This paper studies the effect of quantum computers on Bitcoin mining. The shift in computational paradigm towards quantum computation allows the entire search space of the golden nonce to be queried at once by exploiting quantum superpositions and entanglement. Using Grover’s algorithm, a solution can be extracted in time O(2256/t), where t is the target value for the nonce. This is better using a square root over the classical search algorithm that requires O(2256/t) tries. If sufficiently large quantum computers are available for the public, mining activity in the classical sense becomes obsolete, as quantum computers always win. Without considering quantum noise, the size of the quantum computer needs to be ≈104 qubits.
This paper studies the effect of quantum computers on Bitcoin mining. The shift in computational paradigm towards quantum computation allows the entire search space of the golden nonce to be queried at once by exploiting quantum superpositions and entanglement. Using Grover’s algorithm, a solution can be extracted in time O(2256/t), where t is the target value for the nonce. This is better using a square root over the classical search algorithm that requires O(2256/t) tries. If sufficiently large quantum computers are available for the public, mining activity in the classical sense becomes obsolete, as quantum computers always win. Without considering quantum noise, the size of the quantum computer needs to be ≈104 qubits.
As quantum computers continue to advance, quantum algorithms for Bitcoin mining have attracted growing attention from researchers. Unlike conventional mining performed on classical computers, quantum computers using Grover’s algorithm can find a valid nonce more quickly by leveraging fundamental quantum properties such as superposition and amplitude amplification. However, existing quantum mining approaches require hybrid computation with classical machines due to the limited search space, which diminishes the benefits of quantum acceleration. Moreover, Grover’s algorithm consists of repeated oracle and diffusion steps, resulting in extensive use of gates and ancilla qubits. To address these issues, we propose a faster and more efficient quantum algorithm for Bitcoin mining. The proposed method expands the search space to include the extra nonce and timestamp, and redesigns the diffusion procedure using a non-unitary operator. By expanding the search space, the expected number of valid candidates can be increased to approximately one under the target difficulty assumption, thereby reducing, but not eliminating, the need for repeated classical-quantum reinitialization. In addition, the use of a non-unitary operator reduces the dependence on iterative Grover amplification. Our circuit-level analysis shows that the proposed model can preserve Bitcoin consensus constraints under bounded timestamp variation while reducing circuit-resource overhead in terms of gate count, circuit depth, and ancilla qubit requirements.
Bitcoin already faces a quantum threat through Shor attacks on elliptic-curve signatures. This paper isolates the other component that public discussion often conflates with it: mining. Grover's algorithm halves the exponent of brute-force search, promising a quadratic edge to any quantum miner of Bitcoin. Exactly how large that edge grows depends on fault-tolerant hardware. No prior study has costed that hardware end to end. We build an open-source estimator that sweeps the full attack surface: reversible oracles for double-SHA-256 mining and RIPEMD-based address preimages, surface-code factory sizing, fleet logistics under Nakamoto-consensus timing, and Kardashev-scale energy accounting. A parametric sweep over difficulty bits b, runtime caps, and target success probabilities reveals a sharp transition. At the most favourable partial-preimage setting (b = 32, 2^224 marked states), a superconducting surface-code fleet still requires about 10^8 physical qubits and about 10^4 MW. That load is comparable to a large national grid. Tightening to Bitcoin's January 2025 mainnet difficulty (b about 79) explodes the bill to about 10^23 qubits and about 10^25 W, approaching the Kardashev Type II threshold. These numbers settle a narrower question than "Is Bitcoin quantum-secure?" Once Grover mining is lifted from asymptotic query counts to fault-tolerant physical cost, practical quantum mining collapses under oracle, distillation, and fleet overhead. To push mining into non-trivial consensus effects, one must invoke astronomical quantum fleets operating at energy scales that lie far above present-day civilization.
Our aim is to determine conditions for quantum computing technology to give rise to security risks associated with quantum Bitcoin mining. Specifically, we determine the speed and energy efficiency a quantum computer needs to offer an advantage over classical mining. We analyze the setting in which the Bitcoin network is entirely classical except for a single quantum miner who has a small hash rate compared to that of the network. We develop a closed-form approximation for the probability that the quantum miner successfully mines a block, with this probability dependent on the number of Grover iterations the quantum miner applies before making a measurement. Next, we show that for a quantum miner that is “peaceful”, this success probability is maximized if the quantum miner applies Grover iterations for 16 minutes before measuring, which is surprising as the network mines blocks every 10 minutes on average. Using this optimal mining procedure, we show that the quantum miner outperforms a classical computer in efficiency (cost per block) if the condition Q < Crb is satisfied, where Q is the cost of a Grover iteration, C is the cost of a classical hash, r is the quantum miner's speed in Grover iterations per second, and b is a factor that attains its maximum if the quantum miner uses our optimal mining procedure. This condition lays the foundation for determining when quantum mining, and the known security risks associated with it, will arise.
We study the impact that two miners equipped with quantum computers purpose-built for quantum Bitcoin mining will have on the 51% attack threshold of the Bitcoin network, given that the miners are playing a competitive game against each other to be the first to mine a block. We extend an existing game-theoretic framework for Bitcoin mining and compute the resultant payoff matrices. From these payoff matrices, we determine optimal quantum mining strategies for two non-colluding and aggressive quantum miners with multiple opportunities at finding a valid block in an otherwise classical Bitcoin network. We show that these optimal quantum mining strategies have a negligible effect on the 51% attack threshold. The novelty of our work is the inclusion of the Aggressive Quantum Mining Strategy and the realistic approach of allowing the quantum miners to restart their search if their measurements do not yield a valid block when determining the optimal quantum mining strategies. Our result is important for evaluating quantum-mining threats on cryptocurrencies based on Proof-of-Work, e.g. Bitcoin
Abstract This paper explores the impact of quantum computing on the efficiency of blockchain mining, focusing on three cryptographic hash algorithms: SHA-256, BLAKE2b, and Keccak-256. Through simulations, we compare the performance of these algorithms in both classical and quantum environments, with a specific emphasis on the effects of increasing qubit counts. The study also examines the potential of Grover’s algorithm to accelerate mining times and improve overall mining efficiency. Our findings indicate significant reductions in mining times when using quantum computing, particularly with the application of Grover’s algorithm. While classical mining techniques are widely used today, the introduction of quantum computing presents both opportunities and challenges for the future of blockchain technology. This paper provides valuable insights into how quantum advancements could reshape blockchain mining, highlighting the need for continued exploration of quantum-resistant cryptographic methods.
Quantum computing is one of the shifts in paradigm with the potential to break most cryptographic systems. Quantum computers will run complex problems with superposition and entanglement much faster exponentially than classical computers. This poses a solid threat to cryptographic security by efficiently factoring large integers using quantum algorithms like Shor's algorithm, possibly breaking public-key cryptosystems like RSA and ECC. Moreover, Grover's algorithm speeds up symmetric key algorithms brute-force search. This paper discusses these vulnerabilities, surveys the development and feasibility of quantum-resistant algorithms, and addresses practical challenges from their implementations. Finally, it points out standardization processes underway and computation paths for further research. Our findings underline the need to urgently migrate to quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions for robust security in the presence of quantum computing.