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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Five interpretations

Alexander E. Wendt

Published Apr 20, 2015• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

While there is general agreement that quantum theory poses a fundamental challenge to the classical worldview, there is none on what worldview should replace it. This lack of clear positive implications is the heart of the interpretation problem in quantum theory, or understanding what the world must be like assuming the theory is true. The difficulty is twofold. First, if the theory is correct and complete then there seems to be no way to adjudicate empirically among its interpretations, forcing us to rely on metaphysics instead. Second, the classical metaphysics upon which human beings have relied in the past to interpret new theories is now itself problematic, leaving us without an interpretive backstop to anchor our thinking. Bell is surely right in expecting whatever picture of reality eventually emerges from quantum theory to “astonish us,” but by the same token it is very hard to see what that picture should be.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781316005163.005

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The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy

Eddy Keming Chen

In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.

arXiv:2110.12102•The Philosophical Review•Apr 1, 2020•0 citations

What the Philosophical Interpretation of Quantum Theory Can Accomplish

MARTIN J. CARRIER

Lecture notes in physics•Jan 1, 2015•3 citations

A New Theory of Free Will

Marcus Arvan

This paper shows that the conjunction of several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical information off to subjective conscious awareness (in much the same way that a song written on an ordinary compact-disc is only played when read by an outside medium, i.e. a CD-player). According to this theory, every possible physical “timeline” in the multiverse may be fully physically deterministic or physically-causally closed but each person’s consciousness still entirely free to choose, ex nihilo, outside of the physical order, which physically-closed timeline is experienced by conscious observers. Although Libertarian Compatibilism is admittedly fantastic, I show that it not only follows from several live scientific and philosophical hypotheses, I also show that it (A) is a far more explanatorily powerful model of quantum mechanics than more traditional interpretations (e.g. the Copenhagen, Everett, and Bohmian interpretations), (B) makes determinate, testable empirical predictions in quantum theory, and finally, (C) predicts and explains the very existence of a number of philosophical debates and positions in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will. First, I show that whereas traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics are all philosophically problematic and roughly as ontologically “extravagant” as Libertarian Compatibilism – in that they all posit “unseen” processes – Libertarian Compatibilism is nearly identical in structure to the only working simulation that human beings have ever constructed capable of reproducing (and so explaining) every single general feature of quantum mechanics we perceive: namely, massive-multiplayer-online-roleplaying videogames (or MMORPGs). Although I am not the first to suggest that our world is akin to a computer simulation, I show that existing MMORPGs (online simulations we have already created) actually reproduce every general feature of quantum mechanics within their simulated-world reference-frames. Second, I show that existing MMORPGs also replicate (and so explain) many philosophical problems we face in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will – all while conforming to the Libertarian Compatibilist model of reality. I conclude, as such, that as fantastic and metaphysically extravagant as Libertarian Compatibilism may initially seem, it may well be true. It explains a number of features of our reality that no other physical or metaphysical theory does.

The Philosophical Forum•Feb 5, 2013•13 citations

An Examination of the Quantum Theories. I

William Marias Malisoff

Reference to quantum theory has become quite the fashion, and to base an expectation on an already receding episode with relativity theory, a great philosophical assault of interpretation of quanta is brewing in many quarters. The author of this series of studies would be content if by a plain statement of “what is the case” at this stage he could stem the more quixotic efforts, or rather reveal their unreal character to the spectators who may be enmeshed in the spell cast over such adventures. It is constantly necessary to restate the physicists' claims plainly in their positive content—as Einstein himself did once for relativity theory—so that one may know what is no-man's land and what is everyman's land in the new territory. This in itself is largely but a hope since there is no unanimity as to all the facts, and, worse, unanimity is no guarantee of stability. Nevertheless, the painstaking revision that is constantly going on on the experimental front enables us to arrange at least the data on a well-ordered scale of reliability. It then becomes much easier to detect false props to otherwise attractive theories, to discriminate live matter from the débris of progress, and to speculate on future growth. For such reasons the present examination of the various quantum theories will proceed from a presentation of facts and theories to their appraisal and then to a proposal concerning the organization of the facts, concepts and theories. The subject is very complex: There are several quantum theories, some of which are already referred to as “classical” although these themselves were anti-classical (anti-Newtonian); all have claimed success in their time; all have serious hiatuses, including the present. The author has chosen to hark back to some of the older issues before appraising the latest claims.

Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 1934•0 citations
While there is general agreement that quantum theory poses a fundamental challenge to the classical worldview, there is none on what worldview should replace it. This lack of clear positive implications is the heart of the interpretation problem in quantum theory, or understanding what the world must be like assuming the theory is true. The difficulty is twofold. First, if the theory is correct and complete then there seems to be no way to adjudicate empirically among its interpretations, forcing us to rely on metaphysics instead. Second, the classical metaphysics upon which human beings have relied in the past to interpret new theories is now itself problematic, leaving us without an interpretive backstop to anchor our thinking. Bell is surely right in expecting whatever picture of reality eventually emerges from quantum theory to “astonish us,” but by the same token it is very hard to see what that picture should be.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.
This paper shows that the conjunction of several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical information off to subjective conscious awareness (in much the same way that a song written on an ordinary compact-disc is only played when read by an outside medium, i.e. a CD-player). According to this theory, every possible physical “timeline” in the multiverse may be fully physically deterministic or physically-causally closed but each person’s consciousness still entirely free to choose, ex nihilo, outside of the physical order, which physically-closed timeline is experienced by conscious observers. Although Libertarian Compatibilism is admittedly fantastic, I show that it not only follows from several live scientific and philosophical hypotheses, I also show that it (A) is a far more explanatorily powerful model of quantum mechanics than more traditional interpretations (e.g. the Copenhagen, Everett, and Bohmian interpretations), (B) makes determinate, testable empirical predictions in quantum theory, and finally, (C) predicts and explains the very existence of a number of philosophical debates and positions in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will. First, I show that whereas traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics are all philosophically problematic and roughly as ontologically “extravagant” as Libertarian Compatibilism – in that they all posit “unseen” processes – Libertarian Compatibilism is nearly identical in structure to the only working simulation that human beings have ever constructed capable of reproducing (and so explaining) every single general feature of quantum mechanics we perceive: namely, massive-multiplayer-online-roleplaying videogames (or MMORPGs). Although I am not the first to suggest that our world is akin to a computer simulation, I show that existing MMORPGs (online simulations we have already created) actually reproduce every general feature of quantum mechanics within their simulated-world reference-frames. Second, I show that existing MMORPGs also replicate (and so explain) many philosophical problems we face in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will – all while conforming to the Libertarian Compatibilist model of reality. I conclude, as such, that as fantastic and metaphysically extravagant as Libertarian Compatibilism may initially seem, it may well be true. It explains a number of features of our reality that no other physical or metaphysical theory does.
Reference to quantum theory has become quite the fashion, and to base an expectation on an already receding episode with relativity theory, a great philosophical assault of interpretation of quanta is brewing in many quarters. The author of this series of studies would be content if by a plain statement of “what is the case” at this stage he could stem the more quixotic efforts, or rather reveal their unreal character to the spectators who may be enmeshed in the spell cast over such adventures. It is constantly necessary to restate the physicists' claims plainly in their positive content—as Einstein himself did once for relativity theory—so that one may know what is no-man's land and what is everyman's land in the new territory. This in itself is largely but a hope since there is no unanimity as to all the facts, and, worse, unanimity is no guarantee of stability. Nevertheless, the painstaking revision that is constantly going on on the experimental front enables us to arrange at least the data on a well-ordered scale of reliability. It then becomes much easier to detect false props to otherwise attractive theories, to discriminate live matter from the débris of progress, and to speculate on future growth. For such reasons the present examination of the various quantum theories will proceed from a presentation of facts and theories to their appraisal and then to a proposal concerning the organization of the facts, concepts and theories. The subject is very complex: There are several quantum theories, some of which are already referred to as “classical” although these themselves were anti-classical (anti-Newtonian); all have claimed success in their time; all have serious hiatuses, including the present. The author has chosen to hark back to some of the older issues before appraising the latest claims.