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Chapman & Hall/CRC eBooks

Alternate Futures

Ronald E. Mickens

Published Mar 24, 2022• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter describes a model certain aspects of human interactions and experiences with the physical universe. It introduces and examines the concepts of alternative futures and counterfactual histories. The essential purpose of the chapter is to give arguments for the proposition that alternative futures can exist. A very interacting, but important issue to note is that the presented general arguments do not depend on whether the systems satisfy classical or quantum physical laws. A branch or trajectory on the outcome tree gives a particular sequence of flippings. The different motions or movements occur within the confines of a bounded space. Counterfactual histories are defined as possible histories of a system that were not in fact actualized. The only requirement is that it be at least two. In the general, the value of the “splittings” may change from one interaction to another.

DOI
10.1201/9781003178972-10

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Systems Exhibiting Alternative Futures

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We construct an explicit example of a physical system having alternative futures (AFs). Several other such systems are also introduced and characterized, but not discussed in detail. Our major goal is to use these results to demonstrate the existence and meaning of the concept of counterfactual histories (CFHs). We find that any system having AFs will also exhibit the phenomenon of CFHs.

Bulletin of the Georgia Academy of Science•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations

Possible States Theory and Human Destiny in the Cosmos

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Possible States Theory posits a universe of unique objects and unique collections of interactions between them. The interactions are designated the possible states. The states include past, future and possible interactions. The theory concerns the propagation of change in the collections of possible states. Using a few simple assumptions, it becomes possible to generalize about the occurrence of change. The theory is consistent with quantum electrodynamics in a finite and discrete environment; however, in the possible states universe, an interaction does not cause alternative possibilities to disappear. The picture of the universe yielded by the theory differs from the conventional viewpoint in important ways. Past, future and possible states may interact with one another; interactions occur without reference to location in space-time. Given that all possibilities are present, the possible states universe is complete. Per Gšdel's incompleteness theorems, the universe cannot be unambiguously described as information. Many truths, some contradicting each other, can simultaneously exist. The human future already participates in the present, opening possibilities never previously envisaged. To imagine the future, therefore, is to quantum mechanically assemble it. Accordingly, humanity prepares its path to the stars by dreaming of it.

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Chapman & Hall/CRC eBooks•Aug 12, 2022•0 citations

Chapter 5. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIOTEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALS

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALSne general (and straightforward) observation which can be made based on chapters 3 and 4 is that there is more than one way to employ Lewis's semantic framework for counterfactual conditionals in the analysis of quantum entangled states.The main reason is that, as we indicated at the end of chapter 2, there may be various ways to define the similarity relation between possible worlds, and this relation is indispensable for the evaluation of counterfactual statements.To characterize the relation of similarity it is necessary to decide which facts from the actual world are salient with respect to the affinity of possible worlds with it, and which are not.We have already reiterated (and this assessment is unanimously, if mostly tacitly, accepted by all who make use of Lewis's semantics in quantum mechanics) that in the context of the quantummechanical phenomena there is no room for law-breaking possible worlds; therefore Lewis's requirement that the number of unlawful events ("miracles") be minimized cannot act as a criterion of similarity between possible worlds.Only singular, individual and contingent facts can set one possible world apart from another, and only such facts can be taken into account when comparing possible worlds with respect to their affinity with the actual world.But it has already been argued that not all facts taking place in the actual world should count towards similarity.It is imperative, then, to make clear how to tell apart those facts that count from those that do not. "ASYMMETRY BY FIAT" SOLUTION REVIVEDIt seems evident that two dominant intuitions regarding the evaluation of quantum counterfactuals have emerged from the extensive discussion in the two previous chapters.However, it will be much more convenient to describe them in terms of extensions to one of Lewis's alternative approaches to counterfactuals rather than in terms of the similarity relation.As we recall (sec.2.3.3),Lewis indicates that the problem with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactuals can find its solution not only within his O 1 It should be stressed, however, that some authors question the assumed asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.For example H. Price, who defends the idea of backward causation, argues that when evaluating counterfactuals we should hold fixed not the past of the antecedent-event, but rather what is epistemologically accessible to us (see Price 1996, pp.169-170, 178-179).2 It is a matter of choice whether to include or exclude the surface of the light cones in the respective "pasts" of e.We will follow the convention according to which, in the first case, the surface of the forward light cone is excluded from the past, but in the second case the surface of the backward light cone is included in it.

