophical posits but scientific discoveries. Contingency and other modal notions have often been seen as beyond the limits of science. Rationalist metaphysicians argue that the metaphysics of modality is strictly prior to any scientific investigation: metaphysics establishes which worlds are possible, and physics merely checks which of these worlds is actual. Naturalistic metaphysicians respond that science may discover new possibilities and new impossibilities. This book’s quantum theory of contingency takes naturalistic metaphysics one step further, allowing that science may discover what it is to be possible. As electromagnetism revealed the nature of light, as acoustics revealed the nature of sound, as statistical mechanics revealed the nature of heat, so quantum physics reveals the nature of contingency.