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International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Quantum Signature without Classical Private Key

Mingcan Chen, Xiangjun Xin, Dongsheng Chen

Published Feb 1, 2022• 7 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10773-022-05025-w

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operators, a new quantum signature scheme is proposed. In our scheme, the signer's private key is generated by a trusted private key generator (PKG), while the identity information of the signer is used as the corresponding public key. Both of the private key and public key of the signer are classical bit strings, which can be easily stored and reused. Given a quantum signature, anyone can verify the validity of the quantum signature with the signer's identity. Therefore, our scheme is a public-key quantum signature without a digital certificate, which has the merits of an identity-based cryptosystem and can simplify the key management of the quantum signature system. On the other hand, our scheme need not use any quantum swap test during the signature verification phase. Furthermore, by the signature proof, our scheme can arbitrate the potential disputation of losing quantum signature, which cannot be arbitrated in most of the quantum signature schemes. So our scheme has the property of strong non-repudiation. It also has the security properties of information-theoretic security, unforgeability, etc. Our scheme can achieve a high efficiency of 70%. Therefore, our quantum signature scheme is more secure, practicable, and efficient than the similar schemes.
Abstract Falcon is a compact and efficient post-quantum signature scheme based on the NTRU lattice, but it follows the conventional public-key setting and does not directly support identity-to-key binding or signer traceability. In this paper, we propose IBFS, a PKG-managed and authenticated identity-binding signature framework over Falcon. In IBFS, a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) derives Falcon-compatible NTRU signing keys for registered users and maintains an authenticated binding between user identities and public keys. Unlike pure identity-based signatures, verification uses the signer’s identity together with an authenticated public key validated against a PKG-managed repository. This framework targets managed deployments with a trusted registration backend, including IoT and edge systems. The device-side evaluation concerns signature verification on an Android smartphone in a server-assisted setting; it does not establish operation of the complete framework on tightly constrained IoT devices. The construction retains the efficiency advantages of Falcon-style signing, including compact short-vector signatures and FFT-accelerated arithmetic, and further introduces a deterministic, PKG-resolvable identity tag that enables resolution of verified signatures to registered identities. We establish correctness and identity-resolution consistency under authentic repository bindings, without claiming non-frameability against the PKG. On the security side, we make the trust boundaries of the managed setting explicit, including key escrow, insider compromise, malicious tracing, and repository integrity. We then give a security argument in the classical Random Oracle Model that reduces the unforgeability of the signing layer, with a concrete advantage bound, to the decisional NTRU and inhomogeneous NTRU short-preimage (NTRU-ISIS) assumptions, together with the PRF security of the key-derivation function. The analysis is restricted to classical adversaries and does not constitute a Quantum Random Oracle Model proof. We therefore position IBFS as a classical-ROM construction whose security relies on these NTRU-based assumptions and on the authenticity of the PKG-managed binding repository.