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Measurement in classical physics Measurements in classical physics are the means by which we come to know the current state of a mechanical system without appreciably disturbing it. The laws of classical mechanics imply that we may interact with the system in such a way that this ideal may be approached arbitrarily closely, at least in principle (i.e., in theory, ignoring practical problems). The aim of this chapter is to examine how far we must revise this programme in the quantum theory of measurement. Did the classical physicist believe in the objective existence of material systems with well-defined position and momentum just because these quantities could be empirically determined with arbitrary precision at the same time? It seems she made a stronger assumption than this; that two successive observations of an apple, first in a tree and then on the ground, are connected to one another by virtue of the fact that the apple actually has a definite position and momentum at each instant, whether it is observed or not. Thus, the programme of classical physics was not merely to predict the results of future experiments by inserting data from previous ones into the laws of motion, but to show how the observations are a function of a causally connected sequence of unique processes undergone by the system of interest, which possesses properties independently of measurements. Measurement was then something of a secondary affair and indeed, prior to quantum mechanics, the theory of measurement as a distinct branch of theoretical physics did not exist.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•May 13, 1993•13 citations

A discrete, finite multiverse

McKenzie, Alan

The Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) famously avoids the issue of wave function collapse. Different MWI trees representing the same quantum events can have different topologies, depending upon the observer. However, they are all isomorphic to the group of block universes containing all of the outcomes of all of the events, and so, in that sense, the group of block universes is a more fundamental representation. Different branches of the MWI tree, representing different universes in MWI, ultimately share the same quantum state in a common ancestor branch. This branching topology is incompatible with that of the Minkowski block universe; the resolution is to replace the branches with discrete, parallel block universes, each of which extends from the trunk to the outermost twigs. The number of universes in a branch is proportional to its thickness which, in turn, depends upon the absolute square of the probability amplitude for the state in that branch. Every quantum event may be represented by a kernel of universes, which is the smallest group of universes that will reproduce the quantum probabilities of the outcomes of that event. By considering the ratios of the probabilities of the outcomes of any event, it can be shown that the number of universes in every kernel must finite, as must be the total number of universes in the multiverse. Further, every universe in the multiverse must be finite both in space and time. Another consequence is that quantum probabilities must be rational, which suggests that quantum mechanics is only an approximation to a discrete theory. A corollary is that not every conceivable universe exists in the multiverse, no doubt to the disappointment of those who enjoy alternate-history novels.

arXiv:1609.04050•Sep 10, 2016•2 citations
This chapter describes a model certain aspects of human interactions and experiences with the physical universe. It introduces and examines the concepts of alternative futures and counterfactual histories. The essential purpose of the chapter is to give arguments for the proposition that alternative futures can exist. A very interacting, but important issue to note is that the presented general arguments do not depend on whether the systems satisfy classical or quantum physical laws. A branch or trajectory on the outcome tree gives a particular sequence of flippings. The different motions or movements occur within the confines of a bounded space. Counterfactual histories are defined as possible histories of a system that were not in fact actualized. The only requirement is that it be at least two. In the general, the value of the “splittings” may change from one interaction to another.
Possible States Theory posits a universe of unique objects and unique collections of interactions between them. The interactions are designated the possible states. The states include past, future and possible interactions. The theory concerns the propagation of change in the collections of possible states. Using a few simple assumptions, it becomes possible to generalize about the occurrence of change. The theory is consistent with quantum electrodynamics in a finite and discrete environment; however, in the possible states universe, an interaction does not cause alternative possibilities to disappear. The picture of the universe yielded by the theory differs from the conventional viewpoint in important ways. Past, future and possible states may interact with one another; interactions occur without reference to location in space-time. Given that all possibilities are present, the possible states universe is complete. Per Gšdel's incompleteness theorems, the universe cannot be unambiguously described as information. Many truths, some contradicting each other, can simultaneously exist. The human future already participates in the present, opening possibilities never previously envisaged. To imagine the future, therefore, is to quantum mechanically assemble it. Accordingly, humanity prepares its path to the stars by dreaming of it.
The modern version of the wave-function collapse in quantum mechanics is based on decoherence and leads to the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics. The decoherence causes the universe to develop an emergent branching structure. One can interpret the branching structure either as a tree structure or as parallel different histories. Time is not continuous since there are no measurable continuous in quantum physics. Notion of continuous range of possible values of time is just an idealization. The same goes with the direction of time that is a prior assumption based on the branching structure of the multiverse. The multiverse does not exist in external space nor time since there is nothing more beside it. The observer's mind should be not in a superposition with himself. Because of this, in the Many-minds interpretations it is argued that the distinction between worlds should be made at the level of the individual observer. The human bodies are in a superposition, but the minds have definite states that are never in superposition. All possible lives, personalities that do not violate the laws of physics are facts since they represent a valid history in the multiverse. We are one of this possible personalities. Our choices are defined by our personality explained to us by our mind, our consciousness is the unchangeable part of us. It is nonphysical and it senses the world. It does not interact with the brain in the other way beside it.
TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALSne general (and straightforward) observation which can be made based on chapters 3 and 4 is that there is more than one way to employ Lewis's semantic framework for counterfactual conditionals in the analysis of quantum entangled states.The main reason is that, as we indicated at the end of chapter 2, there may be various ways to define the similarity relation between possible worlds, and this relation is indispensable for the evaluation of counterfactual statements.To characterize the relation of similarity it is necessary to decide which facts from the actual world are salient with respect to the affinity of possible worlds with it, and which are not.We have already reiterated (and this assessment is unanimously, if mostly tacitly, accepted by all who make use of Lewis's semantics in quantum mechanics) that in the context of the quantummechanical phenomena there is no room for law-breaking possible worlds; therefore Lewis's requirement that the number of unlawful events ("miracles") be minimized cannot act as a criterion of similarity between possible worlds.Only singular, individual and contingent facts can set one possible world apart from another, and only such facts can be taken into account when comparing possible worlds with respect to their affinity with the actual world.But it has already been argued that not all facts taking place in the actual world should count towards similarity.It is imperative, then, to make clear how to tell apart those facts that count from those that do not. "ASYMMETRY BY FIAT" SOLUTION REVIVEDIt seems evident that two dominant intuitions regarding the evaluation of quantum counterfactuals have emerged from the extensive discussion in the two previous chapters.However, it will be much more convenient to describe them in terms of extensions to one of Lewis's alternative approaches to counterfactuals rather than in terms of the similarity relation.As we recall (sec.2.3.3),Lewis indicates that the problem with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactuals can find its solution not only within his O 1 It should be stressed, however, that some authors question the assumed asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.For example H. Price, who defends the idea of backward causation, argues that when evaluating counterfactuals we should hold fixed not the past of the antecedent-event, but rather what is epistemologically accessible to us (see Price 1996, pp.169-170, 178-179).2 It is a matter of choice whether to include or exclude the surface of the light cones in the respective "pasts" of e.We will follow the convention according to which, in the first case, the surface of the forward light cone is excluded from the past, but in the second case the surface of the backward light cone is included in it.
Measurement in classical physics Measurements in classical physics are the means by which we come to know the current state of a mechanical system without appreciably disturbing it. The laws of classical mechanics imply that we may interact with the system in such a way that this ideal may be approached arbitrarily closely, at least in principle (i.e., in theory, ignoring practical problems). The aim of this chapter is to examine how far we must revise this programme in the quantum theory of measurement. Did the classical physicist believe in the objective existence of material systems with well-defined position and momentum just because these quantities could be empirically determined with arbitrary precision at the same time? It seems she made a stronger assumption than this; that two successive observations of an apple, first in a tree and then on the ground, are connected to one another by virtue of the fact that the apple actually has a definite position and momentum at each instant, whether it is observed or not. Thus, the programme of classical physics was not merely to predict the results of future experiments by inserting data from previous ones into the laws of motion, but to show how the observations are a function of a causally connected sequence of unique processes undergone by the system of interest, which possesses properties independently of measurements. Measurement was then something of a secondary affair and indeed, prior to quantum mechanics, the theory of measurement as a distinct branch of theoretical physics did not exist.
The Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) famously avoids the issue of wave function collapse. Different MWI trees representing the same quantum events can have different topologies, depending upon the observer. However, they are all isomorphic to the group of block universes containing all of the outcomes of all of the events, and so, in that sense, the group of block universes is a more fundamental representation. Different branches of the MWI tree, representing different universes in MWI, ultimately share the same quantum state in a common ancestor branch. This branching topology is incompatible with that of the Minkowski block universe; the resolution is to replace the branches with discrete, parallel block universes, each of which extends from the trunk to the outermost twigs. The number of universes in a branch is proportional to its thickness which, in turn, depends upon the absolute square of the probability amplitude for the state in that branch. Every quantum event may be represented by a kernel of universes, which is the smallest group of universes that will reproduce the quantum probabilities of the outcomes of that event. By considering the ratios of the probabilities of the outcomes of any event, it can be shown that the number of universes in every kernel must finite, as must be the total number of universes in the multiverse. Further, every universe in the multiverse must be finite both in space and time. Another consequence is that quantum probabilities must be rational, which suggests that quantum mechanics is only an approximation to a discrete theory. A corollary is that not every conceivable universe exists in the multiverse, no doubt to the disappointment of those who enjoy alternate-history novels.